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THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND
THE HEBREW PROPHETS

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THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HEBREW PROPHETS

BY

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FOREWORD BY

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HON. DIRECTOR THE TAVISTOCK CLINIC.

PREFACE BY

THE REV. W. R. MATTHEWS, M.A., D.D.

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TO
THE SECRETARY AND HELPERS
OF
THE TAVISTOCK CLINIC

FOREWORD

By H. CRICHTON MILLER, M.A., M.D.,
Hon. Director, Tavistock Clinic.

MAJOR Povah has given me the opportunity of reading this book in typescript. He asks me to write a foreword and this I do most gladly. A few months ago I thought I knew a little about the Old Testament. This belief was shaken by a modest course of Dr. Moffat's translation. Now Major Povah makes me feel that I know considerably less than nothing. This is salutary for me, no doubt. But as a compensation I cling to the belief that I know something of modern Psychology. This being so, I venture to say that our author's views are thoroughly sound in so far as they involve psychological considerations. He has read widely—as will be obvious to every reader. He has also assimilated thoroughly, and that cannot be said of all who have read widely. Furthermore he has brought to the study a mind so open and a judgment so acute, that he has escaped the all too frequent fate of becoming the blind partisan of one school or another.

It is this psychological equipment which Major Povah utilises in his study of the Old Testament.

No wonder he finds it a rewarding subject. Mythology, primitive religions, racial culture have been subjected to treatment of this sort with very fruitful results. But the Bible has been largely exempt and the Old Testament entirely so. Yet I have always believed it to be essential to study the New Testament in the light of its Judaic background and origin. If this be so, it is clearly necessary to apply this psychological approach to the Old Testament as well as to the New Testament.

This volume is certain to cause offence, and that for the simple reason that it will present an unwelcome challenge to many readers; a challenge similar to that which was presented many years ago by the students of Higher Criticism, and which still continues to prove a stumbling block to a certain number. Criticism challenged faith in the sense that it made harder a simple indiscriminating faith in divine omnipotence and divine purpose. It challenged the student to take a wider view; to enlarge his horizon so as to embrace a God who worked through human channels.

But the present challenge is likely to be unwelcome for more personal reasons. The interpretation that Major Povah offers, reveals the subjective in what was previously regarded as merely objective. In other words what before was historical and outside ourselves, turns out to be of ever-recurring human interest and to involve problems that are our own. Elijah's retreat to the wilderness and then to the cave on the mount of God was previously an episode in the life of one of God's servants. But treated

from the point of view of analytical psychology it presents an intensely personal problem ; a problem that demands solution in a man's own soul ; and withal a problem that has hitherto eluded the theologian.

There is another service which this study renders. It helps to break down still further that dangerous isolation of the Bible which modern criticism condemns. The study of history, anthropology, archæology and contemporary languages has made us realise the numberless points of contact between the Bible and the world of its day. Here is another strong link. The symbolism which the psychologist of to-day recognises in many an Old Testament legend, is often the same symbolism that he has met in Greek, Persian, or Egyptian mythology. And from this too great gain should accrue.

I hope that this book will find its way, not only into the libraries of theologians, but also into the hands of many general readers, who are, like myself, unversed in theology yet capable of appreciating a subject so vital and rewarding.

PREFACE

By REV. W. R. MATTHEWS, M.A., D.D.,
Dean of King's College, London

I GLADLY write a few words of introduction to this book by my friend and former pupil. Apart from its intrinsic interest, it has some of the qualities of a pioneering work. No one, of course, could complain that the new psychologists have left us without attempts to enlighten us on the subject of religion ; on the contrary their excursions into this field have been numerous and exciting. But we may perhaps lament that they should have evoked in the ordinary theological reader admiration for their courage rather than respect for their knowledge of the facts of religious history. The originality of Major Povah's book lies in this—that it is an essay on the psychology of the Hebrew Prophets by one who really knows something about the Prophets and can base his analysis upon a foundation of genuine Biblical scholarship.

The amazing nonsense which has been written by great psychological authorities on the subject of religion has unfortunately led many intelligent people to conclude that their psychology is as unscientific as their history. This would be a mistake.

There can be little doubt that Major Povah is right in believing that the main conclusions of the psycho-analytic school are sound, though there are points in which the author of this book speaks with greater confidence than I should venture to feel. The new psychology will certainly profoundly affect the psychology of religion, though it is not yet clear what the final result of the new method will be.

At least we may say that the study of the psychology of religion has become much more exciting and more coherent. What was formerly a series of rather disjointed remarks about various aspects of the religious life or comments upon doubtful statistics based on misleading questionnaires, has now become transformed into an inquiry which clearly is concerned with the very foundations of our lives. It is the normal result of new knowledge or new points of view to disturb accepted beliefs. We need not be surprised therefore that in the hands of many exponents the New Psychology has been used as a weapon of offence against religion. We may take comfort from the thought that every scientific advance has been regarded by the faint-hearted as subversive of faith. Biblical criticism, evolution, the comparative study of religions, have all been in the long run the means of bringing religious faith more into harmony with reality and of deepening our conception of God and His relation with men. The same result may be expected from the scientific study of human experience. As Major Povah well brings out in this book, the source of much evil and weakness in the individual is failure to face reality,

cowardice which builds a fantasy wherein to shelter from the hard tasks which life offers. Much the same is true of Theology. The position of Theology at the present day is intensely exciting to one who strives to look ahead. New light is coming on the nature of God. It is plain that we shall move towards a more widespread negation or towards a surer confidence and deeper insight unto the Divine.

The study of religious experience from the standpoint of modern psychology by men who have a first-hand knowledge of religion as a fact of life and of the historical records of the formative periods in religious development is an urgent need to-day. The attempt to bring together the psychologist and the Old Testament scholar is of great interest. No one would claim that Major Povah's conclusions are all certain. Much still remains to be done on the lines of this book. It can at least claim to be a serious contribution to a living problem and to be written under the guidance of those two loyalties which in the end are not two but one—to the truth of science and to the vision of God.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
CHAPTER I - - - - -	I
The New Psychology—The unconscious mind—Rationalisation—Repression—The Buried Complex—Projection.	
CHAPTER II - - - - -	10
The primary unconscious and the secondary unconscious—Man's psychic energy is instinctive—The libido—Man can sublimate part of his libido on condition that he (a) recognises his instincts and (b) has a sufficiently high ideal—The Christian ideal and its critics.	
CHAPTER III - - - - -	19
The phases of a normal boy's development—Regression—Nirvana or "the flesh pots of Egypt"—Peter Pan—Magic—Jung's view of Christianity—Freud's theory of the primitive father—Tansley's theory of the moral sense—The "stumbling block" in Christianity.	
CHAPTER IV - - - - -	42
The Hebrew scriptures—A glance at Old Testament history in the light of modern scholarship—The J school—The E school—The D school—The P school—The compilation, expansion, etc., of books such as Amos or Hosea—The Septuagint—Hebrew writers (a) do not employ footnotes, (b) seldom use indirect speech, (c) make their characters think aloud.	
CHAPTER V - - - - -	61
The wind and the dust—Life and death—The abnormal and the normal—God and man—The destructive wind—Chance—The abnormal and the normal in psychology—Second Sight—Dreams—"Seeing red."	
CHAPTER VI - - - - -	68
Early Hebrew psychology—Man an animated body—His soul simply his instincts—A temporary ego, but sense of personality weak—The intellect—Life impossible without a body—Early Yahweh religion not concerned with a future life.	
CHAPTER VII - - - - -	78
JE's theology and Freud's theory of the primitive father—JE's view of history—Meaning of name Yahweh—JE's view of the instincts; life is good—JE's psychology of inspiration.	
CHAPTER VIII - - - - -	93
The early prophets and Tansley's theory of the moral sense—Micaiah-ben-Yimlah—Elijah on Horeb—Amos and the separation of the rôle of preacher of justice from that of "Mad Mullah."	
CHAPTER IX - - - - -	107
Hosea and Gomer—The sex and parental instincts—Yahweh's relation to Israel—Difference between Old Testament and Homer—Transcendence of Yahweh—Hosea's favourite word—Hosea and the new psychology.	

	PAGE
CHAPTER X - - - - -	123
The prophets and the unconscious mind—Myths and dreams—Dream symbolism—Isaiah's call to become a prophet—Isaiah's hopes; their connection both with mythical ideas and also with history.	
CHAPTER XI - - - - -	140
The book of Deuteronomy—Its use of suggestion and auto-suggestion—Its effort to reduce the moral idea to a code—Jeremiah—His psychology—His relation to history—The religion of the prophets is not dope.	
CHAPTER XII - - - - -	157
Ezekiel—His call in Babylonia—His appeal to history—His insistence on free-will—His view of the false prophets—False prophecy is true prophecy perverted—False prophets think they are true prophets—Deutero-Isaiah—His appeal to history—Transcendence and Immanence of Yahweh—Yahweh's <i>Dabar</i> (word)—Why the prophets predicted—Comparison of prophet to scientist—Deutero-Isaiah proclaims a word-religion—Uniqueness of this world-religion—Meaning of word <i>Torah</i> in the prophets.	
CHAPTER XIII - - - - -	179
Contrast between psychology of Haggai and that of "Judges"—Holiness—Growth of sense of importance of the individual to Yahweh—Growth of thought of the resurrection—Difference between the Hebrew thought of the resurrection and the Greek thought of immortality—Apocalyptic projects the spiritual into the shy—Christianity replaces the dualistic view of man by the sacramental view.	
CHAPTER XIV - - - - -	191
The New Testament cannot be properly studied apart from the Old—The axioms of prophecy—The uniqueness of the Hebrew idea of <i>Chokmah</i> , wisdom—The New Psychology challenges, not only belief, but also unbelief.	
CHAPTER XV - - - - -	196
The prophets' mental picture of Sin is connected, not with Adam, Eve and the Serpent, but with the "Great Refusal" of Israel in the days of Moses—The "Servant of Yahweh" as Psycho-therapist.	

ABBREVIATIONS

E. R. E. = Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.

Z. A. W. = Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft.

NOTE

In Biblical references quoted in the *foot-notes*, passages of late date are sometimes given along with passages of early date, if they illustrate an idea which was present at an early date.

CHAPTER I

THE New Psychology differs from the Old in that it lays stress on what is called the unconscious mind.

Objections have been raised against the New Psychology, both on the ground that the term unconscious mind is self-contradictory, and also on the ground that the New Psychologists have built up their theories on their experience of psychoneurotic patients, that is to say, of abnormal persons.

“ Why ”—it is asked—“ should the ordinary, normal, man worry his head with such paradoxical notions as that of the unconscious mind, or become morbidly introspective by endeavouring to find processes, akin to those which obsess the madman, at work in his own mind ? ”

To this it must be replied that the hypothesis of the existence of the unconscious mind is merely a hypothesis put forward to account for certain facts ; that it was these facts which led psychologists to postulate the existence of the unconscious mind ; that these facts would be no more affected by the abandonment of the hypothesis of the unconscious mind and the substitution for it of another hypothesis, than the trajectory of a given shell, fired under given atmospheric conditions, at a given elevation and a given muzzle velocity, from a given

gun, would be—or has been—affected by the substitution of the views of Einstein for those of Newton by the experts in the School of Gunnery ; that, though it was pathological cases which first drew the attention of psychologists to the class of facts under consideration, yet, now that these facts have been pointed out, it is within the power of any intelligent and candid person, however normal, to demonstrate for himself the reality of that unknown x which—whether fortunately or unfortunately—the New Psychologists call the unconscious mind ; and that, unless both the Christian preacher and the Greek philosopher are entirely wrong in urging men to know themselves, a man owes it to himself—and his neighbours—to face that unknown x in his own mind, to which the New Psychology is calling his attention.

What then is meant by the unconscious mind ? It is perhaps desirable to point out that it is not to be confounded with the foreconscious.

The term foreconscious is used in connection with all those memories which, although not at the moment in the field of consciousness, can be recalled to consciousness at will—either immediately (as in the case of the multiplication table) or after “ refreshing the memory ” (as in the case of the dates of the Kings of England).

But the term unconscious is used in connection with processes in a man’s mind, of which he is quite unaware, and in connection with experiences which he has not only forgotten (as a normal man forgets the date of Henry VII), but is also prevented by a resistance within his mind from remembering without assistance of quite a different kind from that furnished by repeating “ William the Conqueror, 1066 ; William II, 1087, etc.”

“ But,” it may be asked, “ if no one is conscious of the contents of his unconscious mind, what grounds has anyone for inferring the reality of the unconscious mind ? ”

The ordinary man can, perhaps, most easily become aware of the reality and the subtlety of what is called the unconscious mind, by a candid consideration of such questions as—“ What sort of things do I forget most easily ? ” “ Why does this talk about an unconscious mind irritate me ? ”

It is fairly obvious that our opponent’s real reason for doing a thing or holding an opinion is not always the reason which he thinks is the real reason. The vehemence with which he maintains his political or religious views against our own, is often inversely proportional to his real knowledge of the matter about which he is arguing. If he belongs to the Labour Party, it is often, not, as he imagines, because he thinks that the Labour Party’s policy is good for the country, but because he envies the rich. If he belongs to the Conservative Party, it is often, not, as he imagines, because he thinks that the Conservative Party’s policy is good for the country, but because he prefers to give money “ in charity ” rather than in wages.

We can hardly fail to recognise that the reasons advanced by our opponents for holding their opinions—yes, the reasons which our opponents really believe to be the true reasons—are not always reasons at all, but what are called rationalisations.

Rationalisation is “ the inventing of a reason for an attitude or action, the motive of which is not recognised ” (Baudouin).

Very little study of one’s neighbours is required to see that rationalisation plays an enormous part in men’s lives. A man does not like to admit to

himself that he is, for instance, a miser, a petty tyrant, or a bad workman. It is pleasanter to have recourse unconsciously to that form of rationalisation which is known as a "defence reaction"—a rationalisation which enables a man both to have his cake and to eat it too, both to retain his good opinion of himself and also to indulge his hoarding propensity, his petty tyranny, or his slackness. Tansley in *The New Psychology* says that a defence reaction is "often the homage which vice pays to virtue a miser will excuse his parsimony on the ground that he has to provide adequately for his children, an employer or foreman will excuse the petty tyranny which he shows towards his workpeople on the ground that they are unruly and that discipline must be maintained, whereas the real motive is the love of exercising power over others. 'A bad workman,' as the Proverb says, 'finds fault with his tools,' and he does it, of course, to conceal the incompetence which he will not recognise."

We have, then, caught a glimpse, as it were, of our neighbour's unconscious mind, and detected him unconsciously manufacturing reasons to mislead himself and forgetting the thing which it is embarrassing to consciousness to remember.

But, having proceeded as far as this, can one stop and refuse to proceed further? Does not the suspicion dawn on oneself that even that highly rational person, oneself, may not be immune from rationalising, from forgetting what it is inconvenient to remember?

Now, it is clear that if one's rationalisation is to be successful in enabling one to indulge in conduct which one repudiates in other people, without losing one's good opinion of oneself, it is absolutely necessary that the real reason, the true motive of one's

conduct, should be forgotten. Indeed rationalisation, seeing it does not imply conscious insincerity—for it is the “inventing of a reason for an attitude or action the motive of which is *not* recognised”—is impossible unless and until the real reason for one’s attitude, or the real motive for the conduct “defended” by the defence reaction, has been forgotten.

Moreover, it is clear to anyone who is candid with himself, that we all have a tendency at any rate to forget what it is inconvenient to remember. It is, for instance, easy to forget a kindness shown one by a man one does not like, or the good qualities of a political or theological opponent. It is easier to forget to pay a bill than to render one—to forget to go to the dentist than to go to the theatre.

“But”—it may be asked—“is it always easy, or indeed possible, to forget what it is inconvenient to remember? Is not one sometimes haunted by an anxiety, the ‘inconvenience’ of which is unfortunately equalled by the difficulty—indeed, the impossibility—of forgetting it?”

It is obvious that one may be haunted, obsessed, by an anxiety such as this. But why? Is not the obsessing anxiety itself a defence reaction to save one from facing a certainty? Is not the anxiety lest one may die to-morrow, a defence reaction against facing the thought that one is certainly going to die some day or other?

Cowards die many times before their deaths;
The valiant never taste of death but once.
Of all the wonders that I yet have heard,
It seems to me most strange that men should fear;
Seeing that death, a necessary end,
Will come when it will come.

[*Julius Cæsar.*]

Cæsar, having faced the thought that he is certainly going to die some day or other, is not anxious as to whether he may happen to die on the Ides of March. For anxiety is associated with uncertainty, not with certainty. The very anxiety of the "cowards" as to whether they will die to-morrow, seeing that it is always *uncertain* whether they will or not, is a defence reaction which saves them from facing the thought that they will *certainly* die some day—whether to-morrow or some other day. Their inability to forget their anxiety as to whether they *may* die to-morrow, is due to the success with which they have forgotten that they *must* die some day. What is wrong with them is in reality, not their anxiety, which is only a symptom of their disease, but their repudiation of the thought of death. Being unconscious of the source of their anxiety, they cannot control it; for a man can only control himself in so far as he knows himself. They can only be cured by becoming conscious of the whole mental process of which the anxiety is merely a symptom. But if they can be helped to face the unpleasant thought of the certainty of death, they will become conscious of the whole mental process and be able to control their anxiety.

We note then that forgetting is an unconscious process, that one cannot forget by trying to forget, and that to try to forget is a sure way of remembering. So the rationaliser is not a conscious hypocrite; he deceives himself more successfully than he deceives anyone else—for he has forgotten his true motive. The thought of the true motive is bottled up in the unconscious mind—or, to use the language of modern psychology, repressed.

"Repression is the keeping from consciousness of

mental processes that would be painful to it.”¹ It is to be noted that repression is in the main an unconscious process ; it is unconsciously rather than consciously that a man represses. Repression of a thought follows hard on, but is not equivalent to, the conscious refusal to face it. The conscious refusal to face an inconvenient thought brings into action a kind of mental machinery which works automatically, unconsciously, to protect consciousness from the intrusion of the inconvenient thought. This mental machinery dams up, as it were, the channel by which the inconvenient thought might emerge directly into consciousness. The inconvenient thought is thus repressed into the unconscious mind.

But the unconscious mind resembles a river rather than a stagnant pond. It is not static but dynamic. Far from being dead, the repressed thought is thoroughly alive “and kicking.” It is “dissociated” from consciousness, cut off from the man’s control. But it becomes the centre of a parasitical system within the man’s mind—a system which he cannot control, for he is ignorant of its existence—a system which squanders without his knowledge in unconscious repression the psychic energy which he needs to make a success of life.

This parasitical system, moreover, which is commonly called a complex, is as sensitive as a sensitive abscess.

It cannot bear to be “touched up.” “All the feelings and ideas carried in association with it, have to be ‘shut off’ or ‘dissociated’ from consciousness ; a ‘knot’ in the strands of the emotional being is created, by means of which fresh entangle-

¹See “Glossary” at end of English translation of *Studies in Psycho-Analysis*. Baudouin.

ments are ever being formed. Thus the need for Repression leads to the creation of Complexes, and in their turn the Complexes give rise to ever fresh Repression. The commonest simple example is the 'forgetting' of a name because that name is associated (in the Unconscious) with some painful psychic experience which has given rise to a Complex." [*Psycho-Analysis—A Brief Account of the Freudian Theory.* Barbara Low.]

But a thought which has been repressed by the building of, as it were, a dam across its normal channel of emerging into consciousness, is not under the control of the will. It is like a river which has been dammed up and overflows its banks. It breaks out into consciousness indirectly. And the form in which it appears in consciousness is a disguised form.

For instance, a man consciously refuses to face the thought of an unpleasant duty. At once the unconscious process called repression begins. The thought of his duty is forgotten, but is still working in the unconscious mind, so that the man is ill at ease. He does not know why he is ill at ease, but his conduct reveals an effort to regain his mental equilibrium by what is called compensation. The man who sweats his employés, may give away much money in "charity." The man whose business methods are dishonest, may make his religion a torture to himself. The woman who has repressed the parental instinct, may describe small objects as "darlings." The man who has repressed the thought of religion, may become the slave of superstition.

But repression is not the only way in which one can be protected from thoughts damaging to self-esteem. Projection serves the same purpose. Tansley says in *The New Psychology*—

"Projection consists in attributing parts of the mental content to outside entities. In projection, as in repression, the mind refuses to acknowledge part of its own contents, but instead of refusing attention to the existence of the content in question, it recognizes the existence, while denying the ownership. The ownership of the content in question is too painful or too sublime to be compassed within the limits of its weakness, and an external substitute is sought, whether as scapegoat or support."

Just as one may project one's own fancies on to the shadow on the wall, the coals on the fire, or the sunset sky—so one may project one's hopes or fears on to chance events and find them reinforced by omens of success or disaster ; just as one may project one's repressed self-pity on to a dog and say "poor old dog"—so one may project the responsibility for one's bad temper on to its victim, or one's unconscious indignation against oneself on to one's friends. One may work off one's dislike of a quality one does not wish to recognise in one's self, by abusing it in other people ; or seek to improve the visibility, impaired by the presence of a rafter in one's own eye, by offering to extract a bit of grit from one's neighbour's eye.

Enough has perhaps been said to show that, whether the term unconscious mind be well chosen or not, it stands for something which really affects thought and conduct, and that the resentment displayed by some towards the "New Psychology," may conceivably be due, less to scientific objections, than to the processes called Repression, Rationalisation and Projection.

CHAPTER II

WE have so far considered the term “unconscious” as representing that region of the mind into which repudiated thoughts and “forgotten memories” are repressed, and we have seen that this region of the mind resembles, not a stagnant pond, but a river which has been dammed up. We have now to consider the term “unconscious” as representing that vast hinterland behind consciousness—that unexplored continent whence arise the rivers which repression dams up. If there were no flow, there could be no overflow; if there were no energy “welling up” from behind consciousness, there would be no need of repression. So the unconscious we considered in the last chapter—the unconscious “developed as the result of repression”—is secondary to the unconscious we have now to consider—the unconscious postulated as the source of psychic energy.

Tansley in *The New Psychology* says that the “*primary* unconscious is quite distinct from the FREUDIAN¹ unconscious, which is secondary and developed as the result of repression.” Again—“Repressed complexes constitute what we called . . . the secondary or FREUDIAN unconscious, as

¹So called because of Professor Freud’s discoveries and researches regarding repression.

distinct from the unexplored primary unconscious which is the centre and core of our psychic being." Again—"To the primary unconscious . . . there are no barriers. This region of the mind is rather unexplored . . . than shut off from the rest of the mind." This primary unconscious contains racial elements—it contains man's psychic inheritance from all his ancestors.¹ And—to quote Tansley again—"The primary unconscious is to be regarded . . . as the basis of the entire mind, as the centre or core of the psychic organism. The mental elements corresponding with the great primitive instincts are originally seated in this region, and from it the psychic energy . . . is continually welling up."

Now, according to Tansley "it is to his instincts that he (man) owes the primary driving forces of his psychic being"; for "all human driving force is instinctive." It is inherited instincts which "form the groundwork of the whole structure of the mind, and upon them are built up all the complex elaborations which characterize the manifold activities of man." Again—"Man cannot create the internal forces which impel him to action any more than he can create the forces of external nature. In either case he can only use them, diverting one into a new channel, letting a second have full play in its own, skilfully combining a third and fourth."

Now, whether all the New Psychologists entirely agree with all the above extracts from Tansley's *New Psychology* or not, it seems that they all accept the view that "it is to his instincts that man owes

¹Compare—"As the racial unconscious represents the sum total of the past experiences of the race, it must necessarily contain elements both egocentric and altruistic." (*The New Psychology and the Preacher*, chapter 2. Crichton Miller.)

the primary driving forces of his psychic being." It is at any rate unnecessary, for our present purpose, to discuss the matter further. For it is clear, as we shall see in chapter 6, that this view is the view of the Old Testament writers.¹

We will assume, then, that a man's psychic energy, whether he directs it for good or for evil, is just the urge or drive of his primitive instincts. Call it what you will—the *élan vital*, the life force, the libido²—this craving of the primitive instincts for expression is the driving force of every man's conduct, good or evil.

The libido resembles a dynamo which is constantly at work, or a river of which the waters are constantly renewed. So long as he lives, a man can no more stop the drive of his primitive instincts than he can stop the Great Lakes at Niagara.

But just as man, though he cannot stop the Great Lakes at Niagara, can harness part of their energy and employ it in channels selected by himself—nay, transform part of the water power into electric power, lift it up (Latin *sublimo*) on to overhead wires, and use it to light his cities and to drive his

¹To accept this much of Tansley's views is neither to deny the existence of God or of an ego, nor is it to belittle the power of an ideal or of the influence of one man on another. For, if it were not for the psychic energy derived from the drive of the primitive instincts, the ego would have no energy to respond to the call of God or the influence of other men—no energy to direct towards the attainment of an ideal. Discussing the conceivable sources of the "religious dynamic," Crichton Miller, in *The New Psychology and the Preacher*, chapter 2, says:—"The psychological investigator will probably find that the religious dynamic arises partly from social influences, partly from inherent qualities in the individual, and partly from a third spring, which he will call the racial unconscious, the *WELT-GEIST*, the *GREAT UNKNOWN* or *GOD*, according to his conscious outlook or unconscious prejudice."

²Latin "desire," "longing."

trains ; so man, though he cannot rid himself of his primitive instincts, can to some extent sublimate¹ them, i.e., direct them into channels other than their natural, primitive, channels. It is in possessing the power to sublimate, that man differs from all other animals. It is by means of sublimation that he has emerged from savagery. Had there been no sublimation of primitive instinct, there would be no civilisation.

To-day civilisation continues through man's employment of the libido both along primitive channels and also along non-primitive channels.

Along primitive channels—for if all the members of a community were entirely to sublimate the instinct of self-preservation, the community would become extinct in a day—if they were all entirely to sublimate the sex instinct, the community would become extinct in one generation. Along non-primitive channels—for without sublimation of primitive instincts there would be no security, no credit, no honesty in business, no art, no chance for the weaker members of the community.

Similarly, a civilised individual employs his libido both along primitive channels and also along non-primitive channels. Along primitive channels—for, though he may entirely sublimate a particular instinct (i.e., a particular manifestation of the libido) such as the sex instinct, he cannot entirely sublimate the whole libido (i.e., all the instincts) ; though man does not live by bread alone, he cannot continue to live on this earth without bread. Along non-primitive channels—for, if a man living in a civilised

¹Sublimation (from Latin "sublimo," "to life up on high," "raise," "elevate") is "the employment of energy belonging to a primitive instinct in a new and derived, i.e., non-primitive, channel." [Tansley.]

community were never to sublimate his primitive instincts, he would spend his whole life in the gaol or the mad-house.

Now sublimation involves both (a) recognition of instinct and also (b) conflict.

(a) It involves recognition of instinct. A man cannot sublimate an instinct which he does not recognise and know for what it is ; it is only in so far as he knows himself, that he can control himself.

The brave man is not the man who does not know what fear is. The man who does not know what fear is, cannot be a brave man. He is one who has refused to face the unpleasant fact that he is afraid—who has repudiated and is now repressing the instinct of self-preservation, i.e., forgetting that he has an instinct of self-preservation. Such a man may do foolhardy things to persuade himself that he is not afraid. But he ends with a nervous breakdown.

The man who does not know what fear is, does not direct the instinct of self-preservation along its primitive channel ; for he does not run away. Nor does he sublimate the instinct, i.e., direct it along a derived, non-primitive, channel such as the fear of dishonour (for he will not face the thought of that) or the fear of his God (for the self-sufficiency, implied in his repudiation of the conditions under which he exists, is incompatible with the fear of his Creator).

The instinct is neither employed in its primitive channel nor sublimated. But just as a dam which prevents a river from flowing along its normal channel, will, unless a new channel be provided, be the cause of its overflowing its banks ; so the mental machinery of repression, seeing that it prevents the instinct from working along its primitive channel and provides no new, non-primitive, channel for it,

causes the instinct to overflow its banks, as it were—to break out in a disguised form—to obtain some sort of gratification in what is called a perversion. So the man who does not know what fear is, may—without conscious malingering—suffer from shell shock a day or two before the battle.¹

Instinct is indestructible. If it is neither employed in its primitive channel nor sublimated, it becomes perverted. And an instinct can only be sublimated when it is faced and accepted.

A man or woman may, for instance, entirely sublimate the sex or creative instinct in creative work of one kind or another, but only on condition that he or she both has a sufficiently high ideal and also recognises the sex-instinct for what it is. But a man or a woman who regards the sex-instinct as evil, as unworthy of himself or herself, cannot possibly sublimate it. Such an one, by refusing to face the disturbing fact that he or she has a sex-instinct, may repudiate the sex-instinct; but such repudiation leads merely to the repression of the instinct, to its breaking out as a perversion, and obtaining gratification in a disguised form such as prudery, gossip, or whipping oneself.

It is by failing to realise that the sublimation of an instinct depends upon the recognition and acceptance of its existence, that many "religious" persons, combining high ideals with a repudiation of the conditions to which their Creator has subjected them, break down, become psycho-neurotics, and provide arguments for such of the New Psychologists as are hostile to Christianity.

(b) But sublimation also involves conflict; and the higher the ideal towards which the

¹Thereby escaping both (a) the battle and (b) the facing of the thought that he is afraid of the battle.

libido is directed, the intenser the conflict will be.

Now it is admitted by most people that the ideal presented by Christianity—the religion of the Cross and Resurrection—is the highest ideal which has ever been presented to men. Most people, whether or not they personally appreciate the constant substitution of a sword for peace, which Christianity occasions in the psychic world, are ready to acknowledge that the unique height of its ideal is a merit in Christianity.

But some of the New Psychologists are anti-Christian—not merely non-Christian, but also anti-Christian. They proclaim a new conflict between science and Christianity—a conflict which is concerned, not only with the possibility of believing, but also—and indeed chiefly—with the desirability of believing. It is with no wistful regret that they regard Christianity; they do not wish that it were possible for them to believe in it. On the contrary they look upon it as—at the present stage of evolution at any rate—one of the greatest obstacles to human happiness and progress, in that it confounds religion, without some comfort from which the weaker brethren find it hard to face the horrors of existence, with an impossible ethical ideal, which, it alleges, has actually been reached by one man. If only Christianity would content itself with administering comfort and abandon the administration of ethics, the world might even to-day “make use in some way of its form of thought, and especially of its great wisdom of life.”¹ If only the Church would content itself with the Christ of theology and abandon the Jesus of history, all might yet be well. Men may derive comfort from contemplating Christ in

¹*Psychology of the Unconscious*—Jung—English translation—page 45.

a stained glass window, and then return to face hard reality with a feeling of refreshment, similar to that which is induced by the hearing of beautiful music. But the Jesus of the gospels makes men uncomfortable, and, so long as the biblical scholars persist in declaring that he was a real man who really lived, it is difficult for men to rid themselves of the uncomfortable feeling that they are called upon to make life even more strenuous than it is already by accepting Him as their ideal towards which they must strive.

It is important to remember that it is not on the ground that the Christianity demands sublimation, that such of the New Psychologists as are anti-Christian, quarrel with Christianity. They admit that sublimation is essential—that without sublimation civilisation would cease to exist. Their quarrel is with the Christian ideal.

They hold that the Christian ideal is an impossible ideal, in that it calls for a too rapid and an unnatural sublimation of primitive instinct and involves too intense a conflict. So strenuous, they hold, is this conflict that the attempt to sublimate fails, and the conflict results, not in sublimation, but in repression. The Christian, they hold, fails to sublimate and only succeeds in repressing.¹ From which repression arise nervous breakdowns and all kinds of perversions.

Such distressing results would be avoided, they hold, by the abandonment of the ideal of Jesus in favour of a more "rational" standard of ethics.

¹The "diversion of the sexual libido from the sexual territory into associated functions is still taking place. Where this operation succeeds without injury to the adaptation of the individual it is called sublimation. Where the attempt does not succeed it is called repression." *Psychology of the Unconscious*, Jung. Page 83.

Hence (a) the idea of a transcendent moral ideal—a moral ideal which man does not invent but is bound to strive towards, (b) the idea of a transcendent God as author of this moral ideal, and (c) the lamentable perversity of the bulk of biblical critics in asserting that the gospel of Mark contains a fair amount of history, are barriers to human happiness and progress. It is the duty of all enlightened persons to aid in sweeping away these three barriers.¹ Thus man, freed from the bogies of the ages of superstition, will be able to sublimate his instincts in a rational manner in accordance with rational ideals, and will go forward on the path of civilisation, happiness, and “spiritual autonomy.”

¹Jung in *Psychology of the Unconscious* disposes of the third in a footnote. See note 41, page 273. E. Jones, in *A Psychoanalytic Study of the Holy Ghost*, seems either to place less confidence in the futility of those who are Biblical critics, or more confidence in the “suggestibility” of those who are not. “Whatever time may reveal about the historical personality of the Founder of Christianity, . . .” he writes.

CHAPTER III

WHAT then has the New Psychology to say regarding the Psychology of Religion?

All the New Psychologists lay stress on the influence on a man's idea of God, which is exercised by his relationship to his mother, his father, and his social group.

I. The child's libido—longing, yearning, desire—is at first directed towards his mother. For it is his mother who feeds him, comforts him, waits on him and supplies his every need. He demands everything of her and gives back nothing in return. For he has no sense of responsibility, regards all his "wants" as his "rights," and is unaware of any limit to his right to demand or to his mother's power to supply. So readily does his mother anticipate his needs that he is less conscious of dependence than of omnipotence. She is less the object of his worship than he is of hers; but she is his providence, and on all "special" occasions his "special providence," the picker up of the pieces when he knocks things over. He is the centre of the universe and she is his ever responsive environment. Never again will the child enjoy such a feeling of omnipotence as he enjoys in his mother's arms.

Moreover, the child's demands on his mother are in the main connected with his body—they are sensuous demands. When he feels hunger in his body,

his mother must feed him ; when he feels discomfort in his body, his mother must soothe him ; when he feels pain in his body, his mother must alleviate it. His mother is the gratifier of his desires, and his desires are mainly sensuous desires.

" The Old Ones themselves," says Kipling's Puck in *The Knife and Naked Chalk*, " cannot change men's mothers." The relationship of the child to his mother is nearly the same at every epoch of history, at every stage of civilisation.

II. But the relationship of the boy to his father—the second objective of his libido—was very different in primitive times from what it is in a good home in England to-day. In primitive times it was the father who decided whether a new-born baby should be brought up or allowed to die, and, even if the father decided to bring up the child, he could still put him to death later on—either to punish him or to conciliate a god. When the father had many wives and many children, he was the despotic chieftain rather than the head of the home. In any case, his power over his children was absolute, his will was law, and there was no appeal against his caprice. The primitive father did not come home from the office with chocolates in his pocket ; it was not he who spoiled the child or got him out of his scrapes. Thus the primitive boy's attitude towards the primitive father was an attitude of terror ; the primitive father was essentially the capricious father and the dreaded father. But he was strong and could do things. It was a fine thing to watch him coming home from hunting with the rewards of his prowess. Moreover, he got his way ; when he said to a boy—" Go "—it was inadvisable for the boy to argue the point. It must have been a thrilling and inspiring experience for the primitive

boy, at times when he had not been so unlucky as to annoy his father, to watch his father dealing with the brothers whose luck was out. And when the primitive father punched the boy's own head, the boy took it lying down, with less resentment than admiration, and then ran off and "imitated father" by punching the head of a smaller brother. For the boy did not want to be like his mother whose duty was to wait on him, but like his father on whom it was his duty to wait. The boy relied on his mother, but it was the dreaded and capricious father who, just because he was dreaded and capricious, was the object of the boy's admiration, what he wanted to be himself, in a word—what the primitive mother could never be—his ideal.

So, though one feels that the primitive mother was a pleasanter person than the primitive father, one must recognise that the primitive boy made a great advance when he successfully transferred his libido from his mother to his father; for he ceased to be his own god. Whereas at the mother phase he was the god and his mother the worshipper, at the father phase he was the worshipper and his father the god.

And whereas the primitive mother was the personification of security, of escape from the cruel "real world," of the gratification of bodily desires, of "special providence," of a power that gets one out of scrapes and can be trusted to "rouse" one "a little before the nuts work loose," the dreaded father was, both the personification of Terror and Caprice, and also the boy's ideal.

III. The next objective of a boy's libido is the boys of his group—in England to-day his school or his troop of scouts. At this stage the boy learns esprit de corps, and values above all things the good

opinion of the other members of his group. It is now that he discovers that he has ideas—they are not really original, for they are the ideas of the group—as to what constitutes “good form,” and as to what things “are not done.” At this stage in England to-day, the father may be regarded as somewhat “fossilised,” and the school or troop replaces him as the object of the boy’s admiration. But in primitive times under the patriarchal system the boy remained entirely under the authority of the father, did not venture to tell his father how much better “we do things nowadays,” and probably shrank even from entertaining the thought that his father was a bit out of date. Moreover, under the patriarchal system the primitive father stood for the group. However he expressed it, his motto was “L’état, c’est moi.” So in primitive times there was less distinction between the “father” phase and the “group” phase than there is to-day. The dreaded father, without ceasing to be the boy’s ideal and the personification of Terror and Caprice, became also the personification of the group.

IV. The next objective of the boy’s—or rather man’s—libido is his wife and family. He has now grown up and is no longer “merely an atom revolving in a rotary system,” but “himself the centre of a new system.”¹

So we see that the normal boy² passes through :—

- I. The “Mother attachment” phase,
- II. The “Father attachment” phase,
- III. The “group-attachment” phase,

¹Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, page 251—English translation.

²The “rotation of phases” is different in the normal girl. See *The New Psychology and the Preacher*, chapter 6. Crichton Miller.

into IV, the phase when the boy has become a man and the father of a family.

But it is not uncommon to meet with cases of arrested development, notably with cases of infantilism or "fixation" on the mother, i.e., arrest at the first phase.

For the whole mechanism of repression and rationalisation—the automatic, unconscious, processes which cause one to forget what it is inconvenient to remember, and furnish one with rationalisations to hide one's real motive from consciousness—indicates that everyone has "a tendency not only to look and to work forwards, but also to glance backwards to the pampering sweetness of childhood, to that glorious state of irresponsibility and security with which the protecting mother-care once surrounded him." [Jung—*Psychology of the Unconscious*, page 184—English translation.]¹

As an instance of such "regression" [Latin "regressio," "a going back," "return," "retiring," "retreat"] may be mentioned an incident which occurred during the South African war. A soldier, belonging to a column which had been surprised by a night attack, lost his head and was found rolling on the ground and calling for his mother.

Why did this man roll on the ground? To lie down is a rational means of avoiding bullets. So is digging a trench. But what security can any rational man hope to obtain by rolling on the ground—trying to roll himself into it? The man clearly was acting irrationally—he had lost his head and

¹Cf. Tansley, *The New Psychology*. "The power of repression depends upon the universal faculty of ignoring or forgetting what is unpleasant, and this, in its turn, upon the tendency of psychic energy, as of all energy, to be expended along the line of least resistance—pain, however slight, involving some friction and resistance."

been swept away by the impulses of his unconscious mind. But the question is—"Why did his unconscious mind urge him to try to roll himself into the ground?"

We may compare Jeremiah xx, 17 and 18. "So my mother should have been my grave, and her womb always great. Wherefore came I forth out of the womb to see labour and sorrow?"

Jeremiah was conscious of a yearning, not merely to return to the days when he was a baby, but to return further back still to the prenatal condition within the womb, where security was perfect, where trouble was unknown—a condition of omnipotence in that no want was unsatisfied, no desire ungratified.

Is the man's rolling on the ground—trying to roll himself into it—a symptom and symbol of his unconscious longing to escape from the horrors of existence by a return to the womb—a longing of which he was unconscious and which he was therefore unable to control, whereas Jeremiah faced himself, was conscious of the longing, and so succeeded in conquering it?

At any rate infantilism—"fixation" on the mother or rather at the "mother-phase"¹—is the desire either to escape from the horrors of existence or to enjoy complete sensual satisfaction—in other words to get rid of conflict and the sense of responsibility, either by eradicating the primitive instincts or by gratifying them completely.

¹"It is not the actual mother, although the actual mother, with the abnormal tenderness with which she sometimes pursues her child, even into adult years, may gravely injure it. . . . It is rather the mother imago." *Psychology of the Unconscious*, Jung. Page 184. "Neurotics cry out against their parents . . . reproaches which should really be directed against themselves. Reproach and hatred are always futile attempts to free one's self apparently from the parents, but in reality from one's own hindering longing for the parents." Page 237.

For Nirvana and "the flesh pots of Egypt" are merely alternative methods of avoiding the cross.

Freud, to whom the sensuous seems to be almost equivalent to the sexual, describes fixation upon the mother, in terms of the terrible myth of *Œdipus*, as the *Œdipus Complex*—defined by E. Jones as "the (usually unconscious) desire of a son to kill his father and possess his mother."

This view of Freud's is not accepted by all the New Psychologists. It is pointed out, for instance, in the Introduction to the English translation of Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious* that "Jung sees in the *Œdipus Complex* of Freud only a symbol for the childish desire towards the parents and for the conflict which this craving evokes." Jung himself, though he describes the backward yearning for childish things by the use of the word "incest," says on page 307, note 45, that he "gives to the word 'incest' more significance than properly belongs to the term. Just as libido is the onward driving force, so incest is in some manner the backward urge into childhood."

Many will doubt whether sexual language is at all appropriate to describe an infant's yearning for sensual gratification, or even a man's refusal to face life. However this may be, we are only concerned here to establish that—whatever language is used to describe it—there is a tendency in everyone to long for the complete gratification of all sensual desires, to refuse to face the real world and to long for an unreal world of one's own in which one is omnipotent—able to do anything one likes. In a word, everyone is a potential, if not an actual, Peter Pan.¹

¹See the admirable study of the "Peter Pan" Motif in *The New Psychology and the Preacher*, chapter 6. Crichton Miller.

Now a Peter Pan in real life can neither live in Kensington Gardens nor escape from all contact with cruel reality. The cruel world refuses to respond to his demand for omnipotence or to grant him the applause which is, no doubt, his due. What is poor Peter Pan to do when the world has thus shamefully failed to understand him? Why, give up this "wicked world" in favour of a beautiful world which he can make all for himself, a splendid world to which he can withdraw at any moment, where—should his captain blindly refuse to appreciate his unique cricketing ability—he can keep wicket to his own bowling—nay, command the Grand Fleet and several expeditionary forces and be Prime Minister all at once, and then round off his career by converting the heathen, dying as a martyr and attending his own funeral in Westminster Abbey. The "Never, never land" of Peter Pan is the world of phantasy, the magical world of dreams.

It must be remembered that not all phantasy is evil.¹ The boy, for instance, who wants to get a commission, would never work to pass the necessary examinations, if he were never encouraged by the phantasy of seeing himself as an officer. Nor would there be any hope for a nation if its young men were never to dream dreams, nor its old men to see visions. And we all "make way for the dreamer, the dreamer whose dreams come true."

"If you can dream—and not make dreams your master"—there is the point. There is a fundamental difference between the phantasy which gives birth to practical effort in the real world—such as the phantasy of bowling out the Australians, which leads a boy to bowl his best in the playground—and

¹For the antithesis of Peter Pan, see "*Cold Iron*" by Rudyard Kipling in "*Rewards and Fairies*."

the phantasy which gives birth to nothing but mental pictures—such as the phantasy of bowling out the Australians, which leads the boy to despise the playground and imagine that he will, without going through the mill like the common herd, be picked—as it were by magic—to play in a Test match.

Day dreaming of the latter kind and magic are alike protests against the real world, and Freud in *Totem and Taboo* has shown that magical thinking is dream thinking. There is a kind of omnipotence in dreams.¹ In a dream—whether one is asleep or

¹After discussing *imitative* magic (e.g., “Rain is produced by magic means, by imitating it, and perhaps also by imitating the clouds and storm which produce it. It looks as if they wanted to ‘play rain’”) and *contagious* magic (e.g., “Another method may be used to injure an enemy. You possess yourself of his hair, his nails, anything that he has discarded, or even a part of his clothing, and do something hostile to these things. This is just as effective as if you had dominated the person himself, and anything that you do to the things that belong to him must happen to him too”), Freud says: “Since similarity and contiguity are the two essential principles of the processes of association of ideas, it must be concluded that the dominance of associations of ideas really explains all the madness of the rules of magic. We can see how true Tylor’s quoted characteristic of magic: ‘mistaking an ideal connection for a real one,’ proves to be. The same may be said of Frazer’s idea, who has expressed it in almost the same terms: ‘men mistook the order of their ideas for the order of nature, and hence imagined that the control which they have, or seem to have, over their thoughts, permitted them to have a corresponding control over things.’ . . . But on closer consideration we must sustain the objection that the association theory of magic merely explains the paths that magic travels, and not its essential nature, that is, it does not explain the misunderstanding which bids it put psychological laws in place of natural ones. We are apparently in need here of a dynamic factor.” This dynamic factor Freud finds in primitive man’s wishes. “The motives which impel one to exercise magic are easily recognised; they are the wishes of men. We need only assume that primitive man had great confidence in the power of his wishes. At bottom everything which he accomplished by magic means must have been done solely because he wanted it. Thus in the beginning only his wish is accentuated.” Again—“The principle which controls magic . . . is ‘Omnipotence of thought.’” (*Totem and Taboo*—English translation—Chapter 3 (2).)

day dreaming—one can “ put a girdle round about the earth in forty minutes ”—nay, in a second—and magic the weaver’s head into the shape of a donkey’s ; one “ can call spirits from the vasty deep ” and employ them to supply one’s needs or magic one’s enemies. But if one can do this sort of thing in dreams, why not try to do it in the real world ?

This is just what the “ practical ” magician does. He endeavours to work the real world on the analogy of the dream world.

In dream thinking the principle of cause and effect, to which most people have some regard in the real world, is replaced by the principle of the association of ideas, and the effort to “ conquer nature by obeying her ” by the processes of mental imagery.

To think of an object—say a crown—is to have a mental picture of a crown ; the thought calls up, seems to create, the mental picture. To think of oneself being crowned Emperor of the earth, is to see oneself crowned Emperor of the earth ; the thought calls up the mental picture ; by thinking of oneself as Emperor of the earth one can make oneself Emperor of the earth in imagination.

Let us consider as an instance of magical practices, a method of producing rain. The idea of pouring out water is associated in the mind with the idea of rain. And if the mental picture of pouring out water can call up—or create—the mental picture of rain, why should not the act of pouring out real water in the real world produce—or create—real rain in the real world ? Reasoning thus, the magician in times of drought pours out water in order to make the heavens send rain.

The “ practical ” magician thus applies the principles of the dream world to the real world. His omnipotence is hampered, not by his principles, but

by the material on which he has to work. It is the real world which is the trouble, and the "practical" magician is a failure just because he is "practical." To attain "omnipotence" he must cease to be "practical" and get rid of the real world—see it as an illusion.

So we find that in India the strong tendency to magic which is shown in the Brahmanas, was replaced at a later date by the strong tendency to look on all that is, as Maya—illusion.

And he who can view all that is, as illusion, has returned to the omnipotence of infancy—or rather of the pre-natal condition!¹

The influence of infantilism on Indian thought, is obvious, but it is not only Indian thought that infantilism has influenced! It is only necessary to study the hymn-book to realise that infantilism has coloured much "popular religion" which has passed, and still passes, for Christianity. The function of God has been, and is, regarded by some who are called Christians, as similar to the functions of a mother nursing a baby which is never intended to grow up!

Infantilism has coloured—and still colours—religion; is it perhaps the sufficient cause and explanation of religion?

That it is so, is one of the theories of those of the New Psychologists who seek to "explain" Christianity without a transcendent God.

Thus Freud says—

¹"The latter blending, whether Pantheistic-philosophic or æsthetic, of the sentimental, cultured man with nature is, looked at retrospectively, a reblending with the mother, who was our primary object, and with whom we truly were once wholly one . . . the unity with the mother, illustrated by the confluence of subject and object." *Psychology of the Unconscious*, Jung. Page 198.

“ The almighty, just God and benevolent nature appear to us as a great sublimation of father and mother Religiousness leads biologically back to the long-continued helplessness and need of the offspring of man, who, when later he has recognised his real loneliness, and weakness against the great powers of life, feels his condition similar to that of childhood, and seeks to disavow this forlorn state by regressive renewal of the infantile protective powers.” (Quoted on page 330 of Jung’s *Psychology of the Unconscious*.)

And Jung says in *Psychology of the Unconscious*—

“ At the very first and in foremost position it was father and mother who were the objects of the childish love. They are unequalled and imperishable. Not many difficulties are needed in an adult’s life to cause these memories to reawaken and to become effectual. In religion the regressive reanimation of the father—and—mother imago is organised into a system.” (Page 53.)

In the above passages the father appears to be regarded as the protective rather than as the dreaded father, and infantilism as a “ fixation ” on the “ father-and-mother ” rather than on the mother alone. And it is clear that, in a civilised community at any rate, the father may be regarded as the trusted protector rather than as the dreaded father. But Peter Pan is quite unconcerned about the number of his protectors. He disregards personality in other people ; for he is utterly and perfectly self-centred. As long as he is protected, it is quite irrelevant who is the protector ; as long as someone listens to his talk about himself, it is quite irrelevant who is the listener ; if Wendy will not serve as his maternal imago (Latin “ imitation,” “ copy,” “ image,” “ likeness ”), somebody else will do equally well ;

for the only person with whom Peter Pan is in love, is himself. He is the complete Narcissus.

Now infantilism is clearly incompatible with progress, and Jung is impressed with the past services of religion on the ground that by means of it man has been able to sublimate the backward yearning for parental protection and take a step forward towards his "essential and highest ethical goal, moral autonomy." (Page 307, note 41.)

Again—"The original sin of incest weighs heavily for all time upon the human race. The strong and natural love which binds the child to the father, turns away in those years during which the humanity of the father would be all too plainly recognised, to the higher forms of the father, to the "Fathers" of the church, and to the Father God" (*Psychology of the Unconscious*, page 33.)²

Again—". . . "the idea of the masculine creative deity is a derivation . . . of the "Father image," and aims, above all, to replace the discarded infantile father transference in such a way that for the individual the passing from the narrow circle of the family into the wider circle of human society may be simpler or made easier." (Page 39.)

This sublimation of "the backward urge into childhood" has helped man to put away childish things which he could never have put away successfully by "repression" of the desire for them. For by repression "one is, indeed, freed of the conscious conflict, nevertheless it lies invisible at one's feet, and is stumbled over at every step. The technic of

² Cf. page 210. "The most intensified desire which is ultimately expressed as 'lowest gratification' or reaction to sexual nature, will consider the religious systems as institutions which first receive, then repress and gradually sublimate, the most intense of the sexual nature not immediately available for cultural purposes."

the apparent suppressing and forgetting is inadequate because it is not possible of achievement in the last analysis—it is in reality only a makeshift. The religious projection offers a much more effectual help. In this one keeps the conflict in sight (care, pain, anxiety, and so on) and gives it over to a personality standing outside of one's self, the Divinity." (Page 39.) "one is kept conscious of the conflict (sins) of two opposing tendencies mutually resistant, and through this one prevents a known trouble from becoming, by means of repressing and forgetting, an unknown and therefore so much more tormenting sorrow." (Page 40.)

And, "just as psycho-analysis is in the hands of the physician sets up the real object of transference as the one to take over the conflicts of the oppressed and to solve them, so the Christian religion sets up the Saviour, considered as real." (Page 40).

It seems, then, that just as the auto-erotic patient—the patient who, without admitting it to himself, is in love with himself—"transfers" to the analyst who is treating him, the emotions of repressed self-praise, self-pity, self-love, which have been "bottled up" in his unconscious mind, and so works them off and gains "freedom" or "independence" of them; so the Christian "transfers" his bottled up emotions to the "Saviour considered as real." If we enquire how a Saviour who is only "considered as real" can "take over the conflicts of the oppressed and solve them," we shall find (page 41) that the real transference consists in the mutual love taught in the Christian community.¹ For (page 141) "the exis-

¹If we ask, as Jung has apparently asked himself,—“For what then is the Deity useful?”—we find (page 41) that, in the early centuries of the Christian era, when “sexuality lay only too close to the relations of people with each other,” it was necessary to secure that “the condition of transference among brothers”

tence of personal values was first discovered by Christianity."

We have perhaps considered at sufficient length the effort to account for religion by the backward yearning towards the "maternal imago" or the "father-and-mother imago." It is clear that this backward yearning throws a somewhat lurid light on much which has passed, and still passes, for Christianity. But we are here concerned primarily with the Old Testament, and it is self-evident to anyone who studies the Old Testament, particularly if he studies it in the light of modern scholarship, that whatever the original Yahweh religion was, it was not a religion of the "mother phase." It was the religion of desert nomads who despised the luxuries and abominated the "mother phase" religion of the Canaanites. Cruelty was not foreign to it, but licentiousness was. It is not denied that the "mother fixation" may have had some influence on Apocalyptic, just as it has had on some of the

should be "such as between man and Christ, a spiritual one." Regarding "the religious myth"; we may apparently consider Christianity to be the finest of all religious myths. For, whereas Mithra is represented as sacrificing only "the lower wishes," the animal nature; Christ is represented as making a "veritable self-sacrifice to a higher purpose"—"a sublimation of the infantile personality." And the real problem is "the sublimation of the infantile personality, or, expressed mythologically, a sacrifice and rebirth of the infantile hero." (Page 265.) To Jung (page 144), "the symbol, considered from the standpoint of the actual truth, is misleading, indeed, but it is *psychologically true*, because it was and is the bridge to all the greatest achievements of humanity. But this does not mean to say that this unconscious way of transformation of the incest wish into religious exercises is the only one or the only possible one. There is also a conscious recognition and understanding. . . . This would be the course of moral autonomy, of perfect freedom, when man could without compulsion wish that which he must do, and this from knowledge, without delusion through belief in the religious symbols. It is a Positive Creed which keeps us infantile and, therefore, ethically inferior."

“ Christian ” hymns which make use of apocalyptic imagery. But a very brief study of (say) the book of Daniel is sufficient to indicate that there is more in Apocalyptic than the yearning for the maternal imago.

And whether the yearning for the maternal imago influenced Apocalyptic much or little, it is manifestly ludicrous to consider it as a sufficient cause for the Yahweh religion.

Whatever Moses, Deborah, Samuel, Elijah, Elisha, Amos and the rest may have been, they were clearly not prophets of a “ mother ” God.

It is not from the study of the relationship of the primitive child to its mother that light is thrown on the primitive Yahweh religion, but from the study of the relationship of the primitive boy to his father and to his group. We have seen that the father phase and the group phase, marking respectively the second and third stages in the normal boy's development, were probably less distinct from one another under more primitive conditions than they are in Europe to-day. It is convenient to consider them together.

Freud suggests¹ that man was originally a “ horde animal.” The “ primal father ” ruled the horde despotically, jealously keeping for himself the women of the horde. The feeling of his sons for him was ambivalent—double edged. He was their ideal, what they would have liked to be themselves. So they both envied him and admired him, both hated him and loved him. But, above all, they feared him. He was the “ dreaded father.” But they desired to possess themselves of the women of the horde. At last they attacked the primal father,

¹See *Totem and Taboo*, chapter 4, and *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, chapters 10 and 12.

killed him and devoured him. But their feeling towards him had always been ambivalent. After they had murdered him, their dread of him revived. Perhaps they saw him threatening them in their dreams. Whence reaction and remorse. This led to a horror of incest and of parricide. The band of brothers renounced the spoils of victory—the women of the horde for whose sake they had killed the primal father. In this remorseful renunciation Freud finds the root of the custom of exogamy. But the band of brothers was still oppressed by a sense of guilt. This sense of guilt—of remorse for parricide and incest committed or desired—is to Freud original sin. It is passed on from generation to generation.¹ It is continually renewed in every generation by the Œdipus Complex. There is thus in all men a hereditary, unconscious, dread of the primitive father of the primitive horde.

We thus get the figure of the dreaded father. But the world is also a dreaded place for weak mortals to live in. The reality principle is a stern principle. Who has not dreaded life and longed to escape from the horrors of existence? Dread is thus the affect (or feeling) caused both by the thought of the dreaded father and also by the thought of reality. Thus the idea of the dreaded father is condensed with the idea of the dreaded real world—with the idea of ultimate reality. Thence the idea of the dreaded God.

Freud's theory raises many questions. But let us not be diverted from our purpose by raising objections—let us rather lay hold of three points which

¹See *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, footnote on page 10, English translation.—“The ego's nucleus, which comprises ‘the archaic inheritance’ of the human mind, is unconscious.” Cf. *Totem and Taboo*, pages 261 to 268, English translation.

to most people will appear reasonable. First of all, the primitive father was capricious and irresponsible. Secondly, his sons dreaded him. Thirdly, he was their ideal in that they desired to emulate his power and caprice.

Now it is not difficult to point to types of religion in which God is regarded as pre-eminently the God of Caprice ; in which men cower before his power and ascribe to him purposes not merely inscrutable, but also irreconcilable with man's own sense of justice ; in which the " saints " of this capricious God emulate his capriciousness and lack of a sense of fair-play in their dealings with " sinners."

Just as in primitive times the " group phase " in the boy's development was hardly distinguishable from the " father phase," so the " group " type of religion is hardly distinguishable from the " primitive father " type. The capricious " father-god " becomes the war God and the personification of the group.

Concerning the personification of the group, Tansley says in *The New Psychology*—" He (man) creates gods in his own image. A particularly strong power with an obvious individuality is his tribe, and this he personifies as the tribal god, which he may project upon the image of an idol or of an invisible spirit."

Again—" God always stands for what is felt to be in the interests of humanity."

Again—" It cannot be doubted that God has been a necessity to the human race, that He is still a necessity, and will long continue to be."

Again—" The moral law is primarily the rule of the herd to regulate the behaviour of its members The ' moral sense ' is the sensitiveness of the individual to the call of the herd to regulate his conduct according to herd law."

It is clear that the dread of the capricious father and the personification of the group have coloured and do colour religion. Are they then its sufficient cause and explanation?

This is a question we shall have to discuss when we study the early Yahweh religion, the rise of the Israelite monarchy, and the proclamation by Deutero-Isaiah of the Yahweh religion as the religion for all nations—for the whole group of humanity.

The normal boy, having passed through the mother attachment phase, the father attachment phase, and the group phase, becomes a man and the father of a family. He is now the centre of a group of his own, possesses initiative, and is, in a sense, a creator. He may beget, not only children, but ideas. He may become a "see-er" (seer) of what the rest of his group refuses to face; a genius who says what the rest of his group dares not think; an inventor who, undeterred by the fear of the gods of his group, finds out how to do, and does, the thing which before was taboo; a pioneer who, undeterred by the fear of foreign, unknown, gods, crosses the hills and settles down in a new country. Now it is clear that the seer, the genius, the inventor and the pioneer are heretics against the group tradition; for they do not see with the eyes of their fathers, they express what their fathers repressed, they employ instruments which their fathers regarded as impious, and they "do" things which previously were "not done" in the group. It is not by a "group god," but by a power within themselves that such men as these are driven on, nor are their views as to what ought, or ought not, to be done, dictated by the group code of ethics. They are apt to be burned as heretics in their own generation and canonised in

the next. They thus modify profoundly the group religion, and the group religion is by itself quite incapable of accounting for them. What then accounts for the heroes?

Perhaps it is in this connection that we should consider the theory that religion is just the rationalisation of the drive of the life force, or the rationalisation of "the ethical self."

Thus Jung says—

"If one honours God, the sun or the fire, then one honours one's own vital force, the libido. It is as Seneca says: 'God is near you, he is with you, in you.' God is our own longing to which we pay divine honours." (*Psychology of the Unconscious*. Page 52.)

It is implied that the idea of a transcendent God is a rationalisation of the drive of the life force which only *seems* to make demands upon us such as one personality makes on another, and that the transcendent moral ideal is a guiding fiction.¹

Akin to this theory that God is merely our own longing to which we pay divine honours, is the theory that God is "the ethical self."

Thus Tansley says in *The New Psychology*—"In a primitive state of culture man projects parts of his own personality upon the forces of nature and thus personifies and often deifies them. He does not understand the nature of these forces . . . he attributes to them the only nature of which he has direct first-hand knowledge, the nature of the human will and the human passions. Thus he creates gods in his own image."

¹A guiding fiction is "the image of an end to be attained, which the mind sets up as a rationalisation, thus explaining to itself the urge of a subconscious motive." (Baudouin). Note that Baudouin speaks of the subconscious where the majority of the New Psychologists speak of the unconscious.

“ The Devil is nearly always represented as subordinate to God, because a universe in which ‘ good ’ and ‘ evil ’ are equally potent is too painful to contemplate, and would lead to despair. Alternatively we have the insistence upon original sin, the human heart being represented as wicked, but redeemable by the grace of God.”

“ The projection of the most diverse human qualities upon God is well illustrated by the different aspects God takes according to human preoccupations. . . . Since Christianity became dominant, He is most universally the God of Love, because the oppressed majority must have consolation, and also because more and more the tender instinct is felt to be the hope of humanity.”

“ With increase of the individual’s spiritual autonomy God has another function to perform. The individual demands the right of entering into personal relations with God. . . . God then becomes the centre of the individual’s own struggles towards unification, the repository of his highest hopes, the confidant of his deepest troubles. The more intimate the communion, the more frankly and simply the individual ‘ casts his burden upon the Lord,’ the more useful God is to him and the more real his personal religion. In this relation God is simply what we have called in chapter 16 the ethical self, the highest standard conceived by the individual, and it is then that ‘ His service is perfect freedom.’ ”

The theory that the idea of a transcendent God is simply the rationalisation of the onward drive of the libido, seems to sum up all the theories which have been advanced, or indeed can conceivably be advanced, to “ explain ” religion in terms of the New Psychology. For whether it be asserted that God is the sublimation of man’s backward yearning

towards childish things, that God is the projection of man's dread and admiration of the primitive father, that God is the personification of man's esprit de corps, or that God is man's ethical self,—it is alike asserted that God is the rationalisation of the life force or libido—that there is no God whom we may call "He," merely a force which we must call "It."

Thus those of the New Psychologists who oppose Christianity—widely as they may, and indeed often do, differ from one another in philosophy—agree together against the prophets of Israel and the Christians, in that they regard God as an It rather than as a He.

It is also worth noticing two other points in which they agree. Firstly, they strongly dislike any view of history which allows that Jesus was a real man. Secondly, they object to the "unhappy combination of religion and morality." (*Psychology of the Unconscious*. Page 45.)

For instance, Jung only requires a footnote¹ in which to write off the biblical scholarship of the last century and remove the stumbling-block of history from Christianity. But even this is not all that Jung has done towards the emancipation of Christians. He smooths still further the path of those who wish to "make use in some way of its [Christianity's] form of thought, and especially of its great wisdom of life" (page 45), by removing another stumbling-block—a most irritating stumbling-block which has been the cause of a great deal of trouble during the past nineteen centuries, and indeed caused acute inconvenience in the little states of Israel and Judah as long ago as the eighth century B.C.

¹*Psychology of the Unconscious*, page 273, note 41.

“ The stumbling-block ”—says Jung in discussing Christianity —“ is the unhappy combination of religion and morality. This must be overcome.” (Page 45.)

CHAPTER IV

PRELIMINARY NOTE

The Hebrew Scriptures are called "TORAH (Law), NEBIYIM (Prophets), and KETHUBIM (Writings)."

TORAH - - - - - 5 books
Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers
and Deuteronomy.

NEBIYIM.

FORMER PROPHETS - - - 4 books
Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings.

LATTER PROPHETS - - - 4 books
Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, The Twelve.

KETHUBIM - - - - 11 books
Psalms; Proverbs; Job; Song of
Songs; Ruth; Lamentations; Ec-
clesiastes; Esther; Daniel; Ezra
and Nehemiah (one book only);
Chronicles.

It will be noted that there are in all 5 plus 8 plus 11
= 24 books.

"The Twelve" consists of Hosea, Joel, Amos, Oba-
diah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah,
Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi.

IT is now time to consider briefly, for the assis-
tance of such readers as are unacquainted with
the results of modern biblical criticism, the
general position of modern scholars towards the Old
Testament literature.

During the last century some of the greatest and most critical brains in Germany, England, America and elsewhere have been busy with the investigation of the Old Testament. Never in the history of the world has any body of literature—with the single exception of the New Testament—been subjected to such acid, searching and thorough-going analysis as that to which the Old Testament has been subjected during this period. But for many years now all biblical scholars, except a few whose dissent from the general conclusions of the others seems to be due, not to any inadequacy in the evidence, but to the opinion that the unique religious value of the Bible implies the historical accuracy of everything recorded in it, have been in general agreement with regard to the main outline of the Old Testament history. Much which once passed for history, has been shown to be myth or legend, and the limitations of the Old Testament writers as historians have been clearly recognised. But biblical criticism has been less destructive than constructive. It has established, as part of the history of the world, the main outline of the history of Israel, and has removed the public careers of men such as Amos, Isaiah and Jeremiah from the region of faith to the region of history.

The history of Israel up to the time of Amos may be very briefly glanced at under four heads.

- I. The Patriarchs.
- II. Moses.
- III. The settlement in the land of Canaan.
- IV. The rise of the prophets and of the monarchy.

I. Just as, behind what may be called the real history of Greece, the Greek historian sees such figures as Agamemnon and Odysseus, so behind the

real history of Israel, the Biblical historian sees the figures of the patriarchs. In dealing with the book of Genesis, it is not easy to decide how much is historical and how much mythical or legendary. But, at the least, Genesis represents true history in that it shows us the ancestors of the Israelites as nomad shepherds.

II. So far are modern scholars from agreement as to the date of Moses, that the dates assigned to him vary by as much as two centuries. But scholars are agreed (1) that Moses really lived and exercised a quite immeasurable influence on later generations ; (2) that he formed a number of disorganised tribes into a strong confederacy ; (3) that the basis of this confederacy was the recognition, as the God of the confederacy, of Yahweh,¹ the God of Moses, who, it was held, had, out of pure generosity, adopted Israel to be his people ; (4) that, whatever may have been the theology of Moses, it laid a remarkably strong emphasis on Yahweh's demand for mutual justice and honesty between his followers.

III. Scholars agree that the occupation of the land of Canaan was the result of a prolonged struggle which lasted from the days of Joshua to the days of David, and is presented with far greater accuracy in the books of " Judges " and " Samuel " than in the idealised account contained in the book of " Joshua."

IV. Scholars agree that of the two accounts of the origin of the monarchy, which are contained in the book of Samuel, the account given in I Sam. ix, x, 1 to 16, and xi (less verse 14)—the account in which Samuel himself takes the initiative and appears as the founder of the monarchy—is the more accurate ; that it was the prophets who called the monarchy

¹Jehovah is an incorrect spelling of the name.

into existence ; that, when the monarchy had been established, it maintained guilds of what we may call professional prophets ; and that to find out what manner of men the David of history and his contemporaries were, and what their idea of Yahweh was, we must look at the book of Samuel and the early chapters of Kings, where we find accounts of them based very often on contemporary records, and not at the book of Chronicles, which was not compiled till about seven centuries later than the age of David and ascribes to David the theology of the compiler. [Compare for instance II Sam. xxiv, 1, with I Chron. xxi, 1.]

Scholars are also in general agreement with regard to the main outline of the literary history of the "Pentateuch," or "Law of Moses," and of those books—Joshua, Judges, Samuel and Kings—which are described in the Hebrew Bible as "The Former Prophets."

Israelite records—myths, legends, history, laws—were compiled by a series or school of editors in Judah, called the J school, in the ninth century B.C., and also by a series or school of editors in Northern Israel (Ephraim), called the E school, in the eighth century B.C. The J and E records were subsequently combined, thus forming what is called JE.¹

It is probable that the nucleus of the book of Deuteronomy was compiled by the disciples of Hosea and Isaiah in the seventh century B.C., and that their work was the basis of Josiah's reformation in 621 B.C. The book of Deuteronomy is a revision of the old laws in the light of the teaching of the prophets Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Micah. To the

¹The symbols J and E were *not* allotted by scholars to these groups of Editors on account of the initial letters of Judah and Ephraim.

compilers it stood for what Moses really meant, and the bulk of it is put into the mouth of Moses. The influence of this wonderful book was profound. The book itself and the work of a series or school of editors of Israelite records, to which—probably in the sixth century B.C.—it gave rise, is denoted by the symbol D.

It was probably also in the sixth century B.C. that Priestly editors collected and revised much of the ecclesiastical and other law. Their work, which also includes narrative, is known as P.

The presentation of the early history of Israel, which we find in the Old Testament, is the result of the combination by subsequent editors—probably in the fourth century B.C.—of the work of the J, E, D and P editors. It is to be noted that J, E, D and P are all compilations rather than original works, and that the D editors not only furnished their own compilation to the whole, but also, to some extent, re-edited J and E.

A simple way to gain a grasp of the J, E and P points of view is to read *The Book of Genesis in Colloquial English*—T. H. Robinson—1s. 6d.—National Adult School Union, Bloomsbury Street, W.C. 1. Exodus and Numbers consist, like Genesis, of J, E and P elements. Leviticus consists entirely¹ of P. The work of D in the Pentateuch is almost confined to the book of Deuteronomy.

Joshua is akin to the Pentateuch in that it is the result of the combination of J, E, D and P elements. Indeed the term Hexateuch ("six books") is used by scholars to indicate that the book of Joshua forms with the Pentateuch, or "five books of Moses," one composite whole.

¹It does not seem to be necessary to discriminate here between the important "Holiness Code" (H) and the remainder of P.

Judges and Samuel consist in the main of J and E. But the J and E material has been revised, considerably in the case of Judges and slightly in the case of Samuel, by the D school.

Kings was compiled by the D school.

The D school, inspired as they were by the teaching of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Micah, had a bigger theology, a higher standard of ethics, and a clearer psychology of inspiration than J and E. But their inability to free themselves from the doctrine of mechanical retribution and their erroneous view as to the date of the promulgation of the Deuteronomic Code have been the cause of enormous difficulty to readers of the Bible. It is thus necessary for us to appreciate their point of view.

The prophets whose teaching inspired the book of Deuteronomy, taught that Yahweh was just, but they had nothing to say on the subject of a future life for the individual. The D school thus had only this life in which to reconcile the justice of Yahweh with the hard facts of experience. To them Yahweh must reward the righteous and punish the wicked, and had only this life in which to do it. Therefore prosperity in this life ought to be the result of righteousness and adversity in this life the result of wickedness.

The D school's attitude towards the unfortunate characters of history was thus the same as the attitude of Job's friends towards Job.¹ They dared not, in the interests of their religion, face the unpleasant truth that the righteous often suffer unjustly, that honesty is not always the best policy. Their refusal to face this unpleasant—seemingly blasphemous—truth led to repression and rationalisation which have seriously affected their work as historians.

¹The date of the book of Job is perhaps about 400 B.C.

Their historical error in ascribing the promulgation of the D code to Moses and in regarding his speech on the plains of Moab as the culminating point of revelation, accounts for their very different attitude towards (*a*) those parts of J and E—the parts we find in Genesis, Exodus and Numbers—which relate events prior to Moses' speech on the plains of Moab, and towards (*b*) those parts of J and E which relate subsequent events.

Holding that revelation had not been completed till "the plains of Moab," they had no motive for objecting to divergences from the D standard which JE recorded as having occurred before that date. So they hardly touched the J and E records we find in Genesis, Exodus and Numbers.

But, having dated the Deuteronomic code before the death of Moses, they had to judge everyone who lived between the death of Moses and their own time, by the D standard. Thus all the kings of North Israel had to be condemned for doing evil in the sight of Yahweh owing to their failure to observe a code which did not exist till the kingdom of North Israel had come to an end! And the heroes of the faith who lived between the speech of Moses on the plains of Moab and the compilation of Deuteronomy, must, on the D hypothesis, have been acquainted with the D code. Therefore, being heroes of the faith, they must have observed it. If, then, J and E indicated that these heroes of the faith had neither been acquainted with the D code nor kept it—! The D school are not the only Church historians who have been confronted with a difficulty of this kind and have bequeathed fresh difficulties to their successors through their efforts to deal with it.

In order, then, to appreciate the religious views of the J and E editors who in the ninth and eighth cen-

turies B.C. compiled the records of Israel, it is necessary to disentangle their work from the work of later editors. That it has succeeded in doing this, is one of the greatest achievements of modern biblical scholarship. It is not always possible to distinguish between J and E; but it is nearly always possible to distinguish between (a) JE,¹ (b) D, and (c) P.

It is to be noted that the J editors were at work in the ninth century B.C.—the age of Elijah—and the E editors in the eighth century B.C.—the age of Amos and Hosea. Thus in studying J we are studying a compilation of religious ideas within the influence of which Elijah grew up; and in studying J and E we are studying two compilations of religious ideas within the influence of which Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Micah grew up. Once we have realised that the J and E editors were, like the monastic chroniclers of the Saxon period, not so much creators as preservers, we shall recognise that much of their work is far older than themselves. Therefore, by studying J and E we can see broadly what the Yahweh religion was before it was transformed, deepened and expanded by the teaching of Amos and his successors.

The study of J and E in isolation from the work of later editors which is intertwined with it in our Bible, cannot but yield surprises to those who have previously imagined that the bulk of the Pentateuch was written by Moses and was consequently in existence before the days of the Judges.

Four points may be specially mentioned.

(1) In the days of J and E the right of sacrificing to Yahweh was not restricted to the "sons of Aaron."

¹The combination of J and E.

The P code which attributes this restriction to Moses, was not compiled till the sixth century B.C.

(2) In the days of J and E sacrifice was not restricted to one central sanctuary. The D code which attributes this restriction to Moses, was not compiled till the seventh century B.C.

(3) In the days of J and E the worship of Yahweh was often, indeed normally, idolatrous. There are indeed suggestions that idols of Yahweh were not employed in the strenuous days of Moses ; but it is clear that, when Jeroboam I worshipped Yahweh in the form of a golden bull or calf, he was not doing anything essentially new. There is, indeed, no evidence that Elijah attacked the idolatrous worship of Yahweh ; nor is it certain that even Amos did so. Hosea is, as far as we know, the first prophet who unequivocally denounced the idolatrous worship of Yahweh.¹

(4) In the days of J and E the Yahweh religion was monolatrous rather than monotheistic. The loyal worshipper of Yahweh was not concerned with the metaphysical problems which interest us to-day. He took it for granted that other nations had their own gods (see, e.g., Judges xi, 24, of Jephthah ; I Samuel xxvi, 19, of David). All he was concerned about, was that no other God than Yahweh, the god of his fathers, should be worshipped in Israel. The question fought out between the party of Elijah, Elisha and Jehu and the party of Jezebel was not—"Does more than one God exist?"—but—"Is Israel to worship any other god besides Yahweh in Yahweh's own territory?"

¹It is, perhaps, significant that the Hebrew root "to miss a goal or way"—*chata*—used by D of the "sin" which Jeroboam "sinned" and "made Israel to sin" (see I Kings xii, 30 ; xiii, 34 ; xvi, 2, 19, 26, etc.), is a favourite word of Hosea to describe the idolatrous worship of Yahweh.

The appearance of Amos ushers in a new era in the history of the religion of Israel, and the book of Amos is the earliest of a group of books which we must now very briefly consider. As we have seen, the section of the Hebrew Bible, which is called "The Prophets," includes four books—Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings—which are called "The Former Prophets"; these we have already very briefly considered. The other books in this section of the Hebrew Bible are called "The Latter Prophets" and are four in number—Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and "The Twelve." "The Twelve" is reckoned as one book, but contains the books of all the so-called "Minor Prophets." The term "Minor Prophets" can only be described as most unfortunate, in that it suggests that books such as Amos, Hosea, Micah and Jonah, are of minor importance, as well as of smaller dimensions than the books of Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel.

It should be noted that the book of "Daniel" does not belong to "The Prophets." It was indeed not written till about 167 B.C.; and by this date the section of the Hebrew Bible, which is called The Prophets, was already regarded as part of the Scriptures and closed against the entrance of new books. It is one of the eleven books which form the third and last section of the Hebrew scriptures—the section which is known as "The Writings."

Amos prophesied about 760 B.C., in the days of Northern Israel's seeming prosperity. The prophetic activity of Hosea, which no doubt extended over some years, may be dated about 740 B.C. At the time of Hosea's prophesying there were already ominous signs of the approaching fall of Northern Israel, which both Amos and Hosea predicted. In 722 B.C., Samaria fell to the Assyrians, and the flower

of the population of Northern Israel was deported. Foreigners conquered by the Assyrians, were introduced in place of the deported Israelites, and from the intermixture of Israelite and heathen blood sprang the Samaritans.

But in 740 B.C., eighteen years before the fall of Northern Israel, Isaiah of Jerusalem had received his call to become a prophet. His prophetic activity, during the latter part of which Micah also was prophesying, extended up to at least 701 B.C., the year in which Sennacherib, whether through the breaking out of an epidemic in his army or for some other reason, had to content himself with shutting up Hezekiah, King of Judah, "like a caged bird"—to quote the Assyrian inscription—and failed to take Jerusalem. Judah's remarkable escape from sharing the fate of Samaria at the hands of the Assyrians is one of the most important events in the history of the world. For had Jerusalem fallen in 701 B.C., it is hard to see how the message of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Micah would have been preserved on the earth. But the survival of the kingdom of Judah for over a century gave the disciples of these prophets time to exert such an influence among their fellow countrymen, that when Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon destroyed Jerusalem in 586 B.C. and the state of Judah came to an end, the religion of the prophets survived the fall of the state.

As we have seen, it is probable that the nucleus of the book of Deuteronomy was compiled by the school of Hosea and Isaiah, and that it was the basis of the reformation carried through by the young king Josiah in 621 B.C. This reformation was at once one of the most tragic failures and one of the most enduring successes in history. It failed to save the state, but it preserved the religion of the

prophets on the earth. This reformation was preceded, and no doubt forwarded, by the prophesying of Zephaniah. Jeremiah's career as a prophet began shortly before the reformation and continued till after the fall of Jerusalem in 586 B.C. He thus saw both the promulgation of the dogma that honesty is the best policy, and also events, such as the fall of Josiah in 609 B.C. and of Jerusalem in 586 B.C., which made it more than ordinarily difficult to accept this dogma. It was in the life-time of Jeremiah that Nahum—and probably Habakkuk also—prophesied. Nahum resembles the false prophets rather than the true prophets in that his prophecy is a denunciation of Nineveh and contains no rebuke against Judah. He is a spiritual descendant of Elisha, but hardly of Amos and Hosea; and his prophecy helps us to understand the theology of the "false" prophets who opposed Jeremiah. Was Nahum himself one of Jeremiah's opponents? At any rate we can hardly imagine that he was one of Jeremiah's supporters.

Ezekiel, a younger contemporary of Jeremiah, began prophesying during the life-time of Jeremiah. He was deported to Babylonia with other Jews in 597 B.C., eleven years before the fall of Jerusalem; and it was, not in the land of Israel, but in Babylonia, that he received his call to become a prophet. He, like Jeremiah, predicted the fall of Jerusalem; but after its fall he drew up a programme of reconstruction in faith that the Jews would be restored to Jerusalem and that the Temple would be rebuilt.

During the exile the D and P editors were also active, as we have already seen.

"Deutero-Isaiah" (author of Isaiah xl to lv) hailed the early triumphs of Cyrus the Persian as heralding the restoration of Israel, and declared that

the religion of Yahweh was the universal religion—the religion for all the nations. It seems that Cyrus, after his conquest of Babylon, allowed some of the Jews from Babylonia to return to Jerusalem in 538 B.C. In 516 B.C., under the influence of the prophesying of Haggai and Zechariah, the rebuilding of the Temple was completed. But gloomy years followed, as is indicated in the prophesying of the prophet (or group of prophets), known as Trito-Isaiah (chapters lvi to lxvi), and of an unknown or anonymous prophet, Malachi—"my messenger."

In 445 B.C., Nehemiah, a Jew, was appointed Governor of Jerusalem by the Persian King, and succeeded in organising the Jewish community at Jerusalem as a "church state" within the Persian Empire. It is to be remembered that at this time, as at all times since the fall of Jerusalem in 586 B.C., there were more Jews outside Palestine than in it.

We have already noted that, probably in the fourth century B.C., after this organisation of Judaism had been carried out, the "Pentateuch" reached essentially its present condition.

The organisation of Judaism and the growth of the doctrine of the verbal inspiration of the "law of Moses" tended to prevent potential prophets from speaking their messages. Gradually the word Torah—"pointing out," "direction," "instruction"—which to the great prophets stood for an ideal pointed out by a living God—came to be, not wholly restricted, but specially applied, to the law of Moses; indeed the Pentateuch is called the Torah by the Jews to this day. For five centuries after the age of Malachi no one came forward, as Isaiah or Jeremiah had come forward, and declared publicly that he had received a message from the living God, in the light of which all existing notions of orthodox

religion must be examined. But there was much literary activity. At least one book which belongs to the "Latter Prophets"—the book of Jonah—was written after the time of Nehemiah, and all the "Latter Prophets" were edited, re-edited and expanded.

By about 200 B.C., "The Prophets" were regarded as part of the sacred scriptures, but they have never been put by the Jews on the same level as the Torah or Law of Moses.

The remaining books of the Hebrew Bible constitute the section called "The Writings." "The Writings" were regarded as part of the sacred scriptures by the beginning of the Christian era, though even after the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D., there was some discussion as to the right of certain books to be included in this, the third and last section of the Hebrew scriptures. It should be noted that the Hebrew Bible does not include the Apocrypha.

To-day the Hebrew Bible is called "Torah, Nebi'im (Prophets) and Kethubim (Writings)."

To return to the prophetic literature—it seems that men, like Amos, Hosea and Isaiah, who spoke their messages, were not usually writers, though we hear of some of them, e.g., Jeremiah, causing some of their prophecies to be written down. More often than not the arrangement of a book bearing the name of one of the great prophets, is due, not to the prophet himself, but to his disciples. One can easily imagine, for instance, the disciples of (say) Hosea writing down some of his rhythmical utterances, juxtaposing, sometimes oracles on the same subject, sometimes oracles on subjects which were associated in their minds, sometimes oracles on quite different subjects. The earliest form of the book of Hosea was thus probably a compilation of

the prophet's teaching by his disciples—a compilation made in a manner not unlike that in which the compiler of Q—probably Matthew—compiled parables, sayings and discourses of Jesus, with less regard to chronological sequence than to similarity of subject-matter. So we may describe the first stage in the literary history of most of the books bearing the names of the great “speaking” prophets, as compilation by the prophet's disciples.

The next stage may be described by the word expansion. Additions were made by disciples in the style and under the influence of the prophet. Passages were inserted to suggest what the prophet would have said had he still been present. Sometimes sayings of the prophet which appeared “dangerous,” were toned down and modified in the interests of “orthodoxy,” just as certain great poems have been toned down before finding a place in the hymn book. Marginal notes by copyists—glosses—were inserted in the text.

In the case of certain books we can trace a third stage—the combination of the book of one great prophet with the book of another. For instance, in our book of Zechariah chapters i to viii belong to the prophet of that name, chapters ix to xiv to a quite different author or group of authors; and our book of Isaiah contains three quite different books. Chapters i to xxxix contain the work of Isaiah with subsequent expansions; chapters xl to lv are in the main the work of an unknown prophet called “Deutero-Isaiah,” “exilic Isaiah,” or “Isaiah of Babylon”; chapters lvi to lxvi are, to quote Dr. Box, “mainly the work of an author, it would seem, who wrote in Jerusalem shortly before the first arrival of Nehemiah, i.e., before 445 B.C. This

writer is sometimes styled the 'Trito-Isaiah.'"¹

Having regard to the complicated literary history of the "Latter Prophets," and to the fact that the Massoretic Text (M.T.) which we have in our Hebrew Bibles, is often obscure, and not seldom untranslatable, it will probably appear to the reader, if he has not studied the Higher Criticism, that we have little ground for imagining that we know much about what the prophets really taught. But, as anyone who takes the trouble to study the results of modern Biblical scholarship, will see for himself, such a view is quite erroneous. The application of scientific methods to the study of the Old Testament has "rediscovered the prophets." Later additions and marginal glosses which have crept into the text, have, in one case after another, been detected, and their removal allows the message of the prophets to shine forth uncompromising, challenging, convincing. Though there are still many interesting points about which scholars are not in agreement, it is an understatement, rather than an overstatement, of the case to say that the general outline of the history of the great message conveyed by Amos and his successors, has been clearly and convincingly established in its place in the history of the world.

It is perhaps well to mention that the translation of the Hebrew scriptures into Greek was begun at Alexandria about 250 B.C. In this Greek version additional books—the books of our Apocrypha—are included; the books which are contained in the Hebrew Bible, appear in a different order; and there is no tripartite division into "Law," "Prophets" and "Writings."

¹*A Short Introduction to the Literature of The Old Testament*—G. H. Box—Rivingtons—Edition, 1924. This book, which only costs 2s. 6d., should be in the possession of everyone who desires to take an intelligent interest in the Old Testament.

This Greek version is called the Septuagint (LXX) from the legend that seventy scribes were employed in the making of it. It is often of great value to scholars in places where the Hebrew text (M.T.) is obscure or doubtful.

JE is the first literature which the student of the Psychology of the Old Testament must consider. But it is well first of all to notice (a) certain differences between the style of Biblical writers in general and the style of English writers ; (b) certain differences between " popular " Hebrew psychology and " popular " English psychology. (b) will be the subject of the next two chapters. A brief consideration of (a) will bring the present chapter to an end.

(i) It is pointed out in *Beginnings of Christianity* in connection with Acts xxi, 20 and 21, that Biblical writers do not employ footnotes. They often embody in the dialogue notes or explanations of their own, which modern writers would put in a footnote or embody in the narrative. For instance, in Exodus xviii, 6—" I thy father-in-law Jethro am come unto thee, and thy wife, and her two sons with her "—it is the reader, rather than Moses, who requires to be reminded of the relationship of Jethro to Moses and of the number of the sons of Moses.

(ii) Hebrew hardly ever employs indirect speech. Note, for instance, I Sam. ii, 15 to 16. A modern English historian would seldom employ three sets of inverted commas in a passage of this length—especially when, as in this case, a customary procedure rather than a single act is being recorded. Compare I Sam. ix, 23 ; x, 2 ; xx, 6. When a modern historian uses direct speech in describing a conversation, it is probably because he wants to stress the ipsissima verba. But a Hebrew writer

normally uses direct speech in recording a conversation, whether he wants to stress the *ipsissima verba* or not—whether he knows the *ipsissima verba* or not.

(iii) A Biblical writer makes his characters think aloud.¹ Indeed, in Hebrew a man does not usually “think”; he “says in his leb,”² “heart” or “mind,” or simply “says.” See, for instance, I Sam. xx, 3. Also I Sam. xviii, 8, 11, 17. Verse 17 is particularly interesting. It shows that the biblical writers “analyse” their characters—describe them as “saying,” not only their conscious thoughts, but also their unconscious motives. Saul presumably found excellent military reasons for sending David against the Philistines, rationalised his conduct and did not admit³ its true motive to himself. Yet he is described as “saying” his unconscious motive. Again, popular orators rationalise their successes as due to their own virtues or the wisdom of the measures they advocate; yet in Psalm xii, 4, they are described, with a remorselessness worthy of Freud, as saying—“With our tongue will we prevail.” Nor do “sinners” employ such unsophisticated ways of enticing the unwary as we should gather from Proverbs i, 10 to 12, did we not realise that “to say” in Hebrew must often be rendered “to think” and sometimes understood of the unconscious thought. And the author of Wisdom does not mean to imply that the “ungodly” have no high-sounding “guiding fiction” to describe their procedure towards the “poor” and the “widows.” (Wisdom ii, 12.)⁴

¹cf.—of Yahweh—Genesis ii, 18; viii, 21.

²Deut. ix, 4; xviii, 21.

³At first at any rate. His only previous attack on David had been made while he was in a fit. See I Sam. xviii, 10 to 11).

⁴This book was probably originally written in Greek.

In Hebrew, then, a man "says" his thoughts¹—sometimes even his unconscious motives of which he is not aware.

¹Note that in the New Testament the endo-psychic experience of Jesus after his baptism is described in the form of a dialogue—"The tempter came and said" "but he answered and said" ; see Matthew iv, 1 to 11. So the demon which is walking through waterless places, "says" [Luke xi, 24]. The prodigal son "says" [Luke xv, 17]. The rich man "says" what he will "say" to his psyche=nephesh=appetite, instincts [Luke xii, 17 to 19]. God "says" to the rich man [Luke xii, 20].

CHAPTER V

IMAGINE a primitive Hebrew nomad watching the beginning, the course and the end of what is called in India a "dust devil." The wind catches up some of the dust of the earth "in its wings"¹ and drives it along in a whirling spiral for a greater or shorter distance. The "dust devil" moves along like a living thing—the dust of the earth seems to be animated by the wind. Presently the wind drops it—deserts it. The "dust devil" collapses. The dust returns to the rest of the dust, whence the wind a short time before caught it up and animated it for a season.

(I) Dust temporarily animated by the wind—such is the Hebrew nomad's mental picture of man's life! For when men breathe and can move at will, they are alive. When they have ceased to breathe, they are dead. So the thought of life is associated with the thought of breath—wind—spirit. All these words—breath, wind, spirit—can in Hebrew be represented by one word—Ruach.²

Thus the primitive Hebrew was aware, on the one hand, of the Ruach, the wind, breath, élan

¹Cf. Hosea iv, 19.

²Let the reader who does not know Hebrew read Ezekiel xxxvii, 1 to 14, in R.V. "Spirit" (of the Lord) in verses 1 and 14; "breath" in verses 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10; "wind" in verse 9; are all translations of the one Hebrew word Ruach.

vital—seemingly itself alive and the source of life—and, on the other hand, of the dust of the desert, lifeless “matter.”¹

(II) But not only did the primitive Hebrew feel the contrast between the dead Dust and the live Wind; he also felt the contrast between the normal and the abnormal. However “unscientific” he may have been, he noticed some of the normal sequences of nature and was seriously perturbed at their interruption. He was, for instance, terrified when on a cloudless day the sun was suddenly extinguished by an eclipse. Now the normal was felt to be natural. It did not challenge attention nor demand explanation. It was taken for granted—like the dust of the desert when this lay at rest, inert, lifeless. It was the abnormal which was capricious, challenged attention and demanded explanation—like the dust of the desert when this was caught up in the wings of the wind, animated by the wind, in movement, seemingly endowed with life.

So the thought of the normal in nature was associated in the Hebrew nomad’s mind with the thought of the desert dust; the thought of the abnormal in nature—the capricious, the miraculous—was associated with the thought of the Ruach or of God.²

¹See, for instance, Genesis ii, 7; vi, 17; vii, 15; vii, 22; Joshua ii, 11; Judges xv, 19; I Kings x, 5; Isaiah xlii, 5; Habak. ii, 19; Zech. xii, 1; Eccles. iii, 19 to 21; viii, 8; xii, 7; Psalm civ, 29 to 30; cl., 6; Lam. iv, 20.

²See, e.g., Genesis xix, 24 to 25; xxx, 8; xxxiii, 10; xxxviii, 7, 10; xlii, 28; xliii, 23; Exodus iv, 16; viii, 19; Judges vii, 22; I Sam. vi, 19; xiv, 15; xxv, 38; xxvi, 12; II Sam. vi, 7 to 9; ix, 3; xxi, 14; xxiv, 15 to 16; I Kings iii, 28; II Kings xv, 5; xix, 35; Zech. xii, 8; xiv, 13; Psalm xxix (all); xxxvi, 6; II Macc. ix, 5; Acts xii, 23. Cf. I Sam. xxix 9; II Sam. xiv, 17, 20; xix, 27.

(III) For it was not only the contrast between life and death and the contrast between the abnormal and the normal, which corresponded to the contrast between wind and dust. The contrast between God and man also corresponded to the contrast between wind and dust. "The Egyptians are men and not God; and their horses are flesh and not spirit (Ruach)."^{1 2} Yahweh was Ruach or the God of Ruach; man was flesh or dust. In J's creation story Yahweh blows into the Adam's nose a living breath (nishmath chayyim). In the Song of Deborah he is regarded as actually coming into action in support of his people against the chariots of Sisera, riding on the rain clouds, flooding the Kishon, swamping the plain, preventing the chariots from manœuvring, giving the Israelite infantry their opportunity.

(IV) For to the Hebrew nomad, living on the edge of the desert, the wind was, not merely the refreshing breeze, but also the driver up of the destroying sandstorm. And the wind was regarded as the blast of Yahweh's nostrils. So the Ruach of Yahweh was, not only the agent of life, but also the agent of destruction. The abnormal, capricious, overwhelming disaster—what is still called in legal language to-day "the act of God"—was carried out by the Ruach, the breath of his nostrils—the wind which dries up the streams to cause drought—the wind which drives up the clouds to cause floods, or the locusts to cause

¹Isaiah xxxi, 3. Cf. Genesis i, 2; ii, 7; Numbers xvi, 22; xxvii, 16; Jer. xxxviii, 16; Ezekiel xviii, 4; Job xii, 10; xxvii, 3; xxxii, 8; xxxiii, 4; Psalms civ, 29 to 30; Eccles. xii, 7.

²To-day we have no more spiritual word than "spiritual"—from Latin *spiritus* = "breath," "breeze."

famine—the wind which fans the prairie fire to cause destruction.¹

(V) Moreover, “chance” is, like the wind, capricious, challenges attention and demands explanation. The thought of it was therefore associated with the thought of the Ruach. It was thus regarded as a method of getting into touch with Yahweh—finding out his wishes—obtaining his advice. The Urim and Tummim, often referred to in the book of Samuel, were sacred lots, employed for the purpose of “enquiring of Yahweh” and obtaining his answer by a process analogous to “tossing up.”²

So, to the primitive Hebrew, the thought of Yahweh, of life, of destruction, of the abnormal, and of chance, was associated with the thought of the Ruach; the thought of man, of death, and of the normal, was associated with the thought of the desert dust.

(VI) But it was not only in the events going on “out there”—outside his mind—that the primitive Hebrew felt the contrast between the normal and the abnormal. He felt the same contrast in his own endo-psychic experiences, and in studying what we call the psychology of other men. For the normal man in a normal psychological condition did not challenge attention; his psychology did not demand explanation; he was taken for granted, as the dust of the desert was taken for granted.

But if the normal man “sees red”—goes mad

¹See, for instance, Exodus xv, 8, 10; I Kings xviii, 12; II Kings ii, 16; Isaiah xxx, 28, 33; xxxiv, 16; xl, 7; lix, 19; Job xxvi, 13.

²See, for instance, Judges xviii, 5; I Sam. x, 22; xiv, 36 to 42; xxiii, 2, 4, 9 to 12; II Sam. v, 19, 23 to 25; Hosea iv, 12; Ezek. xxi, 21.

—throws a javelin at his best friend—at a time of excitement accomplishes acts of strength or endurance of which neither he himself nor anyone else suspected that he was capable—takes command of a body of troops and exercises the indefinable quality of leadership—or becomes suddenly panic stricken—loses his head—becomes violently angry—what then? The normal man has become abnormal; he is acting in a manner which challenges attention, demands explanation. What has happened? The Ruach—wind—breath—spirit—of Yahweh has leaped upon him—taken possession of him—inspired him.

Just as both life and capricious disasters in Israel were attributed directly to the Ruach of Yahweh, so psychological abnormality in Israel was likewise attributed directly to the Ruach of Yahweh.¹ The inhabitant of Israel, who was psychologically abnormal, was inspired (Latin *inspiro* = “to blow into,” “breathe into”) by Yahweh.

(a) For instance, what is called “second sight,” challenged attention and demanded explanation. The thought of this abnormal “seeing” was associated with the thought of the Ruach; and according to I Sam. ix, 9, the type of man who was afterwards called a Nabi (Prophet), was originally called a Roeh (See-er, Seer).

(b) Again, a man’s dreams are capricious. They are beyond his control and demand explanation.

¹The calling up of Samuel by the witch of Endor (I Sam. xxviii) is not an exception. For at this period—and for a long time afterwards—Yahweh was not thought to have any authority in Sheol. Sheol is below the earth. And there is no Ruach, breath, air, below the earth. Sheol resembles foreign countries (I Sam. xxvi, 19) in being subject to powers other than Yahweh. By consulting the witch of Endor Saul apostatized from the Yahweh religion and dealt with powers other than Yahweh.

Therefore they were associated with the Ruach. In the E narrative the dream is perhaps the most common method in which Yahweh is recorded to have spoken to men.^{1 2}

In I Sam. xxviii, 6, dreams, Urim i.e., sacred lots, and prophets are all regarded as permissible methods of consulting Yahweh.

(c) We find also that in "Judges" and "Samuel" not only Gideon's and Jephthah's power of leadership and prestige, but also Samson's violent method of paying his betting debt and Saul's attempt to murder David by flinging a javelin at him, are ascribed to the inspiration of Yahweh.^{3 4}

Indeed, in the early literature of Israel, what we call the incalculable, remarkable, outcroppings of the unconscious mind—whether outcroppings of goodness or of wickedness—of sanity or of insanity

¹Nor in later days, though Ecclesiasticus xxxiv, 5 to 8, is suspicious of them, were dreams considered an unworthy means of revelation. (See Psalm cxxvii, 2. "He giveth unto his beloved in sleep.") In the New Testament the casting of lots was only employed before the coming of the Spirit, and was afterwards regarded as an unworthy means of attempting to discover God's will. Contrast the appointment of Matthias in Acts i, with that of Paul and Barnabas in Acts xiii. But dreams were still considered as a means by which—in conjunction with other means—God might make known his will to men. Cf. *The New Psychology and the Preacher*, chapter 11. Crichton Miller.

²In Job vii, 14, nightmares are ascribed to God.

³See Judges iii, 10; vi, 34; ix, 23; xi, 29; xiii, 25; xiv, 6; xiv, 19; xv, 14; I Sam. x, 5-13; xi, 6-7; xvi, 13, 14-16, 23; xviii, 10; xix, 9; xix, 20-24; xxi, 13-15; II Sam. xxiv, 1. Compare II Kings ix, 11, "mad fellow"; xix, 7. But also Genesis xli, 38; Exodus xxviii, 3; Numbers xxvii, 18; Deut. xxxiv, 9. In the last two Hebrew is not "the spirit" but "a spirit."

⁴If the LXX reading "God" for "Yahweh" in I Sam. xix, 9, is correct, the author avoids describing the spirit of Yahweh as evil (see Driver's *Commentary on Samuel*). But, even if we translate xix, 9 and xviii 10, as "an evil divine spirit," it is described in xvi, 14 as "an evil spirit from Yahweh."

—of morale or of panic—are all ascribed to the Ruach of Yahweh.

Thus the early Hebrews, like certain modern psychologists, were unable to distinguish between the promptings of the living God and the mere outbursts of the unconscious. Only, whereas such modern psychologists consider that they have outgrown the need for God, and ascribe all the promptings of the living God to the unconscious, the early Hebrews had not reached the conception of the unconscious and ascribed all its outbursts—good and evil—to the spirit of God.

CHAPTER VI

I

PRINCIPAL Wheeler Robinson has pointed out that "the Hebrew idea of human personality is an animated body, not an incarnated soul."¹

If we consider J's creation story, we shall see that Genesis ii, 7, describes two acts, not only one, in the drama of man's creation. The first act is described in the words—"Yahweh formed (as a potter forms) the adam of the dust of the adamah (ground)." It is to be noted that the term "the adam" is applied to the "piece of pottery" moulded by Yahweh, before this "piece of pottery" has begun to breathe, before it has a soul. At the end of the first act of the drama of Genesis ii, 7, the adam exists, but has no soul.²

In the second act of the drama Yahweh blows into the adam's nose a living breath (nishmath chayyim), and the adam becomes "a living soul."³

In Genesis iii, 19, man is told that he is dust and will "return" to dust. Indeed, man was regarded as essentially, not body and soul, but body (or flesh) only. Man was essentially flesh, dust, the adam from the adamah (ground). The expression

¹Article in English in *Z.A.W.* of 1923.

²Cf. Ezekiel xxxvii, 8.

³Cf. Ezekiel xxxvii, 9 to 10.

“all men” in English must be rendered in Hebrew by *kol-basar*, “all flesh”—an expression which may also include animals as well as men.

It will be noted that the Hebrew view of man was fundamentally different from Plato's. Man was not, to Hebrew thought, a soul which had accidentally and unhappily fallen into a body—a soul which was degraded by contact with a body; he was rather a body which had been temporarily—and unhappily only temporarily—lent a soul. Man was a body (flesh) and *had temporarily* a soul.

For there was nothing permanent about this soul. Its presence in the adam was due to the fact that Yahweh had blown a living breath—something quite opposite to the essential nature of the adam—into the adam's nose.

But when that “piece of pottery” called the adam was broken, what happened? Just as, when the dust devil collapsed, the dust returned to the rest of the dust whence it had been taken; so the adam breathed out his soul¹ with his breath to be mingled with the air, and returned to the dust whence he had been taken.

II

Man was thus essentially flesh—dust of the desert, lifeless matter—but he was temporarily animated, given instincts, by Yahweh's loan of breath, wind, *ruach*, *élan vital*.

For the word *nephesh*, “soul,” also means “appetite,” “desire.”² The soul is thus equivalent

¹See Genesis xxxv, 18; I Kings xix, 4; Jer. xv, 9; Jonah iv, 3; Job xi, 20; xxvii, 8. Note particularly of “Servant of Yahweh,” Isaiah liii, 12. Cf. also I Kings xvii, 21 and 22. For life as a mere breath, see Job vii, 7; Eccles. ix, 9, comparing also i, 2 and 14; James iv, 14.

²HUNGER.—Deut. xii, 15, 20; xiv, 26; Leviticus xvi, 29;

to the urge of the primitive instincts. To early Hebrew thought, as to Jung, "the soul is wholly only libido . . . it is to wish."¹

The soul is thus the primitive instincts—the primitive instincts of which the Buddhist desires above all things to be rid, but which the Hebrew regards as the loan of his God.

The soul is in Deut. xii, 23,² equated to the blood—"the blood is the life" (Hebrew *nephesh*—"soul"). With this connection of the blood with the instincts we may compare our own expression "hot-blooded," and the fact that an anæmic person is not usually energetic.

Now one man can share the emotional experience of another man—the *nephesh* of one man can be bound up in, or knit to,³ the *nephesh* of another man. And the equation of the blood to the *nephesh* throws light on the meaning of blood sacrifice and of blood brotherhood which exists in the East to-day.

xxiii, 32; Isaiah v, 14; xxix, 8; lv, 2; lvi, 11; Ezek. vii, 19; Lam. ii, 12.

SEX.—Gen. xxxiv, 3; Jer. ii, 24; Song of Songs iii, 1, 3; v, 6.

SELF PRESERVATION.—I Sam. xx, 4; Psalm lvii, 1.

AMBITION.—Habak. ii, 5; Psalm xxiv, 4; Proverbs xxviii, 25; Eccles. vi, 9.

ACQUISITIVE INSTINCT.—Psalm x, 3.

PARENTAL INSTINCT.—Gen. xlv, 30; I Sam. i, 10, 15; xxx, 6; II Kings iv, 27; Job xxx, 25.

FRIENDSHIP.—I Sam. xviii, 1.

REPULSION.—I Sam. xxiii, 20; Jer. vi, 8; Ezek. xxiii, 17, 18; xxv, 6, 15; xxxvi, 5; Zech. xi, 8; Psalm cvii, 18.

Note also Psalm cvii, 26; cxix, 28, in more general sense; and for "disappointment," see Judges xviii, 25; Job iii, 20; xxi, 25; xxvii, 2; and I Sam. i, 10, cited above.

¹*Psychology of the Unconscious*, page 309, note 70.

²Cf. Gen. iv, 10; ix, 4 to 5; Levit. xvii, 11, 14; II Sam. xxiii, 17.

³Gen. xlv, 30; I. Sam. xviii, 1.

Men become blood brothers by drinking¹ (in primitive times actually, in later times symbolically) each other's blood. They thus share one another's life, are bound to be loyal to their covenant with one another. Or a covenant may be ratified by the sacrifice of an animal. The animal is killed in order that its blood, its materialized *nephesh*, may be extracted from it. The blood of this animal, its *nephesh* or soul, is drunk (in primitive times actually, in later times symbolically) by the two parties to the covenant. In Exodus xxiv 3 to 11, we have JE's account of the covenant between Yahweh and the Israelites at Horeb. When Moses sprinkles part of the blood of the sacrifice on an object representing Yahweh, and part on the people, Yahweh and the people share the same *nephesh* and are bound to be loyal (*tsaddiq*, "righteous") to one another.

III

So long as a man is alive, "both the inner *nephesh* (soul) and the outer *basar* (flesh, body) are conceived as resting on a common substratum" (*Oxford Hebrew Lexicon*, page 659). In other words there is a temporary ego. That this is so is clear from the frequent use of such expressions as "my body," "my soul," and from the occasional use of such expressions as "my heart is turned upon me" (Hosea xi, 8—"within me" is a mistranslation—see *Oxford Hebrew Lexicon*, page 753), where the ego seems to be torn or crushed in an endo-psychic conflict.

But though there was an ego, the sense of personality was weak in early Hebrew thought.

¹Or the practice is sometimes carried out by mutual inoculation with one another's blood. See article, "Brotherhood (Artificial)" in *E.R.E.*

Man had little initiative or personal responsibility. For, father and mother having become one flesh, there was a kind of mechanical solidarity¹ between their descendants—between the different portions of flesh which had been derived from the same flesh. Men of the same family were of one another's bone and flesh and were, as we say, all tarred with the same brush. We may compare with the early Hebrew view of the solidarity of the family the principle of the blood feud which still exists to-day—the principle in accordance with which a man, if his brother is murdered, need not necessarily kill the actual murderer, but may do his duty to his own family by killing some other member of the murderer's family.

(b) Moreover, man, to early Hebrew thought, was hardly an individual or unified personality.² Primitive man was the prey of violent impulses which seemed to leap on him from without, to sweep him along, now one way, now another, and to make him a bundle of dissociated selves rather than a unified personality. As violent emotions came upon him, mastered him and drove him along without his conscious volition, so, one feels, he regarded them as capable, once they had been released and had, as it were, passed beyond him, of continuing to work themselves out without requiring his assistance or being subject to his control. At any rate, the emotion released, the blessing, the curse, were regarded as having a certain independence, a certain power of working themselves out. Once Isaac had blessed Jacob

¹See, for instance, Gen. xxix, 14; Josh. vii, 24; II Sam. v, 1; xix, 13; Isaiah lviii, 7; and principle of levirate marriage, Deut. xxv, 5 to 10. See also I Esdras viii 70.

²"His body was a complex of localized functions, and his body was himself." H. Wheeler Robinson in *Z.A.W.* 1923.

under the mistaken impression that he was blessing Esau, it was too late to rectify the error.

Moreover, a man's seed was clearly an extension of himself—an extension of himself which could live on on the earth after the main part of him was dead.¹ Children thus provided what appears to us as a kind of substitute for immortality, and childlessness was the greatest of afflictions. And as a man's seed was independent of him, so, it has been suggested,² the constituent parts of his body were regarded as having a certain independence of him. Saul is told to do "as his hand shall find."³ Psalm xlv, 4 speaks of a man's right hand teaching him terrible things. It was felt that there was a "locus" of Samson's strength by the discovery of which it was hoped to detach his strength from him; see Judges xvi, 4 to 22.

We must conclude then that, though primitive Hebrew thought recognised an ego, its sense of personality was weak. And, since man *was* flesh (body) and merely *had temporarily* a soul, the personality was connected with the body rather than with the soul.

When a man died, he expired, breathed out his *nephesh*, the loan of *élan vital* lent him by Yahweh. The restless drive of the primitive instincts was hushed, and the man remained flesh and returned to the desert dust whence he had been taken. Since man was originally dust and his soul merely

¹See, for instance, Gen. xxii, 1 to 2, 16 to 18; xxiv, 2, 9; xlvii, 29 to 30; II Sam. vii, 12; xvi, 11; Micah vi, 7; Psalm cii, 28.

²See Wheeler Robinson in *Z.A.W.* of 1923.

³I Sam. x, 7. Compare II Sam. xii, 4, 5; Deut. viii, 17; Ezek. xxi, 7; Psalm xvi, 9 to 10; xxii, 14 to 15; xxxi, 9 to 10; xxxv, 10; li, 8; ciii, 1; cxxxvii, 5 to 6; Job xxix, 10 to 11. Poetic parallelism may account for some of these passages. Compare also Numbers xi, 10; Hosea xiv, 4. Psalm cvi, 23.

a temporary loan from Yahweh, death was spoken of as a returning.¹ Sheol, the Hebrew Hades, was naturally below the earth ; for men are buried below the earth.

And there was no air—no wind, breath, spirit—no ruach below the earth. Therefore to the early Yahweh worshippers Sheol was not subject to Yahweh—it was cut off from his sight—and he could do nothing for the dead. Nor was there any nephesh, soul, instinct, in Sheol.² A man could pray that his nephesh might be delivered from Sheol—i.e. saved from dying. A man could speak of his nephesh as drawing near to Sheol (like a “dust devil” that has begun to collapse and needs a fresh eddy of the wind to revive it). But I can find no instance earlier than the Book of Job of the nephesh actually entering Sheol, (xiv, 22).³ (And by the time “Job” was written, the thought of “personality” had begun to challenge attention). Sheol seems even in Isaiah xiv, 3 to 23 (not by Isaiah) and Ezekiel xxxii 17 to 32, to be a world without nephesh. Men are gathered to their fathers and meet there. Social distinctions continue as on the earth. But there are no moral distinctions. It is true that Isaiah xiv, 3 to 23, describes the inhabitants of Sheol as becoming quite interested at the descent of the

¹See Gen. iii, 19 ; Psalm ix, 17 ; xc, 3 ; Job xxx, 23 ; xxxiv, 14 to 15 ; Tobit iii, 6.

²See Psalm xxx, 9 ; xxxi, 17 ; lxxxviii, 5, 10 to 12 ; xciv, 17 ; cxv, 17 to 18. In Psalm xvi, 10, R.V. margin is correct ; R.V. text “corruption” is not a translation of the Hebrew.

³On this passage see Driver—*International Critical Commentary on Job*—“Knowledge does not survive death : senticiency does : the dead man feels the pangs of decay, as the flesh still clothing him moulders away, and his soul can grieve for the dreary existence to which he is condemned in Sheol.” The date of the book of Job is perhaps about 400 B.C.

king of Babylon to Sheol. But the writer hardly pictures them as remaining excited for more than a minute or two. The inhabitants of Sheol are not disembodied spirits. They are bodies without instincts.¹

IV

We have, so far, considered man's (1) flesh or body (2) soul or instincts (3) personality or ego. But what of his intellect?

We must here notice a difference between the way in which the Hebrews located psychological functions in the body, and the way in which the English language locates them to-day.

Whereas an Englishman thinks with his head and feels with his heart, a Hebrew thought with his heart and felt either with his heart or, perhaps more commonly, with his abdomen (intestines liver, kidneys, etc.).

The Hebrew word for compassion (*Rachamim*) is connected with the word *Rechem*, "womb." In Colossians iii, 12, Paul speaks of *σπλάγχνα οἰκτιρμοῦ*, an expression which A.V. renders literally by "bowels of mercy," and R.V., having regard to English psychology, by "a heart of compassion."²

The word *Lebab* or *Leb* means "central part." It is used of the "heart" of the sea and of the "chest" of the body. It means "heart" and is so translated in E.V. But, having regard to the difference between Hebrew and English psychology,

¹See Gen. xxv, 8, 17; xxxv, 29; xxxvii, 35; xlvii, 30; xlix, 29; I Sam. xxviii, 19; II Sam. xii, 23; I Kings ii, 10; xi, 43; xiv, 13, 20, 31; Deut. xxxi, 16; Ezek. xxvi, 20; Job xxvi, 5; xxx, 23; Tobit vi, 14.

²See (a) Gen. xliii, 30; Amos i, 11; *rachamim*—(b) Jer. xxxi, 20; Job xx, 20; Song of Solomon v, 4; Psalm xl, 8; *meim* = "intestines"—(c) Jer. xi, 20; xii, 2; xvii, 10; xx, 12; Psalm xvi, 7; Proverbs xxiii, 16; *kilayoth* = "kidneys."

it is in many cases better to render it by "mind." The Hebrew did not think with his brain but with the middle part of him, the heart. Thus the heart was the seat of the intellect. A "man without heart" meant a stupid man.¹ Similarly, in the New Testament it will often bring out the meaning more effectively if the Greek word *kardia* ("heart") be rendered by "mind."

V

Since, as we have seen, the soul was only libido, simply "to wish," it was impossible to conceive of a soul without a body.

It is remarkable that whereas the thought that there is some sort of future life for the soul after it has left the body, seems to be found in all other early religions, this thought was foreign to the genuine Yahweh religion in its early days. It is true that the mourning customs described in the Old Testament, resemble those of other religions, and imply the fear of the souls of—at any rate—the recently dead. For instance a man who has touched the body of a dead man, is described [Numbers v, 2], as "unclean by the dead." This, in the Hebrew, is *tame le nephesh*, and seems to imply that the uncleanness consists in contact with the soul (*nephesh*) of the dead man, which is conceived as lingering near the body whence it has recently departed. But necromancy or any kind of dealings with the dead are regarded with abhorrence in the genuine Yahweh religion. Indeed Saul's final apostacy from Yahweh was indicated by his attempt to call up Samuel from Sheol.

¹Note Hosea iv, 11; vii, 11; Proverbs vii, 7; ix, 4, 16; x, 13; xi, 12; xii, 11; xv, 21; Job xxxiv, 10, 34. In Daniel, a late book, we find "visions of *head*"; Daniel vii, 1, etc.

The early Yahweh religion had nothing to do with the dead. This remarkable difference between the early Yahweh religion and other early religions is probably due to the intense loyalty to Yahweh enjoined by Moses. Yahweh was the only God to be worshipped in Israel, and so long as Yahweh was not regarded as having any authority in heathen countries on the surface of the earth, he could not be regarded as having any authority in Sheol, under the earth. If there was any power in Sheol, it was not Yahweh, and the loyal worshipper of Yahweh could have nothing to do with it. Indeed we can trace, even in the early Yahweh religion, the feeling that life consists in fellowship with Yahweh, and that there can be no life where Yahweh is absent. Therefore in the Old Testament the dead are, not ghosts, but REPHAIM, "powerless ones." It is only in Yahweh's presence that there is life.^{1 2}

¹Did Ezekiel regard his picture of Sheol in xxxii, 17 to 32, as representing fact? The cartoonist who depicts the ghost of a deceased Prime Minister at Westminster does not necessarily believe in ghosts.

²The question is sometimes asked: "Is genuine religion possible without the hope of immortality?" The study of the early Yahweh religion indicates that the answer to this question is—"Yes." The religion of the Prophets cannot be accounted for by "the yearning for immortality."

CHAPTER VII

PERHAPS the chief impression which a first study of JE in isolation from D and P leaves upon the mind, is one of surprise—surprise that J and E should be part of the Bible. It is not merely that there is confusion and inconsistency in the theology, ethics and psychology—the confusion and inconsistency were more striking when one read the early books of the Bible without distinguishing JE from D and P, but rather that the character ascribed to Yahweh, though sometimes in harmony with the Christian idea of God, often appears to Christians as unworthy of a decent man, and occasionally as unworthy of the less debased sort of criminal; that, though the heroes of the faith sometimes set examples worthy of emulation for all time, their very religion often encourages them to indulge in conduct which is to-day regarded as the mark of the criminal or of the dangerous lunatic; that, as we have already noticed, the editors fail to distinguish between the direct action of Yahweh and what appears to be abnormal in nature, or between what we call the genuine inspiration of God, and what we call the mere violent outcropping of the unconscious mind; and that they have so little sense of the unity of the universe that, though they unequivocally assert that Yahweh is the only God to be worshipped in Israel, and

hold that he displayed his power in bringing the Israelites out of Egypt, they show no surprise when heroes of the faith like Jephthah¹ and David² recognise the existence and authority of other gods outside the land of Israel. We may ask then what light the New Psychology throws on the religion of Israel as we find it in JE.

It is clear that little which we find in the early religion of Israel, can be accounted for by the "mother phase" of a boy's development. The early Yahweh religion was cruel but not licentious; it regarded the luxuries of Canaan with suspicion, never looked upon Yahweh as feminine, and, whatever we may say of it, it was a man's religion. It produced fine fighting men—men who were often fanatics, but did not run away from life and were just as ready to receive hard knocks as to give them. Joshua, Ehud, Deborah, Barak, Gideon, Jephthah, Samuel and David—whatever we may think of them—were no Peter Pans, no shirkers of life. Infantilism throws little or no light on the early Yahweh religion.

But the case is far otherwise when we turn to the boy's "father phase" and to his "group phase" for enlightenment. We will consider the "group phase" in the next chapter and the "father phase" here.

We have seen that Terror, Power and Caprice were, according to Freud's picture, the outstanding features of the primitive father in the eyes of the primitive boy.

When we turn to JE we find that Terror, Power and Caprice were often the outstanding features

¹Judges xi, 24.

²I Sam. xxvi, 19.

of the character of Yahweh in the eyes of his worshippers in the days of which JE write.

To quote a few instances. The attitude towards Pharaoh, which is ascribed to Yahweh in Exodus ix, 16—"In very deed for this cause have I made thee to stand [Lexicon 'maintained thee'] for to shew in thee my power, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth"—is not compatible with our sense of justice. Yahweh is represented as commanding the massacre of the women and children of the Amalekites—see I Samuel xv, 2 and 3)—"Thus saith Yahweh Sabaoth . . . slay both man and woman, infant and suckling"—as striking Uzzah dead for doing his best to prevent the ark from falling to the ground (see II Sam. vi, 6 to 7)—as requiring the hanging of seven innocent persons as a preliminary to stopping a famine (see II Sam. xxi, 1 to 14)—as instigating David to break a taboo so as to provide himself with an excuse for punishing Israel (see II Sam. xxiv, 1).¹ The passages just quoted are among the most revolting which can be found in JE, but they are not exceptional, nor is the character ascribed to Yahweh in them difficult to reconcile with the character usually ascribed to him in JE. For Yahweh in JE is more often regarded as a capricious God than as a just God; no one can say what may annoy him or what he is likely to do next; he seems to be guided by whim rather than by principle; his worshippers regard him with irrational terror rather than with reverent fear.

These traits in the character which is often ascribed to Yahweh in JE, and the effect on his

¹It is significant that this theology was too horrible for the Chronicler who wrote about 250 B.C. Cf. II Sam. xxiv, 1, with I Chron. xxi, 1.

worshippers of their ascription of these traits to him, exactly correspond with the predominating traits in the character of Freud's primitive father of the horde and with the effect on his sons of these traits in his character.

Moreover, JE's vague idea as to the extent of the authority of Yahweh—whose power seems to be regarded, sometimes as limited to the land of Israel, sometimes as manifested also in Egypt—corresponds to the primitive boy's vague idea as to the extent of his father's authority. For, though the primitive boy in the primitive horde was aware of the existence of other hordes in which other primitive boys owed allegiance to other primitive fathers, he presumably regarded his own father as more dreadful than the fathers of these other hordes, some of whom his father had perhaps fought against and conquered. But he was not interested in such problems as the unity of the universe. His father stood to him for Terror and Caprice and was also his ideal ; but his father's authority was clearly limited, more or less narrowly, to his own horde.

It thus seems that the dread of the primitive boy for the primitive father—a hereditary dread passed on from one generation to another after the real meaning of it had been forgotten—may quite possibly account for certain features in the early Yahweh religion. This theory does not imply that David, for instance, had as a boy lived in abject terror of his father Jesse, nor that he was aware that his primitive ancestors had lived in abject terror of their primitive fathers. It implies rather that his theology was influenced by what we may call a hereditary dread—a dread rooted, not

in his own experience, but in the experience of his ancestors.

As an instance of a hereditary dread we may mention the tendency of horses to shy at puddles by the roadside. Why should a horse which has been bred in England and is accustomed to passing bicycles and motor-cars, be frightened by a puddle by the roadside. He has, as we say, no reason to be frightened ; no puddle by the roadside has ever hurt him. True, but his ancestors in other countries had only too good a reason for fearing a dark object by the wayside. For this dark object might prove to be a panther.

Similarly, the child's fear of what may come out of the space between the wardrobe and the corner of the room after the night-light has been put out, is an irrational dread ; for he has never seen anything come out of that space and has no reason to expect that anything ever will. But the fear of darkness was reasonable enough in the child's primitive ancestors, who lived on the edge of the jungle and had only too good a cause for fearing what might spring out of the dark corner.

It seems to be at any rate a tenable hypothesis that the idea of the capricious, incalculable, disaster in nature—the idea of the famine, for instance, or of the pestilence—was associated in the minds of David and of his contemporaries with the hereditary, unconscious, dread of the primitive father—an irrational dread which was the heritage of the terror felt not unreasonably by their primitive ancestors in childhood for the father of the horde.

We have already seen that the incalculable disaster in nature was attributed to the direct action of Yahweh. It seems, then, that the character often attributed to Yahweh in JE may well be explained

as the condensation of the idea of the capricious, overwhelming, in nature with the hereditary dread of the primitive father. Moreover, the appalling cruelties which the worshippers of Yahweh often practised on their enemies in the name of Yahweh, may be, at any rate partially, explained by their unconscious, hereditary, admiration for the cruelty and caprice of the primitive father and by their unconscious desire to compensate for their hereditary dread of him by working off their resentment against it on other people.

It seems, then, not unreasonable to assume that Freud's theory regarding the primitive father of the horde explains much in the theology of JE.

But does it account for the JE religion ?

To indicate the difficulty of accepting such a view we will content ourselves with considering briefly (a) the conception of Yahweh's relationship to Israel ; (b) the character of Joseph ; (c) the religion of David.

(a) It is remarkable that, whereas in Greek myths Zeus was often the actual " primitive father," in that he and some woman were regarded as the physical ancestors of the tribe, in the Old Testament Yahweh was never regarded as the physical ancestor of Israel.

It has been pointed out that if we would reconstruct the kind of mental picture which J formed of the Adam and Eve story, we must not picture Yahweh as a giant walking in a garden where two pigmies are trying to hide themselves. The difference between Yahweh and Adam was not pictured as a difference in size, but as a difference in essence. Yahweh might be regarded as being of human shape ; but whereas Adam was flesh, Yahweh was spirit (RUACH).

“ Israel is my son, my firstborn ”—says Yahweh in Exodus iv, 22 ; but Israel’s sonship implies, not physical descent, but adoption. Israel is Yahweh’s son because—and only because—Yahweh has, in his covenant with Abraham or Moses, adopted him as his son.

However much the character ascribed to Yahweh is coloured by the hereditary dread of the father of the horde, Yahweh is “ not a man that he should lie.” [Numbers xxiii, 19.]

It is, not the similarity, but the difference between Yahweh and man, which impresses JE. From the beginning there is something of transcendence in their theology.

There is a radical difference between the impression left on the mind by the character ascribed by Homer to Zeus, and the impression left on the mind by the character ascribed by JE to Yahweh.

(b) To turn to Joseph. It is doubtful—and, for our present purpose, immaterial—how far the story of Joseph is historical. But even if the story of Joseph in Genesis be no more historical than the story of Odysseus in Homer, the religion ascribed to the man who was regarded as the great ancestor of the Ephaimites, stands for what JE regard as true religion.

Now a man who meets the advances of his master’s wife by recalling his master’s confidence in him and saying—“ How then can I do this great wickedness, and sin against God ? ”—[Gen. xxxix, 7 to 9]—a man who forgives his brothers for selling him into slavery and says to them—“ Fear not : for am I in the place of God ? And as for you, ye meant evil against me ; but God meant it for good . . . to save much people alive ”—[Gen. 1, 19 and 20]—

such a man is not the worshipper of a capricious or revengeful God.

A comparison between Homer and the JE portions of Genesis is a fair one. Both Homer and the JE portions of Genesis deal mainly with the prehistoric, but they represent the religious ideas in which Plato and Amos respectively were brought up.

We can hardly avoid asking why it is that, whereas Plato felt himself bound to exclude Homer, the Bible of the Greeks, from his ideal republic on the ground that the Homeric religion was subversive of morality, Amos and Hosea appealed to religious ideas which we find in JE, as the basis of their moral teaching. And we may ask further why it is that, while few Scoutmasters would care to hold up the character of Odysseus—attractive as he is—for the emulation of their Boy Scouts, the character of Joseph—the boy who began by being an intolerable prig and ended by becoming a gentleman—remains one of the finest characters in literature.

(c) To pass to established history. Much in the theology of David seems to be explained by the Freudian theory. During a famine David hangs seven innocent persons in order that Yahweh may "let himself be intreated"¹ for the land; he ascribes the death of Uzzah to the vengeance of Yahweh for the breaking of one taboo, and a destructive epidemic to the vengeance of Yahweh for his own breaking of another. Yet in the last case he appeals against the capricious Yahweh of the popular theology of his day to the just Yahweh whom he dimly feels to be the real Yahweh. In this narrative—surely one of the most terrible narratives in the Old Testament—though Yahweh appears as the villain

¹So Hebrew of II Sam. xxi, 14.

and David as the hero, David is no rebel like Prometheus, but a man of faith who in spite of his appalling theology gropes after the justice of God. "Let us fall now into the hand of Yahweh; for his mercies are great: and let me not fall into the hand of man." (II Sam. xxiv, 14.) "Lo, I have sinned, and I have done perversely: but these sheep, what have they done? Let thine hand, I pray thee, be against me, and against my father's house." (verse 17.)

Broken-hearted at the treachery of Absalom, his son, this great soldier's nerve fails and he flies from his capital. But when the priests bring out the ark of Yahweh in order that the magical potency of this sacred object may accompany him on his flight, at his moment of supreme trial David's religion rises above his theology and he says—"Carry back the ark of God into the city: if I shall find favour in the eyes of Yahweh, he will bring me again, and shew me both it, and his habitation." [II Sam. xv, 25.]

And when, instead of flaying Nathan alive for denouncing him for the murder of Uriah, he confesses his crimes, saying—"I have sinned against Yahweh"—and accepts the principle that even the king cannot put his own caprice before justice without offending Yahweh, his theology differs as widely from the theology of a worshipper of the "primitive father" as justice differs from caprice. [II Sam. xii, 1 to 25.]

Suggesting then to the advocates of the "father phase" theory of religion, a consideration of JE's view of Yahweh, of the character they ascribe to Joseph, and of their presentation of the David of history, let us pass on to a consideration of (a) JE's view of history, (b) their view of evil, and (c) their psychology of inspiration.

(a) We will take first JE's view of history. E gives us a definition of the name of Yahweh, which, whether it be etymologically correct or not, expresses the view of the E editors that Yahweh is a God of history, of progress.

'E,' in Exodus iii, 14, connects the name with the Imperfect Tense of the Hebrew verb Hayah (or Hawah) meaning "to become." Now the Hebrew Imperfect does not suggest mere continuance, the function of the participle, but progressive continuance. It suggests movement, life, history. It is the normal way of expressing the future. Translate verse 14: "And God said unto Moses—'I will be what I will be': and he said 'Thus shalt thou say unto the Israelites—'I will be' hath sent me unto you.' " To 'E' the meaning of Yahweh is not "He that is," but "He will be." The 'E' editors thought of the God of their fathers, not as static but as dynamic, not as the God of frozen perfection thought out by Greek philosophy, but as a living God, "marching on" and calling men to dangerous adventures in which "He will be" with them and will make Himself known to them. (See Peake's *One Volume Bible Commentary* in loco.)

And how is Moses to prove the existence of Yahweh? How is he to satisfy himself of the genuineness of his call? In iii, 12, Yahweh is represented as saying to Moses—"I will be with thee; and this shall be the token unto thee, that I have sent thee: when thou hast brought forth the people out of Egypt, ye shall serve God upon this mountain."

Here we have JE's view as to the way in which men may be sure of God. And it is quite "unphilosophical." It does not prove the existence of God. No—"solvitur ambulando." Obey first, and then you will know. If you do not obey, you will

never know. Centuries later the translators of the LXX, desiring doubtless to commend their religion to the philosophical Greeks, translated "I will be what I will be" by "I am he that is."¹ Their translation, with its hint of the passionless, logical, dead God of Aristotle, was taken over by the Church, and Greek theologians sought to reduce the living "I will be" of the prophets to the logical "One who is" of Greek philosophy. But when we look behind the theory of the Greek of the LXX to the Hebrew of the E editors, we find that the derivation of the name Yahweh which is given in E, implies the confidence in the future, the forward look, the interest in history as purposive, which are among the unique elements in Hebrew thought and are connected with the Hebrew faith in Yahweh as a God of history, a God of progress.

(b) Moreover, JE's confidence in the future of their nation is matched by their insistence that life is good. Their view of the instincts is fundamentally opposed to the Buddhist's. They do not desire to be rid of the soul, thirst, desire, craving, libido, or drive of the primitive instincts. On the contrary they regard the nephesh, soul or instincts, as the gift of their God.

To JE the loan of life was the loan of a good thing, and their only regret was that it was only a temporary loan. The thought of Sheol lay like a pall across the Hebrew religion. The Hebrews, feeling themselves to be the temporary guests of Yahweh, sought for long life that they might enjoy his hospitality for as long as possible. It was not Nirvana that they longed for, but escape for as long as possible from Sheol.

¹ ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ "Ων. (cf. ὁ "Ων ἀπέσταλκέ με προς ὑμᾶς in LXX. of Exodus iii, 14.)

It is true that in the later literature passages occur in which life is felt to be so hard as to be unendurable. It is, for instance, noteworthy that the same Hebrew root *Ragaz* as is used in I Sam. xxviii, 15, by the Samuel who is supposed to have been called up from Sheol by a medium and says—"Why hast thou *disquieted* me?"—is used by Job when he desires to return to the womb. See Job iii, 17, 26—"There the wicked cease from *troubling*"—"trouble cometh." (It is also used in Job xiv, 1.) Sheol here seems to be a Nirvana where one is at rest, and it is equated to the mother's womb in Job i, 21; iii, 10 to 26. [Cf. Jeremiah xx, 14 to 18.] The desire to return thither is the "mother complex" of modern psychology; it is the desire to escape from life and from the living God who takes men out of the womb and flings them into the rough and tumble of life. [Psalm xxii, 9.]

But such longing for Sheol is exceptional, and the normal Hebrew's prayer is, not for Nirvana, but for length of days in which he may praise Yahweh in the land of the living.

The Hebrew, then, regarded the instincts, not with suspicion, but as the gift of Yahweh. Nor did genuine Hebrew thought ascribe the origin of sin to the flesh. The flesh was not evil; it was just lifeless dust of the desert—without strength.¹

So genuine Hebrew thought is free from the tendency—which has invaded even Christianity—to consider the sex instinct as a degraded instinct, and to exalt celibacy as a "higher state" than marriage.

But, if sin does not originate in the flesh or in the instincts, where does it originate? J gives us the answer—an answer which will always be a stumbling

¹Cf. use of word "flesh" in New Testament (e.g., Mark xiv, 38) by all writers except Paul.

block to Greek philosophy, but which anticipates in a startling manner many of the conclusions of the New Psychology—that there is something wrong with man's intellectual processes, that sin originates, not in the flesh nor in the instincts, but in the mind.

The whole imagination (yetser, i.e., purpose, bent, formation, tendency) of the thoughts (machsheboth, purposes, phantasies) of man's heart (i.e., according to English Psychology—"of man's mind") is merely evil all day long. [See Genesis vi, 5, and compare Mark vii, 21.]¹

To JE the cause of man's sin is that man's thinking is warped and out of touch with reality.

(c) In conclusion, we must turn to what we may call the psychology of inspiration, of JE. As we have already seen, JE fails to distinguish between the genuine inspiration of Yahweh and what we call the mere outcroppings of the unconscious. All the violent outcroppings of the unconscious such as the ravings of the Mad Mullahs who accompany Samuel, are considered to be inspiration, due to the spirit of Yahweh, and consequently true inspiration. Moreover, JE view Balaam as the verbal inspirationists view the authors of books in the Bible. Balaam is a prophet in spite of himself, and cannot avoid speaking what God puts into his mouth. [Numbers xxiii, 29; xxiv, 1; xxiii, 12.] To JE there is no such thing as false inspiration. They feel that the only way in which Yahweh could protect Israel from Balaam's curse, was by turning it into a blessing; had a curse been uttered, it must, being the inspiration of Yahweh, have worked itself out, as Isaac's blessing of Jacob worked itself out.

¹With Gen. vi, 5, cf. Gen. vi, 11 to 12; viii, 21; Eccles. vii, 29. See also Isaiah xxxi, 3, with which cf. Mark xiv, 38; Psalm cxxxix, 14 to 16; Job x, 10 to 11; II Macc. vii, 22. A lower view appears in Psalm li, 5; Job xiv, 4; xv, 14.

Again, the difference between JE's view of inspiration and the Christian view is well brought out if we render Judges xiv, 19—in the account of Samson's behaviour on losing his bet—in more colloquial language than that of R.V.

"Samson, inspired by Yahweh, went down to Ashkelon, killed thirty of the inhabitants, stripped them of their clothes and so paid his bet to the men who had found out his riddle."

But, though the J and E editors resemble the Freudian School in their inability to distinguish between the genuine inspiration of God and the mere outcroppings of the unconscious, they differ immensely from the Freudian School in that they do recognise what we may call differing degrees of inspiration.

For JE are dominated by an ideal and a religious experience—how far these are historical it is irrelevant for our present purpose to discuss—the ideal and the religious experience of Moses, the man to whom Yahweh used to speak face to face as a man speaks to his neighbour.

In Numbers xi, 17, the Ruach of Yahweh is regarded, not as fitfully poured out on Moses, but as permanently resting on him—as indeed capable of being extended from Moses to the elders who, sharing in the spirit which is upon him, are to assist him in the leadership of the people.

Moreover, in Numbers xii, 6 to 8, Yahweh says—"If there be a prophet among you, I, Yahweh, will make myself known unto him in a vision, I will speak with him in a dream. My servant Moses is not so [i.e., he is a different sort of man] . . . with him will I speak mouth to mouth, even manifestly, and not in dark speeches, and the form of Yahweh shall he behold." And Exodus xxxiii, 11, states

that—"Yahweh spake [frequentative, i.e., "was in the habit of speaking"] unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend."

In considering the psychology of inspiration of JE we must never forget that behind JE is Moses. And the inspiration of Moses differs from the inspiration of the other prophets of whom JE write, not perhaps in kind, but at any rate in degree.

To Aaron, Miriam and ordinary prophets, Yahweh makes himself known by visions and dreams. But Yahweh's servant, Moses, is a different sort of man. He is in constant touch with Yahweh. So Yahweh can teach him, not merely symbolically by dreams and visions, but by the constant intercourse, the constantly renewed conversation, by which a man makes himself known to his neighbour.

Thus, to JE, (a) all manifestations of the unconscious are inspiration, due to the Spirit of God; (b) there may be differences in the degree of inspiration; but (c) all inspiration is true so far as it goes.

CHAPTER VIII

IN the days of Samuel the popular theology of the Israelites may be said to pass from the "father phase" to the "group phase." It was the rise of the prophets in the days of Samuel which created the monarchy and made possible the completion of the conquest of the land of Canaan. It was Samuel and his "Mad Mullahs,"¹ who preached a holy war and stirred up the people to follow Saul and David and fight against the Philistines.

It was in the name of Yahweh Tsebaoth, the God of the armies of Israel, that David went out to meet Goliath; and the establishment of his kingdom was the result of a national, or "group," religious movement which started from the prophets. Both Saul and David were anointed king by Samuel and were described as "Yahweh's anointed" (Hebrew "the Messiah of Yahweh"—LXX "the Christ of the Lord").

Under David and Solomon the Israelites constituted one national group under one king, and in Nathan's message from Yahweh to David concerning his dynasty the adoptive sonship of Israel to Yahweh is concentrated in the reigning king of the house of David, the visible head on earth of the

¹In II Kings ix, 11, the prophet who was sent by Elisha to proclaim a "holy war" against the house of Ahab by anointing Jehu as king, is described by Jehu's officers as "this mad fellow."

national group. Of the reigning king of the house of David Yahweh says in II Samuel vii, 14—"I will be his father, and he shall be my son."

As the prophets created the monarchy, so the monarchy, when it had been established, supported the prophets. It maintained guilds of professional prophets who stirred up the people to support the king in his wars. These prophets also stirred up the king if he was slack in the prosecution of a holy war, and opposed him if he was disloyal to the national religion. It was a prophet who denounced Ahab in the name of Yahweh for his humanity in sparing the life of Ben-hadad, king of Damascus, and it was the prophets who, in answer to Ahab's attempt to modify the harshness of the Yahweh religion by syncretism with the licentious—presumably "mother phase"—religion of the Baal of Tyre, stirred up the bloodthirsty revolution of Jehu. Jehu overthrew the house of Ahab and treacherously massacred many of the worshippers of the Baal of Tyre. The Yahweh religion thus triumphant, Jeroboam II, a descendant of Jehu, encouraged by the prophet Jonah [II Kings xiv, 25], took advantage of the temporary weakness of Assyria to raise Northern Israel to a position of greater power and outward prosperity than it had enjoyed since its separation from Judah on the death of Solomon. In the long reign of Jeroboam II the "group spirit" was strong in Northern Israel, and the people were looking forward to a great "day of Yahweh"—"the day" (in German "Der Tag") on which Yahweh, the God of the group, was to give Israel the victory over all the neighbouring groups.

It is clear that the psychology of the "group phase" in a boy's development throws light on the popular theology and ethics of this period. The

popular view of Yahweh was expressed in the title Yahweh Tsebaoth—Yahweh, the God of the armies of Israel. Yahweh stood for the group, and the character popularly ascribed to him was—largely at any rate—the personification of the qualities admired in the group.

The popular ethics conformed to the popular theology. The ethics demanded by the Yahweh religion were the ethics which were “felt to be”—to use Tansley’s expression—in the interest of the national group. To Jehu the worshippers of the Baal of Tyre were no less guilty of treason than of religious apostacy. It was, moreover, as we have seen, a prophet who in the name of Yahweh denounced the humane conduct of Ahab in sparing the life of Ben-hadad, his prisoner of war. “Thus saith Yahweh—Because thou hast let go out of thy hand the man whom I had devoted to destruction, therefore thy life shall go for his life, and thy people for his people” [I Kings xx, 42]. The Yahweh of the popular religion—without being divested of the capriciousness of the primitive father—has clearly become the war god of the group.

Nor is it only before the fall of Samaria in 722, which ended the history of Northern Israel, that the group phase theology and ethics can be traced in the Old Testament religion. We can trace them in the religion of the opponents of Jeremiah and in that of the opponents of Zechariah, in the religion condemned by the author of Jonah, in the religion of the supporters of the Maccabæan dynasty. In the New Testament period they inspired the war with Rome (66 to 70 A.D.), of which Gwatkin says—“Israel had fought with Rome for nothing less than the empire of the East, and under better leaders might have won.” [See Peake’s *Commentary*, page

610.] And even after the fall of Jerusalem they blazed up again in one last bid for world dominion, and led to the disastrous insurrection of Bar-Cochba who claimed to be the Messiah (135 A.D.).

Indeed, the presence in the Israelite religion of elements which seem to be connected with the theology and ethics of the "father" and "group" phases, is as remarkable as the comparative absence of elements which can be connected with the "mother phase."

We have already noticed some of the difficulties which will confront those of the New Psychologists who seek to explain religion by the psychology of the "father phase," if they should happen to turn their attention to a study of the Old Testament in the light of modern criticism. We have now to ask—Can the Old Testament religion be explained by the psychology of the "group phase"?

Those who would maintain that the Old Testament religion can be thus explained, are faced with the fact that in the ninth century B.C. there arose a prophet—Micaiah ben-Yimlah—who opposed the prophets of the group religion, and with the fact that, in doing so, he was but the first of a long line of Israelites of the Old Covenant who denounced the group religion of their contemporaries—a line of men whom, though they themselves sometimes refused to be called prophets, we to-day call the prophets *par excellence*—a line of men which culminated in the man who declared that God was able of the very stones (Aramaic *abenaya*) to raise up sons (Aramaic *benaya*) to the group ancestor. [Matthew iii, 9.]

It will, perhaps, be said that these men were mere cosmopolitans who personified a wider group than the national group; but it is hardly conceivable

that a student of the Old Testament in the light of modern criticism could look upon those prophets who lived before the Babylonian exile, as proclaimers of a cosmopolitan religion. The fall of Jerusalem and the collapse of the Yahweh religion as a national religion had to become accomplished facts before the need for regarding the Yahweh religion as a universal religion could arise. And when this need did arise—when a prophet (the author of Isaiah xl to lv) proclaimed unequivocally that the Yahweh religion was a religion for all nations, his theology and ethics had striking features—indeed unique features—which must be considered in due course in a later chapter.

Micaiah was presumably one of those “sons of the prophets” or professional prophets who were maintained by the monarchy. When he opposed King Ahab and refused to follow the lead of his brother-prophets, he put himself in the position of a member of a Trade Union who is at one and the same time quarrelling with his employer and refusing to carry out the orders of his brother Trades Unionists. His terrible theology seems to have been influenced by the hereditary dread of the primitive father; but it is hard to see how his religion can be accounted for as “religion of the group.” He challenges the close attention of all students of the psychology of religion.

We have seen that JE failed to distinguish between what we call the genuine inspiration of God, and what we call the mere outcropping of the unconscious; that they regarded all inspiration as true; but that they recognised a difference in degrees of inspiration.

In Numbers xii, 6 to 8, JE distinguishes between degrees of inspiration and suggests that the degree

of inspiration depends on the faithfulness of its recipient. It is the degree of the faithfulness of Moses to Yahweh, which distinguishes him from other men. But in Numbers xii, 6 to 8, Aaron and Miriam are not represented as unfaithful to Yahweh ; they are represented merely as less faithful to Yahweh than Moses is. Their lower form of inspiration is considered to be true enough so far as it goes.

JE are not aware of, or, at any rate, do not consider, any case in which the prophets have flatly, irreconcilably, contradicted one another. But Micaiah does flatly, irreconcilably, contradict the other prophets.

Before the incident which has made him famous in history, Micaiah had been out of favour with Ahab [See I Kings xxii, 7 and 8]. He had perhaps already contradicted the other prophets. For it is significant that Jehoshaphat was not satisfied by the unanimity of four hundred of these [verse 6] and apparently marked the absence of Micaiah. At any rate it is a critical moment in the history of religion when Micaiah ben-Yimlah is brought—apparently from prison—before Ahab and Jehoshaphat “ at the entrance of the gate of Samaria.” [See I Kings xxii, 1 to 28.] Four hundred professional prophets of Yahweh are prophesying prosperity in the name of Yahweh. But Micaiah cannot be faithless to Yahweh. He knows that those four hundred prophets are deceived. But his psychology is quite inadequate to distinguishing between the Spirit of Yahweh and the mere outcroppings of the unconscious mind. The four hundred are showing all the ordinary signs of ecstasy. Therefore they must be inspired by Yahweh just as much as he is. But he is right and they are wrong. What then ? “ *Quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat.*” Yahweh has

deliberately deceived them—perhaps justly since Ahab deserves to be “enticed,” “made a fool of”—yet deliberately deceived them.

Such is the terrible theology of Micaiah ben-Yimlah. For though the vision of Yahweh and the host of heaven doubtless came to him in a dream or trance, he presumably brought his reason to bear on it in recounting it to Ahab.

But though Micaiah's theology seems to be influenced by the theology of the “father phase” religion, his psychology of inspiration indicates an immense advance on JE's. It is true that he does not distinguish between what we call the inspiration of God, and what we call the mere outcropping of the unconscious. Indeed, it is (see verse 23) Yahweh himself who has put a lying spirit (*Ruach*)—a spirit of deceit—an inspiration intended to betray—in the mouths of Ahab's prophets in order to fool him and betray him by a prediction of prosperity; and it is also Yahweh who has—through Micaiah—predicted against Ahab adversity. Both true and false inspiration are due to Yahweh, who seems to be regarded as a capricious, rather than as a just, God.

But, however primitive Micaiah's theology, his psychology of inspiration is quite new. He distinguishes, not merely between degrees of true inspiration, but between true and false inspiration. His message to his fellow-countrymen is that not all “inspiration” is true; that there are, not only true prophets, but also false prophets.

The narrative of Elijah on Horeb precedes the narrative of Micaiah in the book of Kings. But it implies a development in psychology. [See I Kings xix, 11 and 12.] Yahweh is the author of life and rules over nature. He is passing by—“marching on”—as the American war hymn puts it. That is

why things happen, whether in the world of nature or of mind. But Yahweh is not to be identified with the catastrophes of nature nor with what we call the mere outcroppings of the unconscious. Yahweh is not in the Ruach, the fire or the earthquake. Neither the sense of inspiration, the fire of eloquence nor the violent upheaval of the unconscious is a guarantee that it is Yahweh's voice which is heard. It is in a "sound of a low whisper"¹ that Yahweh speaks to Elijah.

The two narratives—concerning Micaiah and Elijah on Horeb—herald a new era in Old Testament history. Up to this period the prophets of Yahweh have presented a solid front to the world—they have been both Mad Mullahs and also preachers of justice. Samuel said—"Speak, Yahweh, for thy servant is listening"—but he was also the leader of raving Mad Mullahs. Elijah on Carmel prayed quietly while the prophets of the Baal of Tyre raved—but he also massacred his opponents in cold blood. Elisha deserved the title "man of God"—but he also instigated a bloodthirsty revolution and died with words of primitive magic on his lips. [II Kings xiii, 14 to 20.]

Though Micaiah deliberately contradicts his brother prophets, he does not deny their inspiration. He declares that Yahweh has deceived them. But Elijah's vision on Horeb suggests the suspicion that such prophets may not be inspired by Yahweh at all, that they may be merely mistaking what we call the violent outcroppings of their own unconscious minds, for the sound of a low whisper in which Yahweh speaks to those who really listen to him.

Thus in the very age (middle of ninth century,

¹So Hebrew of I Kings xix, 12.

B.C.) of the triumph of the prophets—in the very age when they overthrew the house of Omri and set up the house of Jehu—questions were being raised about the validity of their inspiration.

A century later Amos created a breach in the solid front which the prophets of Yahweh had hitherto presented to the world. Micaiah had opposed the members of the prophetic guild to which he belonged; Amos refused to join the prophetic guild at all.

He ascribed its origin to Yahweh, but declared that it had yielded to the popular demand for popular preaching and had ceased to speak Yahweh's message. "Thus saith Yahweh I raised up of your sons for prophets (But ye) commanded the prophets, saying, Prophecy not." (Amos ii, 6, 11, 12).

It is remarkable that Amos, though he refused to join the prophetic guild, was not externally distinguishable from one of the professional prophets. Amaziah called him a seer—see-er—chozeh—(vii, 12)—and told him to desist from "prophesying," (Niphal of verb Naba from Nabi, "a prophet"). Moreover, Amos himself, though refusing to be called a nabi, declared that Yahweh had sent him to "prophesy" (Niphal of Naba) to Israel (vii, 15).

Amaziah's attitude towards Amos suggests that he felt him to be possessed of the "divine madness" which was, and is, a protection in the East. Just as Ahab did not venture to put Micaiah to death at once, but merely put him in prison till the event should have disproved his prediction and made it apparent that his prophetic madness was simulated; so Amaziah did not, so far as is known, employ violence against Amos, but contented

himself with ordering him to confine his activities to his own country, Judah (vii, 12, cf. i, 1).

It seems, then, that the preaching of Amos was, sometimes at any rate, the result of an abnormal psychological condition such as we describe rather vaguely by the term ecstasy.

The question as to what was the psychological condition of the great prophets when they received their messages, is a keenly debated and difficult one. Some consider, for instance, that, unless Jeremiah had shown signs of the "divine madness" which we call "ecstasy," he would have been put to death; others consider that if he had shown signs of "ecstasy," he would not have been in constant danger of death.

At present most modern scholars regard the great prophets as ecstasies. Thus T. H. Robinson writes—"The prophets spoke under the stress of a peculiar condition of mind and body, which we commonly call ecstasy," (*The Book of Amos in Colloquial Speech*—National Adult School Union—30, Bloomsbury Street, London, W.C., 1,—price 6d.).

But without denying that the great prophets sometimes spoke under the stress of ecstasy, one may doubt whether they always spoke in this manner. We must remember that even JE recognised that the inspiration of Moses was superior to the inspiration of other prophets, and that the superiority of his inspiration consisted in the very fact that he did not need to go off into an ecstasy in order to hold communion with Yahweh. It seems that JE felt that Yahweh could not get the other prophets to listen to him except when they were asleep or in a trance; but that Moses was a different kind of man—a man with whom Yahweh could speak face to face as a man speaks to his

neighbour. It was only by losing control over themselves that the other prophets could hear Yahweh's message; but Moses was in constant and conscious touch with Yahweh. Moreover, Yahweh spoke to Moses "mouth to mouth, even manifestly, and not (as to the prophets to whom he spoke in dreams and visions) in dark speeches" (Hebrew *chidoth*—"allegories"—see Hebrew *Lexicon*, page 295) (Numbers xii, 8). It seems then that, like modern psychologists, JE considered dreams and visions to be "allegorical" or "symbolical"; that they considered dreams and visions to be Yahweh's method of speaking to other prophets; but that they considered Yahweh's method of speaking to Moses to have been direct, and comparable to an actual conversation in which one man hears the very words and sees the very face of the other—"With him will I speak mouth to mouth . . . and the form of Yahweh shall he behold." Thus while the messages received by the other prophets were symbolical, and their psychological condition when they received them, was one of what we call ecstasy; the messages received by Moses were direct, and his psychological condition when he received them, was one of what we call meditation.

It may also be noted that in I Sam. ix, 17, and in I Sam. xvi, 1 to 13, Samuel is represented as holding a conversation with Yahweh—in the first case in the gate of a city, in the second case while interviewing the sons of Jesse. Further, while in II Sam. xxiv, 11—"And David rose up in the morning—Now the word (*dabar*) of Yahweh had¹ come to Gad the nabi, David's seer" (Hebrew)—

¹Cf. Driver's *Commentary*.

Gad's appalling announcement, regarding Yahweh's vengeance for the taking of the census, seems to be the result of a night vision—as Nathan's prediction regarding David's dynasty clearly was (see II Sam. vii, 3 and 4, 17), it is remarkable that in the account of Nathan's rebuke of David for the murder of Uriah, Yahweh simply "sends" Nathan, on the birth of Bathsheba's child, to David. Here no dream is mentioned, and the "word" (*dabar*) of Yahweh is mentioned, not as "coming to" Nathan, but as despised by David when he committed adultery and murder. (see II Sam. xi, 27 ; xii, 1, 9, cf. 10).

It seems, then, to be at any rate a tenable hypothesis that a prophet did not always require a special vision as a preliminary to denouncing a particular act of injustice. That Amos did have abnormal psychical experiences is evident from a study of his visions. But it seems to be precarious to assert that he always preached in a state of ecstasy or as a result of having been in a state of ecstasy. Before he began his career as a prophet, he had been a shepherd in the lonely wilderness of Judah. There he had meditated on the justice of Yahweh till his mind was saturated with the thought of it. Perhaps before the commencement of his prophetic career—and certainly during the course of it—he had ecstatic experiences. But we can hardly assume that he always waited for a special vision or ecstatic experience before opening his mouth anew to denounce the religion of his contemporaries.

It must, at any rate, be remembered that the true prophets were not the only prophets who had abnormal psychical experiences. The false prophets also dreamed dreams and saw visions. The presence of psychical abnormality was not the

criterion by which the true prophet could be distinguished from the false prophet ; it seems rather to have been the one point of resemblance between them.

And we are concerned primarily, not with the resemblances, real or supposed, between those whom we call the prophets par excellence, and those whom we call the false prophets, but rather with the difference between them.¹

It is clear that the prophets from Samuel to Elisha were both what we may call " Mad Mullahs," and also preachers of justice ; that these men were the spiritual ancestors, both of prophets such as Amos, Jeremiah, etc., and also of the " false prophets " ; that from the time of Amos onwards there was a breach among the spiritual descendants of Samuel, the majority (i.e. the " false prophets ") following him, not in his office of a preacher of justice, but in his office of a " Mad Mullah," and the minority ceasing to be " Mad Mullahs " and becoming the greatest preachers of justice in history.

Amos and Hosea clearly distinguished their message from the message of the false prophets. Thus about three centuries after the rise of the prophets there were a few people, at any rate, who realised clearly that there is a fundamental distinction between the genuine inspiration of God and what we nowadays call the mere outcroppings of the unconscious mind. This development in the psychology of inspiration was accompanied by a development in ethics and theology.

To Amos Yahweh, the God of Israel, is not a God of caprice, but a God of justice ; moreover,

¹See *Old Testament Prophecy*, A. B. Davidson—[T. and T. Clark]—chapter 9.

he requires of his worshippers, not sacrifices, but justice and honesty.

Now sacrifices are tied to localities. Justice is universal—necessary and possible wherever men exist ; and in no nation can it be just to sell 15 oz. and call it a pound.

Thus Yahweh, the God of Israel, can be worshipped, not only in the land of Israel, but wherever men exist. And there cannot be more than one God of justice !

Therefore it is not surprising to find that Amos is almost, if not quite, a monotheist. To him Yahweh, the God of Israel, is the God of all the nations.¹

¹Cf. Zechariah xiv, 9. In every generation, in every nation, Yahweh, the God of justice, is "one, and his name (i.e., character) one." Therefore he is "king over all the earth."

CHAPTER IX

PRELIMINARY NOTE

FOR Hosea, see G. A. Smith in the *Book of the Twelve Prophets*, or Box in *Peake's Commentary*. The narrative of Hosea's marriage is contained in i, 2 to 9 and iii, 1 to 4. The following translation of these passages is taken from *The Book of Hosea* (price 9d.) by the present author in "Books of the Old Testament in Colloquial Speech" (National Adult School Union, Bloomsbury Street, W.C. 1., price 9d.)

Chapter i, 2 to 9.—This is the way in which Yahweh began to communicate his message to Hosea.

Yahweh put it into Hosea's mind to woo and marry a girl of treacherous character—one who would bear him children not his own.

(And why?) Because the country was persistently committing adultery by being treacherous to Yahweh.

So Hosea wooed and married Gomer Bath-Diblain. And when she had borne him a son, Yahweh put it into his mind to call the child Jezreel.

(And why?) Because very soon Yahweh would punish the dynasty of Jehu for the massacre of Jezreel and would put an end to the sovereignty of Israel. On that "Day" Yahweh would break the army of Israel in the valley of Jezreel.

When Gomer had borne another child, a daughter, Yahweh put it into Hosea's mind to call the child Lo-ruchamah.

(And why?) Because Yahweh would no longer be moved by a father's sympathy for the Israelites to take their iniquity away.

When Gomer had weaned Lo-ruchamah she bore a son. And Yahweh put it into Hosea's mind to call the child Lo-ammi.

(And why?) Because the Israelites were not Yahweh's people, and Yahweh would not be their God.

Chapter iii, 1 to 4.—Yahweh put it into my mind to woo (Gomer) again, to love her—this wife with a lover, this adulteress.

(And why?) Such was Yahweh's love for the Israelites, though they were looking to other gods and in love with cakes of raisins!

So I bought her for myself for fifteen shekels in money and fifteen shekels' worth of barley. Then I told her that for a long time she must (live alone and) wait for me, having no relations with men—yes, that for a long time I myself could not live with her.

(And why?) Because for a long time the Israelites would have to (live alone and) wait—without king or prince, without sacrifice or sacred pillar, without idol of Yahweh or image.

It will be observed that in the above translation "Yahweh said unto Hosea" [Hebrew] and "Yahweh said unto me" [Hebrew] are rendered by "Yahweh put it into Hosea's mind" and "Yahweh put it into my mind." This rendering was intended to suggest that it is not *necessary* to assume that Yahweh's messages regarding Gomer came to Hosea in ecstatic vision.

Against the rendering it may be urged—(a) That such expressions as "Thus saith Yahweh" are frequently found in accounts of prophetic visions.

(b) That in the accounts of the experiences of men who are *not* "prophets," a different form of expression is employed; e.g., in Nehemiah ii, 12; vii, 5—"What my God put into my heart (i.e., mind) to do."—"My God put into my heart (i.e., mind) to gather together the nobles," etc. Cf. Ezra vii, 27.

But it may be replied—(a) That, as we have already seen, the Hebrew word "to say" often means "to think."

(b) That indirect speech is rare in Hebrew. Yahweh's communications with the Patriarchs and with Moses are given in direct speech.

(c) That in the New Testament the verb "to say" is used in the description of the Temptation of Jesus after his baptism; in Luke xii, 15 to 21, where the rich man "says" what he will "say" to his soul (*psyche* = *nephesh* = instincts), and God "says" his answer to this to the rich man; and in Acts x, 19 and 20—where, while Peter, now seemingly quite awake, is "thinking on" his ecstatic (see verse 10) vision, the Spirit "says" to him—"Behold, three men seek thee. But arise, and get thee down, and go with them, nothing doubting, for I have sent them." Cf. Acts viii, 29; xiii, 2.

WE now turn to Hosea, the younger contemporary of Amos. Hosea is a great psychologist. To say this is not to imply that he studied psychology as a science. He is a psychologist, not because he is interested in theories, but because he is interested in people. His greatness as a psychologist is the result of his greatness as a lover.

It was through his love for Gomer—the wife who was false to him, the wife whom he still loved and sought to win back—that he became both a prophet and a psychologist.

Hosea wrestles with the problem of how to reconcile Gomer to himself. Why is she utterly out of sympathy with him? Why is her affection for him "like a morning mist, like dew that passes early away"? Why cannot she be faithful to him?

But he feels that, just as Gomer has treated him, so Israel has treated Yahweh. As he is suffering at the hands of Gomer, so Yahweh is suffering at the hands of Israel.

Why is Israel utterly out of sympathy with Yahweh? Why cannot Israel be faithful to Yahweh?

Before the break up of the home Gomer has "repented" more than once and been forgiven more than once. But what has been the result?

When Hosea looks at history, he feels that Israel has "repented" more than once and been forgiven more than once. But what has been the result?

What can Hosea make of Gomer? What can Yahweh make of Israel? What is it which wrecks the character of Gomer and the character of Israel?

It is in wrestling with such practical problems that Hosea develops his psychology—a psychology of which the elements are already present in J and E.

Perhaps the first thing which strikes one in considering the psychology of Hosea is the emphasis he lays on the sex-instinct. It is through the sex-instinct that Yahweh calls him to be a prophet, that Gomer comes to grief, and that Yahweh charges him to redeem Gomer. It is in terms of the sex-instinct that he expresses Yahweh's love for Israel, Israel's faithlessness to Yahweh, and Yahweh's longing to restore Israel.¹

Now Yahweh was popularly regarded as the Baal—"lord"—of Israel. And the word Baal means "husband." The thought of a national God as the husband of his people was quite a common one. But the distinctiveness of the Old Testament conception of the marriage of Yahweh and Israel lies in its insistence on the transcendence of Yahweh.

There is a fundamental difference in outlook between the Old Testament and Homer. The wife of Yahweh is, not a particular woman, but Israel, the nation personified. The Israelites are the children of Yahweh and of the nation.

Alternatively, the relationship between Yahweh

¹See Hosea, chapters i, ii and iii.

and Israel is expressed in terms of the parental instinct. Israel, the nation, is Yahweh's son. Yet here again there is no thought that the Divine relationship to the nation is one of physical paternity—a thought, common to many religions, which is, sooner or later, regarded as symbolical by the philosophers—but a thought, which, seeing it regards God as part of the forces of nature, or equates him to the libido, can never help to distinguish him from the forces of nature or from the libido, nor lead to any religion but pantheism. To the Hebrews the difference between man and God corresponds to the difference between the dead dust of the desert and the live—and life-giving—wind (Ruach). Yahweh is, as we say, transcendent. He is Ruach, spirit; men are basar, flesh. It is, not by birth, but by adoption, that Israel is Yahweh's son. In its childhood Yahweh saw the nation; it attracted his love, and he called it out of Egypt to become his son. [Hosea xi, 1.]

Thus the beginning of the nation in the days of Moses is represented, sometimes as the marriage of Israel to Yahweh, sometimes as the adoption of Israel to be Yahweh's son.

Hosea's favourite word is "love" (aheb "to love"). Hosea "loves" Gomer. Gomer is faithless to him and goes after "lovers." Hosea "loves" her still and redeems her. Yahweh "loves" Israel. Israel is faithless to Yahweh and goes after "lovers," the Canaanite standards of morals and religion. Yahweh "loves" Israel still.

The meaning of this verb "aheb" and of its noun "ahebah" is as wide as the sex and parental instincts. It is worth noticing here that in the LXX the verb is represented by the Greek "agapao" and the noun by "agape." For it is often alleged

that Paul had to coin a new Greek word when he wanted to speak of Christian love. Now it is doubtless true that the word "agape" acquired from the New Testament an altogether new significance to heathen speakers of Greek; but it must be remembered that in the first century A.D., the word was very familiar to all Greek speaking Jews from its use in the Shema¹—where agapao translates aheb in the—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God" It is the LXX rendering of Hosea's word for the sex and parental instincts which is used by Paul in I Cor. xiii, and by John when he says "God is love."²

A study of the Hebrew Dictionary shows, both that the Hebrews anticipated the New Psychologists in stressing the fundamental importance of the sex-instinct, and also that they regarded the sex-instinct and parental instinct as undivorceable one from the other.³

For, as we have already seen, to genuine Hebrew thought, sex is not a thing to be apologised for. Genuine Hebrew religion is free from the notion that has invaded most religions—even Christianity—that celibacy is a higher state than marriage. In J's creation myth it is Yahweh who made a woman and "brought her unto the man" [Genesis ii, 22]; in P's it is God, Elohim, who "created" mankind

¹Recited daily by the Jews at the beginning of the Christian era and to-day. At the beginning of the Christian era the Jews of the dispersion were allowed to conduct their synagogue services in Greek.

²Some passages where Aheb or Ahebah is rendered by Agapao or Agape in LXX. Gen. xxiv, 67; xxv, 28; xxix, 18, 20; xxxiv, 3; I Sam. xviii, 3 (with which cf. John xv, 13, remembering that psyche = nephesh); I. Sam. xviii, 20; II Sam. xii, 24; xiii, 1, 4 (on which see Pirke Aboth v, 19); I Kings iii, 3; v, 1; Micah vi, 8; Deut. vi, 5; x, 12; Hosea iii, 1; xi, 1; Jer. ii, 2; Psalm cxix, 97; Song of Solomon i, 7; ii, 5, 7; iii, 1, 3; viii, 6.

³See Gen. i, 12, 22, 27, 28; ii, 18, 22, 23 to 24; v, 2.

"male and female" [Genesis i, 27]. And "children are an heritage of Yahweh; and the fruit of the womb is his reward" [Psalm cxxvii, 3].

Hosea does not ascribe the break up of his home to the fact that Gomer's sex-instinct is strongly developed. He feels rather that it is not sufficiently strongly developed, that it is incapable of sublimation, unable to get beyond the purely physical. Not that Hosea desires the abolition of the physical. Not at all. Yet he feels that Gomer's affection for him is "like a morning mist, like dew that passes away." Gomer is like a child that refuses to grow up. She will not make the effort to learn sympathy, real affection, real love.

As Gomer is to Hosea, so is Israel to Yahweh. Israel, the wife of Yahweh, is as full of religion as Gomer is of sex-instinct. But both are without a real heart. Gomer does not really love Hosea. Israel does not really love Yahweh. Gomer's sex-instinct begins and ends in the purely physical; it is purely selfish. Israel's religion begins and ends in the purely external; it is purely selfish.

There seems to be no reason to think that Hosea objected to religious observances as such. The group spirit was strong in all the prophets. And any religion which is to be a social religion, must have external observances of some kind. Hosea seems to compare religious observances to the sex-instinct on the physical level [iii, 3 and 4]. Both are good so long as they do not begin and end with themselves. Both involve perversion through the repressing of ideals if they are incapable of sublimation—if they remain purely physical or purely external.

Gomer's sex-instinct remains at the purely physical level; it refuses to spread itself out on to a higher level; therefore Gomer's character becomes per-

verted. Though she is Hosea's wife, she goes after "lovers."

Israel's religion remains at the purely external. It seeks only selfish gratification of the "religious feelings," material satisfaction in the form of harvest and vintage, and the "vanquishing and overcoming" of all the national enemies. It refuses to spread itself out on to a higher level; therefore it breaks out in perverted ways. Israel, though devotedly attached to the Yahweh religion, is really worshipping "lovers," the Canaanite Baalim. She calls her God Yahweh, but regards his character as that of a Canaanite Baal. Yahweh is worshipped in name, but the Baalim of Canaan are worshipped in reality.

Hosea closely connects religion with the sex-instinct. It is their low standard of sexual morality which prevents the people from realising the stupidity of their religious notions. It is because they are "obsessed by lust for fornication" that "they do not know Yahweh." [v, 4.]

Thus Hosea declares that their failure to know Yahweh is not primarily an intellectual failure. It is a moral failure. To be content with a lower moral ideal than the highest makes a man incapable of knowing Yahweh.

Here Hosea is a typical Hebrew. To be unable to recognize the living God is evidence of a low character. It is only the fool who says to himself—"There is no God,"¹ and the fool—Nabal—is not a person without brains. He is a morally corrupt, nasty, and ungenerous person—essentially a cad.² The typical Nabal is described in I Samuel xxv, 2 to 42. Cf. Job ii, 10.

¹Psalm xiv, 1.

²Psalm xiv, 2.

But the Nabal is defective on the intellectual side too, though he may not be aware of it. The word is used in opposition to Chakam, "wise"—it suggests a brute stupidity, due to failure to see what all healthy minded people cannot help seeing. So the low moral state is itself due to ignorance of Yahweh. Yahweh's people are ruined because they do not know him. [Hosea iv, 6.]

We seem to be in the grip of a circular argument. The people cannot know Yahweh because of their low moral character. They are of low moral character because they do not know Yahweh.

But before condemning Hosea as a shallow thinker, we must notice his use of the word kashal "to stumble"¹—"trip up." Israel trips up over his awon (iniquity). Now a man does not trip up over a thing which he is aware of. If he were aware of it, he would not trip up over it.

What is this awon, iniquity, over which "Ephraim² is continually stumbling" [so the imperfect of verb kashal in v, 4, may be rendered]? Let us turn to Hosea xiii, 12 to 13. "The iniquity (awon) of Ephraim is bound up; his sin (chattath from verb chata, "to miss (a goal or way)," "go wrong," "sin") is laid up in store [or "treasured up," or "hidden," cf. Exodus ii, 2]. The sorrows of a travailing woman shall come [or "keep on coming"] upon *him*; he is an unwise son; for it is time he should not tarry in the place of the breaking forth of children."³

"The figure (cf. Job xiv, 17) is taken"—says Harper, discussing verse 12 in his commentary on

¹Hosea v, 5; xiv, 1. Cf. iv, 5; v, 1.

²Ephraim is often used by Hosea of Northern Israel.

³Cf. II Kings xix, 3, and Isaiah xxvi, 18 to 19,—*not* by Isaiah but a later passage.

Hosea—"from the custom of tying up money in bags and hiding it in some place for preservation. Ephraim's guilt is collected, carefully bound up; it will be well guarded and preserved, and no part of it will be lost sight of in the day of judgment. In other words, the case is closed."

But why is it closed? Does Yahweh no longer want Israel to repent? Can this be the meaning of the husband of Gomer, the prophet of love? And if so, how are we to connect with verse 12 the following verse in which Ephraim is described as refusing to be born.

No one who, after studying the New Psychology, reads this passage in Hebrew can fail to be struck by the similarity between the expressions used by Hosea and the terms of the New Psychology. The passage may be paraphrased as follows—

"Ephraim's iniquity is repressed; he is not conscious of his sin (or missing of the goal). Time after time is he being called upon to be reborn (i.e., to grow up); but he refuses to face the rebirth."

Ephraim has, without being conscious of the fact, an iniquity (awon) "bound up in a bag," and it is over this iniquity, "unevenness" of the mind, that he stumbles again and again [v, 5]. In modern language Ephraim has a buried complex—a buried complex which is due to his refusal to face a rebirth.

It is worth noticing that Jung uses the word "to stumble" in the same sense as Hosea. Discussing "repression" on page 39 of *Psychology of the Unconscious*, he says—"One is, indeed, freed of the conscious conflict, nevertheless it lies invisible at one's feet, and is stumbled over at every step." We may compare the constant use of scandalon, "stumbling block," and scandalizomai, "I am offended," "I stumble," in the New Testament, and such ex-

pressions as "We have offended against (stumbled over) thy holy laws"—in the Book of Common Prayer.

Ephraim's "hidden" sin (*chattath*)—his "missing of the mark" which he does not really want to find (for the word "hidden" also means "treasured up")¹—and his constant stumbling are due to what we call a buried complex, caused by repression of the thought of a challenge to grow up—to make a "heroic response" to a new demand. What then is the challenge which Ephraim refused to face—the challenge of which the memory has now been repressed into his unconscious mind and is causing him to stumble at every turn?²

The challenge which is heard in the teaching of Moses and the earlier prophets, and, after the clearing up of the primitive confusion regarding the psychology of inspiration, rings out with unprecedented distinctness in the teaching of Amos and Hosea—the challenge to grow up out of the "father phase" and "group phase" theology and ethics of the primitive Yahweh religion and to face and love Yahweh,—the living God—a God, not of caprice

¹The verb *tsaphan* means "to hide," "treasure up," "lie hid," "lurk." What a man has repressed, he is unconscious of; it is "hidden" from him. Yet he is conscious that there is something "treasured up" in his mind which he cannot afford to allow to be disturbed, lest his self-esteem should be bankrupted. And there is always a defence reaction "lurking," "lying hid," ready to fly out at anyone whose finger comes too close to the "mental abscess" which both "hides" "the great refusal" and "treasures up" the self-esteem.

²"It is probable that in every case of repression there is a theoretical factor of insincerity—that is to say, that for an instant of time the individual sees that a certain idea is incompatible with the desired conclusion, and says to himself: 'I had better forget that,' and forthwith does so. If I throw a stone into the air, there must be, theoretically, a moment when it is stationary, namely, between its ascent and descent." *The New Psychology and the Preacher*. Crichton Miller.

and cruelty, but of justice and kindness—a living God who demands of his worshippers, not sacrifice (human or animal), but the hating of evil, the loving of good, and the establishment of MISHPAT [Amos v, 15] in the gate or market-place, that is to say, of justice in the law courts, honesty in business, fairness between employer and employed [Matthew xx, 3 and 4]—a living God who delights, not in the massacre of the heathen [Hosea i, 4. Cf. II Kings x, 11, 18 to 28] but in CHESED [Hosea vi, 6], kindness and affection, both towards himself and also among men.

But the history of religion—not excluding that of Christianity—shows that it is just the combination of ethics and religion, found in the teaching of the great prophets, which is in every generation the stumbling block which one refuses to face and over which one consequently trips up.

One is quite ready to suffer serious inconveniences or worse on behalf of a view of religion which puts orthodoxy or religious observances on the same level as justice and kindness—for, if only one can hold such a view of religion as this, the repression of the last two is easily compensated for by over-emphasis on the first two. One will give one's firstborn for one's transgression, whether as a sacrifice by fire or by "safe" religious education. One will give one's body to be burned or one's intellect to be doped in the interests of what is held to be orthodox. One will make one's religion a torture to oneself and to one's relations. One will, indeed, do, suffer, or believe anything rather than face the fact that God is really alive—as alive to-day as he was in past centuries—and that he is demanding of one nothing else than to be perfectly honest—to love kindness—and to go forward humbly with him. [See Micah vi, 8.]

Or, again, one will delight in ethics provided they are selected by oneself or selected by one's group on a democratic basis. But, as Jung says, the "unhappy combination of religion and morality" is a "stumbling block" which must be "overcome." One cannot tolerate the idea that one's "spiritual autonomy" is limited by the existence of a transcendent ideal—an ideal which, not being reducible to a moral code, is unattainable and consequently disturbing—an ideal which has been selected, neither by oneself nor by one's group, but towards which one is bound, at one's peril, to press forwards.

Thus, both to the person who is of a religious temperament and also to the detached student of ethics, "the unhappy combination of religion and morality" may be a "stumbling block" which must at all costs be got rid of.

Now it is not Christianity which, as Jung seems to imply, is guilty of originating this "unhappy combination." Christianity has obstinately perpetuated it, but cannot fairly be accused of beginning it. It is not the creation but the presupposition of the gospel. "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, if one rise from the dead." Indeed, the same "unhappy combination of religion and morality" which is, according to Jung, a stumbling block in the twentieth century A.D., was, according to Hosea, a stumbling block in the eighth century, B.C.

It is this which Ephraim, according to Hosea, refuses to face, represses, and stumbles over.

The thought of the living God and of his demands has been too sublime for Ephraim to face. To face it would mean both the death of Ephraim's phantasy about himself and also his rebirth by the recognition of a transcendent, overwhelming ideal. So

Ephraim has repudiated the thought of the living God and of his demands, just as JE represents the Israelites as repudiating it at Mount Horeb when they say to Moses—"Let not God speak with us, lest we die." [Exodus xx, 19.]¹

Repudiation [Hosea ii, 5; iv, 1, 6; viii, 3; xi, 2, 7] has been followed by repression and forgetfulness of the living God and his ideal [Hosea ii, 8, 13; iv, 6; viii, 12, 14; xiii, 6], by the perversion of true religion in idolatry [Hosea iv, 8; viii, 13; x, 10], by the formation of what we call a buried complex over which Ephraim stumbles at every turn [Hosea iv, 5; v, 5; xiv, 1], and by "enmity" or animosity against the true prophets as a "defence reaction" against listening to their message [Hosea ix, 7 and 8].

But this is not the full extent of the evil. Just as a boy whose normal development is arrested, may "regress" to the mother phase and become infantile, so the arrest of Ephraim's development, due to his refusal to grow up out of the "father phase" and "group phase" theology and ethics of the primitive Yahweh religion and to learn to love Yahweh, has resulted in regression to a "mother phase" theology and ethics which are far below the level of the primitive Yahweh religion. All that was good in the primitive Yahweh religion has been spoiled by syncretism with the debased "nature worship" of the Canaanites. The very

¹Cf. Deut. v, 25. "If we hear the voice of Yahweh our God any more, then we shall die"—and Deut. xviii, 26. "Let me not hear again the voice of Yahweh my God, neither let me see this great fire any more, that I die not." Note also the question of Isaiah xxxiii, 14. "Who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire? Who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings?"—and the significant answer, "He that walketh righteously, and speaketh uprightly, etc."

thoroughness of the triumph of the party of Elisha over the worshippers of the Baal of Tyre has facilitated this syncretism. For by forcibly absorbing the worshippers of the Baal of Tyre, the popular Yahweh religion has absorbed their theology and ethics with them. The Ephraimites call their God Yahweh, and are proud of their religion, but the character they ascribe to him is the character of a Baal of Canaan. Licentious rites are associated with his worship. [Hosea iv, 11 to 14]. At best he is regarded as a good-natured God who will easily put all Ephraim's troubles right in a day or two, as soon as Ephraim expresses a light-hearted penitence—yes, make “everything come right in the end,” as inevitably as he sends the spring rains to water Ephraim's land, without requiring Ephraim to take any trouble in the matter. [Hosea v, 15, to vi, 3.]

The popular Yahweh religion of earlier times regarded Yahweh as a capricious war-god; but it at any rate produced real men—men who did their work conscientiously. Ehud, Jephthah, Jehu, Jehonadab the son of Rechab and the rest resemble Kipling's “Sons of Martha”¹ in possessing a conscience and in not running away from real life.

“They do not preach that their God will rouse them
a little before the nuts work loose.

They do not teach that His Pity allows them
to leave their work when they damn-well choose.”

But by the time of Hosea the popular Yahweh religion has regressed to infantilism, adopted licentious ritual, and allotted its God the function of replacing the “primitive mother” and saving his votaries, as their own mothers saved them when they were babies, from enduring the rude shocks of

¹In *The Years Between*.

the cruel world and from experiencing the logical results of their own conduct.

The capricious war-god has been replaced by that yet more terrible deity—not unknown in more modern times—the good-natured God ; and in 722 B.C., both the religion and the state of Northern Israel come to an end.

Note on the word 'Awon'—iniquity.

Awon in Hosea means (a) sometimes what we call "buried complex" or "repression"—v, 5 ; vii, 1 ; ix, 7 ; xiii, 12 ; xiv, 1, 2 ; of repression of thought of the living God (cf. Isaiah vi, 7) —(b) sometimes the "perversion" arising from such repression—iv, 8 ; viii, 13 ; x, 10 ; of perverted religion—ix, 9, of sexual perversion—xii, 8, of dirty tricks in business.

CHAPTER X

IT may be objected that we have no more right to interpret the teaching of the prophets as if their thinking were akin to the thinking of the New Psychologists, than we have to interpret P's creation story, as if the thinking of P were akin to the thinking of Darwin. It is as ludicrous, it may be said, to ascribe to them the New Psychologists' view of the unconscious mind as to ascribe to them the modern astronomers' view of the solar system, or to interpret the "demons" with which, to the Jews at the beginning of the Christian era, the atmosphere was full, in terms of bacteriology.

It is true that the prophets did not pursue psychology as a science, and that we cannot imagine them drawing diagrams to represent the unconscious mind. But psychology differs from geology and astronomy in that to practise it men need not dig down to Sheol for fossils, or search out the heavens with telescopes; nor do they need the microscope of the bacteriologist. For the data required by the Psychologist are "very nigh" unto him, "in his mouth" and "in his heart (or mind)" [Deut. xxx, 14]. While essential data, required by most of the modern sciences, were quite inaccessible to the prophets, the data for studying that unknown x which we nowadays call the unconscious mind, were as accessible—or inaccessible—to the men of the eighth century B.C., as to the men of the twentieth century A.D.

To say that human nature is the same in all ages and countries, is a statement of which the truth or falsehood depends on what is meant by the expression "human nature." But the New Psychologists have shown that the workings of the unknown x which we call the unconscious mind, are essentially the same in all ages and in all countries. If the man who studies his neighbours, is in some sense a psychologist; then the man who both recognises his own motives and studies his neighbour's motives, is in some sense a "new" psychologist. That the great prophets and prophetic writers did recognise the existence of an unknown x —call it "unconscious mind," "recesses of the belly" [Proverbs xviii, 8; xx, 27], "inward part," "heart," or what you will—which is capable of distorting right thinking, is self-evident and is indeed one of the peculiarities which distinguish the Bible from all other literature.

We have already seen that genuine Hebrew thought does not connect sin with the flesh nor with the instincts, but with the heart or mind. Indeed the Hebrew view is fundamentally opposed to that of Plato. It is not what Plato (*Republic*: Book IV) calls "the concupiscent principle" or "that part (of the soul) with which it loves and hungers and thirsts, and experiences the flutter of other desires" (Davies' and Vaughan's translation), that is to blame according to Hebrew thought; on the contrary the fault lies according to Hebrew thought with what Plato calls "that part of the soul with which it reasons." For "that part of the soul with which it reasons" is, as we have seen, located according to popular Hebrew thought in the heart, and, in the opinion of J, the whole trend of man's thinking is merely evil all day long [see Genesis vi, 5]. Similarly, to Jeremiah, "the heart (i.e., mind)

is deceitful above all things, and it is desperately sick ; who can know it ? ” [Jer. xvii, 9.]

“ Who can know the mind ? ”—asks Jeremiah, and the answer given in the next verse—“ I, Yahweh, search the mind ”—implies that only Yahweh can know the mind.

So certain, again, is the author of Psalm cxxxix that he himself does not know all that is in his own mind, that he prays—“ Search me, O God, and know my mind : try me, and know my thoughts.” [Psalm cxxxix, 23.]

The later Biblical writers, then, recognise that there is an unknown x , which affects the workings of the “ part of the soul with which it reasons,” and that there is a region of a man’s own mind which he himself does not “ know.”

Indeed, Elijah’s recognition of the existence of a region of his own mind which he himself has not previously known—a region which may disastrously affect thinking and “ prophesying,” is a corollary of his recognition on Horeb of a distinction between the real inspiration of Yahweh and the mere ravings of the “ Mad Mullahs.” For if the mere ravings of the “ Mad Mullahs ” are not, as Micaiah thought they were, due to the direct inspiration of Yahweh, the question must arise—To what are they due ? Evidently not to conscious fabrication ; for it is clear that the false prophets are genuine ecstasies, believe their own messages, and deceive nobody more thoroughly than themselves. Whence then the prophesyings of the false prophets ?

According to Jeremiah xxiii, 16—out of their own heart (i.e., mind). Compare xxiii, 21, 25, 26 ; xiv, 14. These prophets say—“ I have dreamed, I have dreamed ” ; but they are “ prophets of the deceit of their own mind ”—“ they speak a vision of their

own mind, and not out of the mouth of Yahweh."

We shall have to consider the false prophets further in the chapter on Ezekiel ; but it is perhaps already sufficiently clear that false prophecy presented the great prophets with a practical problem which necessitated the postulating of something corresponding to the "unconscious mind" of the New Psychologists.

If it be asserted that the great prophets followed Micaiah in ascribing the deception of the false prophets to the direct action of Yahweh, we must ask, firstly, what is the meaning of Jeremiah xxiii ;¹ secondly, whether it is conceivable that men like Hosea—whose central doctrine is the love of Yahweh for Israel—could hold a theology so horrible as that of Micaiah ; and, thirdly, how, if they did hold such a doctrine, they accounted for their own endo-psychic conflicts. For we cannot believe that the great prophets were never tempted to become false prophets, or that they were true prophets without much searching of heart. Whether they knew it or not, they had unconscious minds. Did no false messages ever arise thence and claim to be the inspiration of Yahweh ? Jeremiah, at any rate, learned to "take forth the precious from the vile" [xv, 19] when the spirit of Yahweh within him analysed him and showed him to himself. [See Jer. xii, 1 to 6.]

Indeed, Elijah's experience on Horeb, his vision after entering into and re-emerging from the cave—a symbol in dreams and myths of the womb (see *The New Psychology and the Preacher*—Crichton Miller—chapter xi), represents both the rebirth of prophecy and also the prophet's discovery of psychical processes at work in his own mind, which are due neither to his own volition nor to the direct

¹See also Micah ii, 11.

inspiration of Yahweh. In a word, Elijah on Horeb gains touch with his own unconscious mind and finds that not all that arises thence is due to the direct inspiration of Yahweh.

The prophets before Elijah, as we have seen, failed to distinguish between the genuine inspiration of Yahweh and the mere outcroppings of the unconscious. The great prophets, Amos and his successors, did distinguish between the inspiration of Yahweh and the mere outcroppings of the unconscious. Indeed, the difference between the psychology of the early prophets and that of the great prophets, consists in this, that the former had not, but the latter had, discovered what we call the unconscious mind.

We have already noticed the similarity between some of the words used by Hosea and the terms used by the New Psychologists in dealing with the unconscious mind. This does not surprise us; for Hosea and the New Psychologists are dealing with the same kind of phenomena, and the New Psychologists have shown that the workings of the unconscious mind are essentially the same in all times and countries.

They have shown, for instance, that the resemblance between the myths and fairy stories of all nations is due to the fact that mythical thinking is collective dream thinking—that is to say, the thinking of the combined unconscious minds of the group. Mythology reveals the fears which are too dreadful to face, the hopes which are too sublime to entertain lest they should be disappointed, the thoughts that “lie too deep for tears,” of the human race. The golden islands of the west are the projection on to the unknown which is beyond the sunset of man’s life on earth, of the longings for happiness of innumerable potential Peter Pans who can-

not, or will not, live in Kensington Gardens in this life. The son of the earth mother and the sun god, who die and rise again from the womb of the earth or of the sea, are projections on to the earth's vegetation or the sun of the longings of innumerable men for rebirth, refreshment, and life beyond the grave.¹

¹See Jung—*Psychology of the Unconscious*—"The meaning of this cycle of myths . . . is clear; it is the longing to attain rebirth through return to the mother's womb, that is to say, to become as immortal as the sun." Pages 132 and 133.

"The maternal significance of water belongs to the clearest symbolism in the realm of mythology, so that the ancients could say: 'The sea is the symbol of birth.' From water comes life. . . . All that is living rises as does the sun, from the water, and at evening plunges into the water. Born from the springs, the rivers, the seas, at death man arrives at the waters of the *Styx* in order to enter upon the 'night journey on the sea.' The wish is that the black water of death might be the water of life; that death, with its cold embrace, might be the mother's womb, just as the sea devours the sun, but brings it forth again out of the maternal womb (*Jonah* motive). Life believes not in death." Page 135.

"The Sun returns into the mother's womb, and after some time is again born . . . it is not to be assumed that astronomy came first and these conceptions of gods afterwards; the process was, as always, inverted." Page 120.

Compare Freud—*Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, page 114, English translation. "The first myth was certainly the psychological, the hero myth; the explanatory nature myth must have followed much later."

In connection with above quotations it may be well to point out, with reference to the statement on page 121 of *Psychology of the Unconscious* to the effect that "ELIAS is HELIOS" (the sun), that the name ELIAS in NEW TESTAMENT is a Græcised form of the name ELIJAH in OLD TESTAMENT (cf. 'Οζίας (OZIAS) for UZZIAH—'Εζεκίας (EZEKIAS) for HEZEKIAH—'Ιωσίας (JOSIAS) for JOSIAH—'Ιεχονίας (JECHONIAS) for JECHONIAH—in Matthew i, 9 to 12, where the Græcised forms, JOSIAS, etc., actually occur in the ENGLISH of the AUTHORISED VERSION). ELIJAH in Hebrew means "Yah or Yahu (i.e., YAHWEH) is GOD"; see *Hebrew Lexicon*, page 45. To connect SAMSON (SHIMSON) with HELIOS (Hebrew SHEMESH) is permissible; but to say that ELIAS is HELIOS, is an error of the type which, when made in Latin or Greek by a schoolboy, is commonly described as a "howler." That writers who are great scholars in all subjects except Hebrew, should make, or be allowed to make with impunity, such errors,

Such myths are found all over the earth. There is indeed a kind of *lingua franca* in mythology—a *lingua franca*, not of words, but of symbols which are the language of the unconscious mind. That many of these symbols are sexual, need not surprise anyone who agrees with the Hebrews in recognising the instincts as the gift of God, and realises that the sex instinct and parental instinct, which cannot according to Hebrew thought be divorced from one another, are the driving force of man's creative work and civilisation.

Moreover, the New Psychologists have shown—it is no new idea as is evident from the dreams ascribed to Pharaoh in Genesis and to Nebuchadnezzar in Daniel—that the dreams of the individual are, often at any rate, like the myths of the group, to be interpreted symbolically. A dream may be the method by which an unwelcome idea, repressed in waking experience into the unconscious mind, emerges in a disguised, symbolic, form into consciousness. A dream may be a message from the unconscious, expressing in the symbolic language of the unconscious something to which consciousness refuses to pay attention in waking life.¹

is merely the nemesis which follows the neglect of Hebrew in Theological Colleges.

¹Note among the symbols in prophetic visions the "summer fruit" of Amos viii, 1 to 2—and the "almond rod" of Jeremiah i, 11 to 12. Amos sees a basket of QAITs ("summer fruit"); the interpretation of the vision is that the QETS ("end") of Northern Israel is at hand. Jeremiah sees "an almond rod"—"a rod of a SHAQED (almond tree)"; the interpretation of the vision is that Yahweh is SHOQED ("waking," or "watching over") his word to perform it, and that, consequently, it is high time for Jeremiah to begin his preaching. It is to be observed that in both the above cases there is more than mere word-play involved. "Summer fruit" suggests ripeness; the "shaqed" (almond tree) is "so called from its early *waking* out of winter's sleep." (Hebrew *Lexicon*, page 1052).

Thus¹ to Peter [see Acts x] brought up to consider Gentiles as dogs, and well aware of the opposition which a more liberal attitude towards them would arouse in his brother Nazarenes, the thought of baptizing Gentiles who had not first of all become Jews, was too intolerable to be entertained in waking life. He could not receive the message of the Spirit directly, as he did when, "filled with the Holy Ghost" [Acts iv, 8], he denounced the very assembly which had put his Master to death. For anything the Sanhedrin might do, he was prepared. He had no repressions regarding the probable result of his boldness in denouncing them, and could in this case receive the inspiration of the Spirit directly. But he was not prepared to face the overthrow of the corner stone of orthodox Judaism. Therefore he could only receive the message of the Spirit regarding the Gentiles in an indirect form. It was in the symbolical form of a command to eat "unclean food," that the command of the Spirit to baptize Gentiles emerged into his consciousness through a vision. If we ask why an order to eat pork was less intolerable to this strict Jew than an order to baptize Gentiles, we may turn to Ezekiel iv, 12 to 17—a passage with which he was doubtless familiar—and to Mark vii, 1 to 23—the description of an incident in the career of Jesus, at which he was doubtless present. (Note the comment of Mark, Peter's secretary, in the last sentence of verse 19. Was it his vision at Cæsarea, which made evident to Peter the real meaning of Jesus' teaching with regard to ceremonial washings?)

It is to be observed that Peter acted on the

¹See "*Dream Symbolism and the Mystic Vision*," Streeter-Hibbert Journal, January, 1925.

message which he had received symbolically, and baptized Cornelius and his household.

It is, of course, as is pointed out by Crichton Miller in *The New Psychology and the Preacher*—chapter xi—easier to refuse to recognise the symbolism of a dream than to recognise it. It is less disturbing to one's equanimity, after dreaming of the serious illness of Mr. Z who has always struck one as a man with a remarkable sense of humour, to hunt the obituary notices of the newspapers in anxiety for the fate of Mr. Z, than to face the question whether one's own sense of humour is in danger of becoming extinct.

Besides the dream symbols—such as the Mr. Z we have just mentioned—which are peculiar to the individual dreamer, the individual dreamer's dream may also contain symbols which are found in myths and are part of the *lingua franca* of the unconscious. Many of these symbols are sexual symbols.

It will not, therefore, surprise us if we find such symbols present in the visions—symbolical as they have always been taken to be—which the prophets "saw" in dream or ecstasy. We have already noted that in the experience of Elijah on Horeb the cave is a symbol of the womb, and that Elijah's entrance into it and re-emergence from it symbolises rebirth. In Isaiah's vision at his call seraphim appear. The word saraph means a serpent;¹ and the seraphim were probably regarded as serpent-like beings. Now the serpent is a common (male) symbol of the libido. It seems that light may be thrown on the interpretation of such visions as that which marked the call of Isaiah to become a prophet, by analysts who are students of the Bible. Crichton

¹See Numbers xxi, 8, where it is translated "fiery serpent" in R.V.; "serpent" in xxi, 9 represents Hebrew nachash.

Miller deals with a few of the symbols which occur in Old Testament visions, in *The New Psychology and the Preacher*.¹

But, having regard to the tendency which appears in the writings of certain other analysts, to suggest that, not merely religion, but also history, have been rendered unnecessary by the discoveries of the New Psychologists, it is perhaps advisable to remind ourselves that to realise that an object which appears in a man's vision is a phallic symbol, though it may help in the interpretation of the vision, is not necessarily tantamount to explaining why the man had a vision, and that the fact that an object may be a phallic symbol in the *lingua franca* of the unconscious, does not prevent the employment of the object for purposes quite unconnected with the sex-instinct in the real world.

For instance, the fact that the serpent (saraph) is a phallic symbol, and the probability that the appearance of the saraph in the imagery of Isaiah's vision was connected with the presence in the temple of a serpent of brass which was held to be the object employed for curative purposes by Moses [II Kings

¹Symbolism being the language of the unconscious, and prophetic visions being the symbolical presentation of truths too sublime to be grasped directly, it is not surprising to the student of the New Testament to find symbols connected with the sex and parental instincts in the visions of the prophets. For the New Testament is permeated by language connected with the sex and parental instincts, e.g., "Everyone that loveth is begotten of God" (I John iv, 7)—"My little children, of whom I am again in travail until Christ be formed in you" (Galatians iv, 19)—"Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the church" (Ephesians v, 25).—"That ye should be joined to another, even to him who was raised from the dead, that we might bring forth fruit unto God" (Romans vii, 4). Such language was in general too sublime for the prophets of the Old Covenant; but symbols of the unconscious, corresponding to the language we have quoted from the New Testament, are found in their visions.

xviii, 4], are interesting. They do not, however, seem, by themselves, to provide an adequate reason for the fact that Isaiah underwent an experience which transformed his life.

So, too, the cross was perhaps a phallic symbol. The TAW (X) of the older Hebrew alphabet was clearly a symbol of some kind. [Ezekiel ix, 4, "a mark" = a TAW, i.e., letter T.] But the question whether the cross had, or had not, phallic significance, was of little interest to the thousands of criminals who were crucified in the days of the Roman Empire. The cross was then primarily the gallows of the Roman Empire. Cicero was not thinking of phallic significance, when he said—"Nomen ipsum crucis absit non modo a corpore civium Romanorum, sed etiam a cogitatione, oculis, auribus." (*Cicero pro Rabirio*, C. 5.) "Far be such an object as the cross—I need not say from the body—but from the very thought, from the very sight, from the very hearing, of a citizen of Rome."

But the extravagances of some of the enthusiasts for dream symbolism and mythology should not blind us to the fact that the consideration of dream symbolism and of mythology is relevant to the study of Isaiah. For his call to become a prophet came to him in one of the most famous visions in the Old Testament, and his equally famous Messianic passages contain mythical ideas.

Isaiah of Jerusalem, who began his career as a prophet in 740 B.C., within the period of Hosea's prophetic activity in Northern Israel, wrestled with the same problem as that with which Hosea was wrestling. Why, if the ox knows his owner and the ass his master's crib, does not Judah know Yahweh? Why does not Judah perceive Yahweh's work nor his hand in history? Why do Isaiah's fellow-

countrymen call evil good and good evil? In xxx, 8 to 11, Isaiah gives the answer. The root cause is Judah's refusal to face the Living God. The people are intensely religious, they throng religious services, they are proud of their prophets. But the prophets must not be too outspoken; they must not create friction nor upset people; they must not disturb time-honoured lies. At all costs they must avoid speaking of a God who is really alive—who was not only alive in the great days of Moses, but is also alive to-day—whose holiness demands, not merely religious observances, but honesty in business, justice between men. As to Hosea, so to Isaiah, the ultimate iniquity (awon) is the refusal to face the living God. "Cause the Holy One of Israel to cease from before us."

But in Isaiah vi we have an account of the resolution of the complex which is due to the refusal to face the living God. One day in 740 B.C., Isaiah is, it seems, worshipping in the Temple. Here the worshippers are in the open air, not under a roof. In front of him the Temple choirs are singing, and the smoke of sacrifice is rising from the altar. Beyond the smoke of sacrifice is the sanctuary itself, consisting of two small compartments. The smaller and inner of these is called the Holy of Holies, and is looked on as the actual dwelling place of Yahweh.

Suddenly Isaiah has an experience such as he has never had before. "I saw the Lord" (ha—adon = the Sovereign)—he says. Above the smoke of sacrifice and the Holy of Holies he sees "a throne, high and lifted up." This is the throne of Yahweh, "The King." Instead of the smoke of the sacrifice he sees the skirts of Yahweh's royal robe, flowing out from the Holy of Holies into the Temple Courts and thence into all the world. Instead of the Tem-

ple choirs Isaiah sees in his vision seraphim—six-winged serpents—worshipping Yahweh.

The presence of the seraphim in the vision may be partly due to the presence in Jerusalem, presumably in the Temple, of a brazen serpent which was doubtless an idol of Yahweh at Jerusalem, just as the golden bull was an idol of Yahweh at Bethel. [II Kings xviii, 4.]

Has Isaiah before his call been a worshipper of Yahweh under the form of a serpent—a symbol of the life force or libido?

In any case the seraphim or serpents are in the vision presumably dream symbols of the libido or life force. But far from being identified with Yahweh, they appear as worshippers before his throne, and their song, the hymn of the life force or libido, expresses the truth that Yahweh, the God who used to speak to Moses face to face as a man speaks to his neighbour, Yahweh Tsebaoth, the God of the armies of Israel, is utterly, inexpressibly, holy—apart, separate, transcendent—distinct and to be distinguished from the life force, the Sovereign of the life force, the creative God whose glory (holiness or creative power in action) fills the whole earth.

It is to be noted that to Isaiah, whose favourite name for Yahweh is "The Holy One of Israel," the word Qadosh, "holy," "apart," "separate," has ceased to mean merely "taboo."¹ To him Yahweh's holiness means what we call transcendence. Yahweh is a transcendent God, and it is his glory—the shining out of his transcendence—which fills the whole world, is immanent, as we say, in the whole world.²

When Isaiah sees Yahweh as he has never seen

¹For original meaning of "holiness" see *Totem and Taboo*.

²See Gordon—*The Prophets of the Old Testament*.

Yahweh before, he sees himself as he has never seen himself before. The contrast is overwhelming. "Woe is me!"—he says—"for I am undone."

We may compare what modern psychologists teach about the cure of the complex. No merely intellectual process is adequate. The patient must both remember and also experience again the painful emotions which led to the repression and the formation of the complex. He must face—he must live through—the whole experience which he once refused to face. Thus the resolution of a complex is a painful process.

But when Isaiah faces Yahweh and faces himself, his iniquity (awon) "gets out of the way," "ceases to obstruct" (see Hebrew *Lexicon*, page 693). His buried complex is resolved, and he leaves the Temple a free man—a man with power—a man whose message has swayed men for twenty-six centuries.¹

¹If there are two seraphim—and only two—in the vision, they may perhaps symbolize the ascent and descent of the libido or life force—the ascent through childhood and youth—the descent in later manhood and old age. See Jung *Psychology of the Unconscious*, page 63—"The forces of nature always have two sides." The libido "has its two sides; it is power which beautifies everything, and which under other circumstances destroys everything"—and page 124—"Again we encounter the motive of the Dioscuri, mortal and immortal, setting and rising sun." Do the twelve wings—six on one seraph and six on the other—symbolize the months or signs of the Zodiac—the six on the one seraph standing for the signs through which the sun (a symbol of the libido) climbs to his summer height—the six on the other seraph standing for the signs through which the sun sinks to his winter depth?

The seraphim appear to be highly sublimated symbols of the libido; for with two wings each seraph covers his feet (i.e. "nakedness" as often in Hebrew).

Perhaps the two wings with which each seraph flies, symbolise the driving force of the libido.

The covering of his face with two wings by each seraph seems to symbolise the inability of the libido to comprehend the transcendent God (Cf. I Peter i, 12).

The "flying" of one of the seraphim and his "touching"

For Isaiah, more than any prophet before him, is a prophet of hope. He looks for a glorious future. He thus invites the attention of all who would account for religion by projection or compensation.

His call takes place in 740 B.C.—the year in which the strong King Uzziah dies. Isaiah sees the King, Yahweh Tsebaoth. Is this merely compensation, or merely condensation of the paternal imago with ultimate reality?

Isaiah calls his son Shear-Yashub—"a remnant will return (to God)." Is Isaiah's hope that a remnant will return to the God of his fathers, merely the projection of a man's desire for recognition—for success in his work—from the disappointing present to the future which, it is hoped, will compensate for the present?

Isaiah the statesman has seen his little country badly governed by bad kings. In the Messianic passages we find descriptions of an ideal king of the house of David, called in ix, 6, an El Gibbor (Hero God)—of a league of nations governed by the fear of Yahweh—of swords being beaten into ploughshares—of the leopard lying down with the kid. Some of the ideas in the Messianic passages are clearly mythical. Is the Messianic hope merely mythological?

of Isaiah's "mouth" with a "hot stone" taken with "tongs" from off the "altar," perhaps symbolize the "regeneration" of Isaiah. If so, we may compare Isaiah's vision with Hosea xiii, 12 to 13. In the latter passage (a) Ephraim refuses to be born; (b) has an "iniquity" (awon) "bound up"; (c) has a "sin" or "error" "laid up in store" or "hidden." In Isaiah's vision (a) a new life is implanted in Isaiah; (b) his "iniquity" is taken away; (c) his "sin" or "error" is "wiped clean," "wiped off the slate" (such seems to be the meaning of root KPR.). We may compare Jeremiah i, 9, where the "touch" of Yahweh's "hand" on Jeremiah's "mouth" generates a living message in Jeremiah, and also Ezekiel ii, 8 to iii, 3.

In short, is the work of Isaiah just beautiful phantasy—containing admittedly some of the finest poetry ever uttered—but still a mere “Midsummer Night’s Dream”—interesting only as literature and from the point of view of the author’s psychology? Those who take such a view are faced with the following facts of simple history—

(1) Sennacherib did not take Jerusalem in 701 B.C., and a remnant did return to the God of Isaiah. This “remnant” brought about the reformation of 621 B.C., whereby the religion of the prophets survived the fall of the national religion in 586 B.C.

(2) While it is obvious that the Messianic passages contain mythical ideas¹—of the kind which are met with in nature myths and mystery religions—it must be remembered that the ideas are not only mythical—they are connected with history. The hero is to arise out of the house of David—he is to be a greater David. The king who will rule in peace, is to be a greater Solomon. Behind Isaiah’s ideal king—in later times called the Messiah—is the David of history—the David who was anointed by Samuel and called in Hebrew “Meshiach Yahweh.”² Behind Isaiah’s reign of peace is the historical reign of Solomon. In the days of Isaiah the house of David had ruled in Jerusalem for three centuries and had seen the rise and fall of one dynasty after another in Northern Israel. After the fall of the kingdom of Northern Israel, the dynasty of David continued to rule in Jerusalem. Great hopes were already associated with this Royal Family, and the story of Nathan’s message from Yahweh to David about the

¹For a study of some of these myths by a theologian—a study made before Psycho-analysis became famous—see *Evolution of the Messianic Idea*—Oesterley.

²In LXX “the Christ of the Lord.”

dynasty [II Samuel vii, 11 to 17] was probably current in Isaiah's time. Isaiah's ideal king has mythical features, but he is to be the descendant of a historical king, and a member of the reigning Royal Family of Judah.

The author of the Messianic passages expected an ideal king to arise in the house of David in his own time. In this expectation he was disappointed. But it is a member of the house of David who is the greatest and most dominating figure in the history of the world.

CHAPTER XI

IT is probable, as we have seen, that the nucleus of the book of Deuteronomy is the work of the disciples of Hosea and Isaiah and of their successors. It is largely a revision of the older law of Moses, in the light of the teaching of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Micah, by men who have, partly at any rate, grasped the meaning of the summary of the teaching of these prophets which we find in Micah vi, 8. This famous passage may perhaps be rendered into modern English as follows :—¹

He has shewed you, O man, what is good ; and what does Yahweh demand of you, but to be honest, and to love kindness, and to go forward humbly with your God.

The limitations of the D school are largely due (*a*) to the opinion that the inexhaustible ideal, expressed in the words translated in R.V. by "walk humbly with thy God," can be reduced to a code, and (*b*) to the opinion that the justice of God implies that honesty must be the best policy—an opinion strengthened by the fact that in 722 B.C., Samaria had fallen as Amos and Hosea had predicted.

Just as in the study of the earlier prophets and of David, so in the study of the D school we find two

¹This retranslation is ventured in order to bring out the width of the meaning of the Hebrew words MISHPAT, CHESED and HALAK. It should be remembered that the term "walking with God" implies, not standing still, but going forward.

conflicting theologies which it is impossible to reconcile.

(1) We can trace the workings of the pious, legalist, mind—the sort of mind which is represented by Job's three friends. Honesty pays. To doubt this is blasphemy; for Yahweh is just and has only this life in which to reward or punish men. So right doing must be the reason for prosperity; evil doing for adversity. Otherwise Yahweh would not be just. In the interests of their own morals such men as Job's three friends must rationalise thus and then avoid thinking. Holding that the essence of Yahweh's message to Moses and the great prophets may be summed up in some such dogmas as —“Yahweh is just”—and—“Honesty is the best policy”—they dare not receive another message from Yahweh lest their dogmas should be overthrown and the bottom knocked out of their religion and ethics. They hold loyally to their dogmas and pass them on to their successors; for they are honest men, immeasurably superior to the Northern Israelites denounced by Amos and Hosea. But the very tenacity with which they hold to their dogmas, causes them to repress the thought of the possibility of a larger revelation. So they delight in verbal inspiration and infallible decisions, saying with the Israelites at Horeb—“Let not God speak with us lest we die.”

Therefore in the book of Deuteronomy the Israelites at Horeb are represented [v, 4 to 5; v, 24 to 31; xviii, 16] as making the great refusal—the refusal to face the living God. From this refusal, for which they are commended [v, 28; xviii, 17], spring verbal inspiration [i, 3; ix, 10; iv, 2; x, 2, 4, 5], the substitution of a fixed and mechanical code for the leading of the living God

[i, 5], and the need for an order of prophets [xviii, 15 to 19], to act, as it were, as a buffer state between the living God and ordinary men, to save men from the dangers of thinking for themselves. It is true that magical practices are sternly forbidden [xviii, 9 to 14]. For it is not through magic that Yahweh will communicate with Israel, but through a succession of prophets [xviii, 15]. These prophets are to be comparable to Moses, the man with whom Yahweh used to speak face to face. But Deuteronomy is in general hardly interested in the personality of the ordinary Israelite. The masses must listen to the prophets.

(2) But we can trace the workings of another kind of mind in Deuteronomy. Some of the compilers had not only listened to the teaching of the prophets, but had also shared their experience and faced and learned to love the living God. To them the problem is not, as it was to Hosea, the resolution of what we call a complex, but the building up of character. They are concerned, not so much with analysis, as with re-education and suggestion.

Israel on the plains of Moab is regarded as cured of what we may call his complex. [Deut. xxix, 4]. Like Josiah's in II Kings xxii, 19, Israel's mind is "tender"—without repression. Now the New Psychologists teach that where there is no repression, there is no dissociation¹—no isolation of part of the self from the knowledge, and consequently from the control, of the self as a whole. So to the D school a man who is cured of his refusal to face the living God and of his refusal to face himself, will be a "complete," an "integral" man, walking

¹In the New Testament a man markedly afflicted with a complex—a dissociation—a divided self—is said to be possessed by a demon.

before Yahweh "completely"—"with integrity" (Tōm, Tummah).¹ His mind will be "at peace with" Yahweh (Shalem—cf. Salaam, Islam).² He will be Yashar, "straight," "upright," "level," i.e. without stumbling-blocks to trip over (Cf. I John ii, 10).³ He will walk before Yahweh in truth (emeth).⁴ He will be able to seek Yahweh, to love Yahweh, with his whole intellect (Leb), with the whole drive of his instincts and all his emotions (Nephesh),⁵ with his unified self (all his "muchness"—m'od). He will be able to love his neighbour as himself. [Leviticus xix, 18].

Such seems to be the ideal of character which the followers of the prophets set before themselves.

But how is a man to be kept loyal to this ideal—to make progress therein?

He must prepare his mind to seek Yahweh. He must take heed to himself lest he forget what Yahweh has done. Especially when he is in prosperity, must he take heed lest he forget Yahweh. For it is only too easy in times of prosperity and success for a man to let his mind "grow fat" and so to repress the thought of the living God [Deut. vi, 10 to 12; xxxi, 20, Hosea xiii, 6, etc.]. A man must keep the law of Yahweh before his eyes. Let

¹See Gen. xx, 6; Josh. xxiv, 14; Deut. xviii, 13; Job i, 1, ii, 3, 9; Psalm xviii, 23, xxvi, 1.

²See I Kings viii, 61; xi, 4; xv, 14; II Kings xx, 3; in accordance with Hebrew Lexicon.

³See I Kings iii, 6; II Kings x, 15; Hosea xiv, 9; Isaiah xl, 3 to 4; Psalms v, 8; xxxvi, 10; cxxv, 4; Proverbs iii, 32; Job i, 1; ii, 3.

⁴See Josh. xxiv, 14; II Kings xx, 3.

⁵The term "religious instinct" is inappropriate in dealing with the Old Testament. The whole nephesh (i.e. all the instincts) is concerned in the love of Yahweh; e.g. the instinct of repulsion is concerned in that he who loves Yahweh, must hate the thing that is evil.

him write it on the doors of his house and on the gates of his city.¹

Let him be keen to teach² his children what Yahweh has done. Let him study the book of the law, learn parts of it by heart, think it over, absorb it, as we say, by reflective auto-suggestion.

In connection with the reliance of the D School on what we call suggestion, for the propagating and deepening of religious ideas, it is perhaps desirable to consider briefly such statements as are frequently made to-day to the effect that religion is due to suggestion, and that prayer is merely auto-suggestion.

Let us first consider the statement that prayer is merely auto-suggestion. To anyone who holds with Jung that when one honours God, one honours one's own libido, prayer can clearly be nothing else than auto-suggestion. Jung's view—utterly opposed to the view of Isaiah which we discussed in the last chapter—equates God with the libido. From which equation it follows that the idea of a transcendent God is a mere rationalisation of the drive of the libido, and that prayer—seeing there is no one to pray *to*—can be nothing but auto-suggestion. It is to be observed that this theory does not seek to explain religion by suggestion, but by the rationalisation of the drive of the libido. For indeed no one can seriously put forward the statement that prayer is merely auto-suggestion, as a final explanation of the existence of religion; the statement represents merely a necessary deduction which follows the acceptance of such theories of religion as Jung's.

¹Deut. vi, 9; xi, 20.

²Teach incisively. Deut. vi, 7. Cf. with different verbs iv, 9; xi, 19.

The opinion that prayer is merely auto-suggestion, is a rational—in fact a necessary—one for anyone who accepts such a philosophy as Jung's. But to say that religion is *due* to suggestion—though an “argument” which appeals to the suggestibility of the unthinking—is not one which any thinking man can advance. That religion is propagated and deepened by suggestion, is admitted by everyone—by none more clearly than by the D school which makes provision for the employment of suggestion by external objects [Deut. vi, 9 ; xi, 20], of herd suggestion [xiii, 5 ; xvii, 7], of hetero-suggestion [iv, 9 ; vi, 7], of auto-suggestion [vi, 6, 7 ; xi, 18]. Now suggestion is “the sub-conscious realisation of an idea.”¹ Given the idea, it may be realised by suggestion. But suggestion does not create the idea.

That the D school propagates by suggestion the religious ideas which it received from the prophets, does not explain whence the prophets received them ; and it is to be noted that the D school clearly distinguishes between reflective auto-suggestion, which is to be practised by all Israel,² and the inspiration of the prophets who are specially raised up by Yahweh.

It is instructive to study the passages in which methods of distinguishing the false prophet from the true prophet are indicated. In xviii, 21 to 22, the test is simply historic—the appeal is to history. If a prophet's prediction does not come to pass, he is a false prophet. In other words, the proof that a prophet is speaking by the genuine

¹Baudouin. Baudouin speaks of the “subconscious” where most writers speak of the “unconscious.”

²Cf. Jer. xv, 16 ; Josh. i, 8 ; Psalm i, 2 ; v, 3 ; xvii, 4 ; xxxvii, 31 ; cxix, 11, 148 ; Job xxiii, 12 and Deut. xvii, 18 to 20.

inspiration of Yahweh, and not by what we call the mere outcropping of his own unconscious, is to be found in the agreement of his teaching with the course of history. His inward experience must be in harmony with the outward experience of men. The subjective must be verified by the objective. If a long view of history be taken, this test seems to be thoroughly scientific.

But it is not easy to take a long view of history. So [Deut. xiii, 1 to 3] it is admitted that a false prophet may be borne out by a short view of history. But none the less his falsity may be detected. Here we have a test which implies some real knowledge of Yahweh on the part of those who are to apply it.¹ Is the prophet's teaching worthy of Yahweh? The test cannot be formulated in words. Yahweh cannot be reduced to a proposition. But so sure are the editors of Deuteronomy that there is a living God and that he does reveal himself to Israel, that they make him the final arbiter. Nor, on the supposition that the editors of Deuteronomy are right, is it conceivable that there could be any other final arbiter.

It is quite clear that the suggestion on which the D school intended in the last resort to rely, was, not the suggestion due to inscriptions on gate posts, not even the hetero-suggestion due to another man, not even reflective auto-suggestion, but what we may call Theo-suggestion—the suggestion due to the Living God.² They feel that a man requires a "listening mind" (leb shomea)

¹Cf. Matthew vii, 15 to 27, where historic proof seems to be recognised in 19—I John iv, 1 to 6.

²Cf. Exod. iv, 12; I Sam. iii, 9 to 10; Isaiah xxx, 20 to 21; li, 7; liv, 13; Jer. i, 9; xxxi, 33; Ezra vii, 27; Neh. ii, 12; vii, 5; I Chron. xxix, 18; Psalm xxv, 14; xxxii, 8 to 9; xlv, 10; li, 6, 10 to 11.

[I Kings iii, 9]. He must from time to time quiet, make silent, his instincts in the presence of Yahweh [Psalm cxxxi, 2], in order that he may be able to hear what Yahweh is saying to him. For the commandment (*mitswah*), the word (*dabar*), is not a dead thing—not the dull echo of a man's own thoughts—but the voice of the living God, leading him in ways he expects not, making of him what he never dreamt of [Deut. xxx, 11 to 14]. Men must at times keep silence and hearken to the voice of Yahweh. They must listen to Yahweh. If they listen, they cannot fail to love Yahweh. Thus, in words which are included in the morning and evening prayers of Jewish children to-day—"Listen, O Israel, the LORD is our God—the LORD only—and thou shalt love the LORD thy God with all thy intellect, with all thy emotions, and with thy whole self." [Deut. vi, 4 and 5]. "Listen," the Deuteronomist seems to say, "and then you will not be able to help loving."

We see, then, that though Deuteronomy is primarily a law book, demanding Israel's submission to a moral *code*, it recognises in places that the teaching of the prophets is too big to be reducible to a code, that it implies, not a moral code, but a moral *ideal*—"Thou shalt love Yahweh thy God."

But great as was the work of the compilers of Deuteronomy and of their successors, the D school, it was not wholly good.

It freed the religion of Yahweh from cruel and immoral rites—such as child sacrifice and "sacred" prostitution; but it crystallized and sanctioned a doctrine of mechanical retribution, which is equally cruel and immoral in its results.

It put an end to the worship of idols of gold and silver; but it was the beginning of a subtler

form of idolatry from which Christianity suffers to-day—the idolatry of the written word—verbal inspiration.

The view of mechanical retribution tended to keep in the background the thought of the importance of the personality of the individual. Verbal inspiration implied the fallacy that a transcendent moral ideal can be reduced to a code.

But these unfortunate teachings of the D school were challenged in advance—contradicted before they were fully formulated—by a man who had seen the making of the Deuteronomic covenant in 621 B.C. and had realised the psychological inadequacy of a moral code—a man who saw that men need, not a moral code, but a moral ideal, a transcendent ideal (Torah¹—"pointing out," "direction") put into the mind by the living God—a man who dreamed of a new covenant under which every Israelite would be a prophet and know Yahweh personally—a man whose career was inexplicable by Deuteronomic orthodoxy, and remained a constant challenge to the popular method of justifying God.

The fascination of the study of Jeremiah lies less in his teaching, remarkable as this is, than in the character of the man himself. On any showing he is one of the most important figures in the history of the world. He sees the breakdown of the Deuteronomic orthodoxy—the tragic death of Josiah—the failure of the Deuteronomic covenant—the fall of Jerusalem. N. Israel has fallen; the ten tribes are lost to history; one of the most heroic efforts in history to make a nation righteous "by Act of Parliament" has failed disastrously.

¹See chapter xii of this book.

Now Jerusalem falls. The flower of the population is deported. All the foundations of the national religion are overthrown.

Why was not this the end of the religion of the prophets? If Jeremiah had proved faithless to his mission, would this have been the end of the religion of the prophets? Would the Freudians have been spared from the contemplation of the neuroses caused by the diffusion of Hebrew ethics?

If we believe in a living God, Jeremiah claims our attention. But if we do not believe in a living God, Jeremiah claims our attention even more urgently. For we are then confronted with the question—"How has this psychoneurotic, who stood alone against the world, succeeded in imposing his delusions on millions of men over a period of $2\frac{1}{2}$ milleniums"?

Was Jeremiah a man with a message from the living God, or was he a psychoneurotic with a fixed idea? That he felt the drive of a compelling personality or force is indisputable.

Fortunately he has revealed himself to us in his writings to an extent to which few of the other outstanding characters of history have revealed themselves. He claims the profound attention of all who would account for religion by psychology.

E. Jones in *Essays in Applied Psycho-analysis* has studied some of the characters of history or fiction in the light of psycho-analysis. He has shown, in a manner that seems to be convincing, that the solution to the riddle of Hamlet lies in the Oedipus complex. Now there are some striking resemblances between the character of Jeremiah and the character of Hamlet.

Jeremiah might have said with Hamlet—"The time is out of joint: O cursed spite, That ever

"I was born to set it right!" For it is clear that Jeremiah did not want to be a prophet. We may contrast his hesitation when the prophetic call came to him [Jer. i, 6], with the alacrity of Isaiah [Isaiah vi, 8].

Hamlet, in spite of his obvious longing for friendship, is unsociable and melancholy. Jeremiah likewise, in spite of his obvious longing for friendship, "sits alone" because of Yahweh's "hand" [xv, 17] and attends neither funeral nor wedding [xvi, 5, 8].

Hamlet does not marry. Nor does Jeremiah [xvi, 2]. Celibacy is extraordinary in a Hebrew. True, Jeremiah gives a reason for it, [xvi, 3 and 4], a reason¹ which seems to account also for his remarkable procedure in advising his government to surrender, and its troops to desert, to the Babylonians [xxi, 8 to 10]. But, we may be asked, is this a genuine reason or is it merely a rationalisation?

Hamlet debates the question—"To be, or not to be." Jeremiah curses the day of his birth [xv, 10; xx, 14 to 18].

Hamlet is under the power of an urge which prevents him, in spite of himself, from carrying out what he wants to carry out—what he regards it as his duty to carry out. Jeremiah is under the power of an urge which drives him in spite of himself into unpopularity, torture and danger of death. Jeremiah declaims hopelessly against the compelling force of this urge in words not unlike those in which an alcoholic declaims against his fixed idea. See

¹Since Yahweh has determined to destroy Jerusalem, to prolong resistance is merely to prolong the agony; to beget children is merely to increase the number of sufferers in the inevitable disaster. The great prophets cannot be described as pacifists. To Jeremiah, as to Samuel, Yahweh is fighting; but to Jeremiah he is fighting against Israel.

Jer. xx, 7 to 9—"O Yahweh, thou hast deceived me, and I was deceived" [or—"O Yahweh, thou hast made a fool of me, and I let myself be fooled"—cf. I Kings xxii, 20, 21, 22, and Ezekiel xiv, 9 (twice), where same verb (Pathah) is used]: thou art stronger than I and hast prevailed [cf. I Kings xxii, 22, where same verb Yakal is used] And every time [slightly altering translation of R.V.] I make up my mind to think of him no more and to speak his message no more, it is as if my mind were on fire, as if there were a hidden fire in my body, and my resistance breaks down, and I cannot prevail [same verb as in verse 7]."

Was Jeremiah, then, a psycho-neurotic—a masochist, perhaps, or a mere propagandist?

But whatever the resemblances between Hamlet and Jeremiah, the differences are more striking than the resemblances.

Hamlet is not master of the situation—Jeremiah dominates the history of Jerusalem for twenty years. The dominating urge in Hamlet's unconscious is in the direction of preventing him from carrying out what it is an axiom of the ethical ideas of the play to regard as his duty. Hamlet does not recognise what this urge is, never faces it, never overcomes it. He only accomplishes his mission by accident. It is not till his mother has been poisoned through the act of his father's murderer, that he avenges his father.

The dominating urge in Jeremiah is in the direction of driving him on to carry out an arduous task. It is for responding loyally to this urge—an urge which he declares to be the message or "word" of Yahweh—that Jeremiah is persecuted, deserted by his friends, beaten, put into the stocks, thrown into a cesspool, etc. "True," it may be said; "but

the endurance of sufferings by the 'prophet' does not prove the genuineness of the 'prophet's' inspiration. In all ages men have given their bodies to be burned in the interest of causes which subsequent generations have viewed as immoral or mad." But it is clear that in the case of Jeremiah subsequent generations have approved the causes—social justice, fair treatment of the poor by the rich, honesty in business, sincerity among teachers of religion—for which Jeremiah suffered. It is moreover clear that the urge to suffer for these causes is not the only urge which we find in Jeremiah. He has to "take forth the precious from the vile" [xv, 19]; for he, like Hamlet, feels a shrinking from life. He is decidedly a potential psycho-neurotic, with a strong tendency to regression. But whereas Hamlet never recognises his complex—never faces it—never conquers it, Jeremiah recognises his tendency—faces it—conquers it.

Decidedly this Jeremiah claims the attention of the psycho-analysts. Half a century before the date of Buddha—two and a half millenniums before the date of Freud—he describes for us the Nirvana complex. See xx, 17—"So my mother should have been my grave, and her womb always great."

But he also describes for us the facing of life which is the resolution of this complex. For one of the messages of Yahweh that comes to Jeremiah in his despondency and enables him to carry on, is—"If thou hast run with the footmen, and they have wearied thee, then how canst thou contend with horses? [cf. I Kings xviii, 46]. And if in a land of peace thou art a fugitive (reading boreach for boteach), how wilt thou do in the jungle of Jordan" ("pride of Jordan," invested with wild beasts). [Jer. xii, 5 to 6.]

It may be said that in Jeremiah we find merely an instance in a remarkable man of the normal conflict between the backward urge towards infantilism and the forward urge¹ towards adaptation to reality—the conflict treated of throughout Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious*. This is no doubt true. But what is the nature of the reality to which loyal obedience to the forward urge can be said to adapt a man, when this loyal obedience to the forward urge leads him to misunderstanding, persecution, enforced celibacy, loss of friends, boycotting at the hands of his fellows, quarrels with his employer, seeming disloyalty to his family, seeming treachery to his country, being put into the stocks, being thrown into a cesspool?

To compare the psychology of a historical character with that of a fictitious character, created by a great author, seems to be permissible so long as it is remembered that it is a mere abstraction to consider the historical character without reference to history. E. Jones is led from the consideration of Hamlet to the consideration of what is behind Hamlet—i.e., Shakespeare. We are naturally led from the consideration of Jeremiah to the consideration of what is behind Jeremiah—i.e., ultimate reality in so far as we can discern this by the course of history.

When we look at history, we find that Jeremiah's prediction that Jerusalem would be destroyed, was fulfilled; we also find that the effect of his celibacy was important in later history. For it seems to be

¹"The libido of mankind is always in advance of his consciousness; unless his libido calls him forth to new dangers he sinks into slothful inactivity or, on the other hand, childish longing for the mother overcomes him at the summit of his existence, and he allows himself to become pitifully weak, instead of striving with desperate courage towards the highest." *Psychology of the Unconscious*—Jung, page 211.

certain that Jeremiah was the raw material—or, at any rate, part of the raw material—out of which the ideal figure of the “Servant of Yahweh” was built up.¹ If Jeremiah had had children, it would have been possible for the “orthodox” of the day to justify Yahweh on traditional lines by asserting that Jeremiah’s faithfulness had proved a source of blessing to his descendants. But, since Jeremiah had no descendants, this rationalisation was impossible. Jeremiah remained a challenge to the theology of the D school.

Moreover, in the book of Jeremiah [xxxix, 31 to 34] occurs the prediction of a new covenant under which Theo-suggestion will take the place of priests and prophets. Yahweh will put his ideal (torah) on each Israelite’s “inward part”—i.e., “suggest” his will to each Israelite’s unconscious—and write it on each Israelite’s mind. There will then be no need for a special order of prophets. For all Israelites will know Yahweh—all will be prophets as Moses desired. [Numbers xi, 29. Cf. Isaiah xi, 9.]

In considering the psychology of the author of such a passage as this, it is clearly unscientific to refuse to notice that the most influential collection of literature in the world to-day is called “The New Covenant.” However much help psychology may give us in the study of the prophets, it is always to the reality principle, as evidenced by history, that we come back. And it is to the court of history that the prophets appeal again and again.

The prophets and the Old Testament writers do not present the psycho-analysts with an abstract problem. The validity of their hopes and of their interpretation of their experience is closely connected with the course of history. “God hath spoken

¹See chapter xv of this book.

once, twice have I heard this ; that power belongeth unto God." [Psalm lxii, 11.]

The Old Testament writers claim that history and man's sense of responsibility are in harmony with their religious experience. What the voice of Yahweh cries to the city [Micah vi, 9]—what "Wisdom" cries in the streets [Proverbs i, 20]—is held to be inescapable by a normal moral sense. To the mathematician it is impossible to believe that things which are unequal to the same thing, can be equal to one another. To the Old Testament writers it is equally impossible to believe that ultimate reality can be so constituted as finally to acquit a man who sells short weight. [Micah vi, 11.]

The Yahweh of religious experience is the Yahweh whose "word" David despised when he murdered Uriah [II Samuel xii, 9]. There is no clearer proof of a prophet's inspiration than that he has strength to declare to Israel Israel's sin [Micah iii, 8. Cf. Ecclesiasticus xlvi, 15].

To the Old Testament writers the individual man is by no means the measure of all things. The individual's conscience is not an infallible guide. "There is a way which seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of death." The sense of inspiration is no proof of the genuineness of inspiration. Yet there is a distinctive, indefinable, something in the religious experience of the genuine prophets, which guarantees its validity. This something is quite indefinable, but it is clearly connected with moral values, with history and with progress. "The prophet which prophesieth of peace, when the word of the prophet shall come to pass, then shall that prophet be known that Yahweh hath truly sent him" [Jer. xxviii, 9]. Yahweh's message is not a message of "peace, peace." The

false prophets "tell men who despise Yahweh's word, 'You shall be all right,' and to men who follow their own stubborn minds they say: 'No harm shall come to you.' But anyone who has stood in Yahweh's council must listen with awe."¹

The "God" of "popular" preaching is essentially the same in all ages and religions.

"They talk of some strict testing of us—pish!
He's a Good Fellow, and 'twill all be well."

Omar Khayyam.

To the prophets most of what passes for religion is "dope"; but there is a religion which is not "dope." For the word of Yahweh is like fire, like a hammer that smashes the rock. [See Jer. xxiii, 29.]

¹Jeremiah xxiii, 16 to 22; translation by Welch in *The Book of Jeremiah in Books of the Old Testament in Colloquial Speech* (National Adult School Union).

CHAPTER XII

IN 586 B.C., Jerusalem was destroyed by the Babylonians. The fall of Jerusalem meant the overthrow of the Yahweh religion as a merely national religion.

Yahweh Sabaoth, the God of the armies of Israel, had not protected his own temple from the heathen. Whereas he had frustrated Sennacherib in 701 B.C., he had not frustrated Nebuchadnezzar in 586 B.C.

To some Jews Yahweh's omission to protect his temple was due to impotence. Such Jews became heathen.

To other Jews Yahweh's omission to protect his temple, however terrible a strain on their faith, was not due to impotence. It was due to deliberate purpose. For six years before the fall of Jerusalem Yahweh had demonstrated his presence with the exiles in Babylonia, and had predicted the fall of Jerusalem, not only by Jeremiah in the land of Israel, but also by a prophet among the exiles who had been deported to Babylonia in 597 B.C.

For it was in 592 B.C., that Ezekiel received his call to become a prophet, and received it, not in the land of Israel, but in Babylonia. It was thus made clearer than it had ever been before, that Yahweh is not confined to the land of Israel, that he is the God of all the nations, and that he cares for those of his people who are exiled from his temple.

It was the fall of the nation and the collapse of the Yahweh religion as a merely national religion, which brought to the front the thought of the value to Yahweh of the individual Israelite. Amos and Hosea addressed the nation as a whole. Isaiah formed a kind of society—a “remnant”—within the nation, but he hardly addressed his message to the members of this society as individuals. Jeremiah dreams of a day when the man in the street will know Yahweh personally. Ezekiel addresses his message to individual Israelites.

Ezekiel is an uncanny figure. The effect of his call on him is overwhelming. He sits “astounded” for seven days [iii, 15]. He seems to suffer from some disease, physical or mental. Some of his visions come to him when he is in a peculiar psychic condition, expressed by the words, “the hand of Yahweh was upon me” [i, 3; iii, 22; viii, 1; xxxiii, 22; xxxvii, 1; xl, 1].¹

There is clearly something of the “divine madness” about Ezekiel. He seems to be gripped by an overwhelming urge—to be almost a passive instrument.

But Ezekiel’s appeal is, not to the signs of the “divine madness,” but to history. “Ye shall know (by the course of future history) that I am Yahweh”²—occurs in his book—not less than forty times—like the chorus in a song.³

Six years before the fall of Jerusalem Ezekiel

¹This expression reminds us of I Kings xviii, 46 (Elijah’s running before Ahab) and II Kings iii, 15 (Elisha’s water divining); but compare Isaiah viii, 11, where Isaiah is in the grip of Yahweh’s hand, and Jer. xv, 17, where Jeremiah lives an unsociable life. Note the result of this condition on Ezekiel in xl, 1, 2 and viii, 1, 3, xi, 1, 24. (Compare iv, 8, iii, 25, “bands.”)

²Cf. this expression in I Kings xx, 13, 28.

³Cf. “The Heavens do rule” (i.e. God does rule) in Daniel.

began to foretell its fall by weird, dramatic acting. But when Jerusalem had fallen he predicted its restoration. Jerusalem would be restored. The heathen, including the remote and uncivilised Scythians (Gog and Magog), would be made to fear Yahweh.

However weird and uncanny Ezekiel may sometimes appear, there is no prophetic madness in Yahweh-Shammah—Yahweh is there—[xlvi, 35], as he calls the restored Jerusalem of his hopes. His programme for the restored community [chapters xl to xlviii] may be charged with dullness, but hardly with encouraging prophetic madness.

There is, indeed, this remarkable fact to notice. This man who seems at times to be like a passive instrument, is, more than any other prophet, insistent on the doctrine of freewill.

He has been described as the first man in history to have a cure of souls. He is a watchman for the souls of individuals.

He attacks the prevailing doctrine of heredity. Yahweh is the God, not only of Israel as a whole, but of each Israelite. Yahweh desires that each Israelite shall "live." It rests with each Israelite whether he will "live" or "die." Men—not merely "at some time," but at all times—are masters of their fate. If they "die," it is, not the fault of their fathers or of Yahweh, but of themselves.

The psychology of Ezekiel has been attacked as unscientific. He seems to ignore heredity and the effect of the past upon the present. Yet notice should be given to his use of the word SHUB, to "return." "Return ye, and turn yourselves from all your transgressions (noun "pesha" from verb "pasha" = "to rebel": "rebellions"); so iniquity (awon—Hosea's word) shall not be your

stumbling block." [xviii, 30. Cf. xiv, 6; xviii, 32].

Hadfield—see *Psychology and Morals*, chapter vi—discriminates between a sin and a moral disease. To get drunk is a sin; to be a chronic alcoholic is a moral disease. The only freewill the chronic alcoholic may have, is the will to face the suffering caused to his friends by his condition, and then to submit to treatment. He has not freewill to cure himself; but he has freewill to go to the doctor. It is this modified form of freewill which is in Ezekiel's mind. For he looks below the mere act to the mind behind it. To him, as to all the prophets, what are commonly called "sins," are not ultimate—they are a "moral disease," the mere symptoms of one ultimate sin. This ultimate sin does not reside in the flesh, nor in the instincts—it is "rebellion" [see xviii, 30] against the living God—the refusal to face the living God and his demands. This refusal leads to an awon, "iniquity," or what we call a "buried complex," which proves a "stumbling block" and the cause of what are commonly called "sins."

To "return" to Yahweh implies facing the claim, the repudiation of which caused the repression and the formation of the complex; it implies the resolution of the complex.

In xxxvi, 25 to 28, Yahweh says—"I will sprinkle clean water upon you I will take away [verb *sūr*—make to "get out of the way, cease to obstruct"—same verb as in Isaiah vi, 7], the stony heart (i.e., mind) out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh (i.e., a human, healthy mind). And I will put my spirit (*Ruach*) within you and ye shall be my people, and I will be your God."

E. Jones' investigations as to the origin of the symbols "water" and "spirit" (*Essays in Applied*

Psycho-Analysis) are of great interest in connection with this passage. If water is connected with birth, as "spirit" [cf. Genesis i, 1; vii, 22] clearly is with life, we have the thought of the Israelites facing the new birth—as Ephraim would not in Hosea xiii, 13—and being born again of water and of the spirit.¹

The spirit Yahweh will put within the Israelites will not be the spirit of prophetic madness. Ezekiel, though clearly himself an ecstatic, views ecstasy with suspicion. He examines the psychology of the false prophets. They "prophesy out of their own heart (i.e., mind) Woe unto the foolish (nabal—see chapter ix of this book) prophets, that follow their own spirit (ruach) They have seen (chazah)² vanity and lying divination, that say, Yahweh saith; and Yahweh hath not sent them. . . . Have ye not seen (chazah) a vain vision, and have ye not spoken a lying divination, whereas ye say, Yahweh saith; albeit I have not spoken? ye have spoken vanity, and seen (chazah) lies." [Ezekiel xiii, 1 to 8.] "The prophets of Israel which prophesy concerning Jerusalem, and which see (chazah) visions of peace for her, and there is no peace. . . . The daughters of thy people which prophesy out of their own heart (mind). . . . Therefore ye shall no more see (chazah) vanity, nor divine divination." [Chapter xiii, 16 to 23.]

¹It is unfortunate that E. Jones, in discussing the significance of Baptism in Christianity, should have overlooked the Old Testament antecedents. The "law" is full of "washings." Baptism by New Testament times was already one of the things required of a Gentile desiring to become a full Jew. Those who listened to John the Baptist, were acquainted with Ezekiel xxxvi, 25 to 28, and with the proselyte's new birth to Judaism. As a Gentile had to be reborn to enter Judaism, so a Jew, John declared, had to be reborn to enter the sovereignty of God.

²Same verb as is used of Balaam's vision in Numbers xxiv, 4, 16.

There are plenty of false prophets among the exiles—prophets who see visions and dream dreams. But the false prophet's "visions of peace" are from his own "mind"—that "mind" which in Jeremiah xvii, 9, is described as "deceitful above all things" and "desperately sick." Clearly Ezekiel was aware of that unknown x which we call the unconscious mind.

But why do these prophets see visions—these prophets who do not know that they are prophesying lies, who are just as confident of the genuineness of their inspiration as Ezekiel is of the genuineness of his? How do the dreams and visions come into their "hearts" (unconscious minds)? Why do these false prophets see visions which ordinary men do not see? Are they really inspired by Yahweh? To this question Ezekiel in chapter xiv gives the tremendous answer—"Yes."

"If the prophet be deceived and speaketh a word, I, Yahweh, have deceived that prophet." [Verse 9.]

Though it is clear from chapter xiii and elsewhere that Ezekiel's theology and psychology are far different from the crude theology and psychology of Micaiah ben-Yimlah, he uses in the above passage the same word (PATHAH—"deceive," "make a fool of") as is used by Micaiah in I Kings xxii and by Jeremiah in a moment of bitterness against Yahweh. [Jer. xx, 7.]

But to Ezekiel it is not Yahweh's fault¹ that his

¹Similarly, though Ezekiel xx, 25 to 26, seems at first sight to mean that Yahweh *deliberately* "gave" the Israelites "statutes that were not good" e.g. child sacrifice, Jeremiah says that such a thing as child sacrifice never entered Yahweh's mind. The passage in Jeremiah xix, 5, suggests that Ezekiel regarded child sacrifice, not as a statute deliberately "given" by Yahweh, but rather as the perversion of the true religion which Yahweh really did "give," by men whose "eyes were after their fathers' idols" (Ezekiel xx, 24).

inspiration "fools" the false prophets. It is the fault of the prophets themselves and of those who listen to their preaching. Both the prophets themselves and also those who listen to them, must "bear their own iniquity" (AWON)¹—that is to say, the responsibility for the perversion of Yahweh's inspiration.

Yahweh has called these prophets and spoken to them. But they repress his true message—both because it is too sublime for them to face themselves and also because it is not what the public wants [verses 4, 5, 10]. In modern language, Yahweh's message is in their unconscious, trying to emerge into consciousness. But they repress it. What then? A prophetic complex is formed, and the very message of Yahweh breaks out as a perversion, as a lie.

We have here a far deeper psychology than that of JE as it is indicated in their account of Balaam. Balaam could not pervert Yahweh's inspiration; he was a true prophet in spite of himself. But the prophets considered by Ezekiel in Ezekiel xiv, can pervert Yahweh's inspiration and are not "true prophets in spite of themselves." They have been truly inspired by Yahweh; but because they will not face Yahweh's true meaning, his very inspiration becomes perverted. The very message of Yahweh becomes a lie.

It is not merely that the message of Yahweh is too sublime to be faced directly and can only be received symbolically—for the great prophets themselves received many of their messages symbolically in

¹Ezek. xiv, 10. For AWON conveying idea of responsibility for evil results—see Num. v, 31; xiv, 34; xxx, 15; Lev. v, 1, 17; vii, 18; xvii, 16; xix, 8; xx, 17, 19; xxii, 16; Ezek. xliv, 10, 12; see also I Sam. xxv, 24; II Sam. xiv, 9; II Kings vii, 9.

dreams and visions. But these men, though worshippers of Yahweh and abhorers of idols, have repressed the thought of the living Yahweh. Their very worship of Yahweh is a perversion; their idea of the true Yahweh is an idol—set up, not like the golden bull on a “high place,” but in their minds [xiv, 3]. Consequently the “stumbling block” of their “iniquity” (awon) is in front of them, blocking their advance; they stumble over their complex at every turn. They can receive Yahweh’s true message neither directly nor symbolically, and the very visions inspired by Yahweh become perverted visions, lying visions.

It follows from the teaching of Ezekiel that the false prophets would have been true prophets, had they not repudiated and repressed the real message of Yahweh; and that a man to whom the prophetic call of Yahweh has come, cannot avoid becoming a prophet. For though he may decline to follow the true prophetic call, he cannot rid himself of it or be as if he had not received it; if he does not consciously receive the true message of Yahweh and become a true prophet, he unconsciously represses it, it breaks out in a perverted form, and he becomes a false prophet.

False prophecy is indeed true prophecy perverted.¹

When we look back on the age of the great prophets, we see the prophets standing out clearly as either true or false. The whites seem to have been thoroughly white and the blacks to have been thoroughly black. Were there no greys? Were there no prophets who were partially true and partially false?

¹According to the principle proclaimed by Ezekiel, it would seem that the faith of an unscrupulous man in his luck or in his star is the perversion of the sense of vocation to fulfil a God-given ideal.

It is clear from a study of Nahum,¹ of Obadiah (a prophet of uncertain date), and of some of the passages which have been inserted into the books of Isaiah and Jeremiah, that there were.

Nahum's "hymn of hate," as it has been called, in which he predicts the fall of Nineveh, is inspired by an overwhelming sense of the justice of Yahweh, which will be vindicated in the punishment of the bloodthirsty city, "all full of lies and rapine" [iii, 1]. But all the emphasis is on the faults of foreigners; Nahum has nothing to say about the faults of Judah; he is more akin to the opponents of Jeremiah than to Jeremiah.

On the other hand, Obadiah's savagery against Edom is relieved by the declaration that the "kingdom (or rather "sovereignty") shall be Yahweh's" [verse 21].

So we find genuine inspiration in the work of prophets whose whole attitude is opposed to that of the "true" prophets; "false" prophets may be sometimes "true."

Moreover, when we consider the work of the great prophets themselves, we find passages in which savagery against Israel's enemies is so intense as to suggest that the utterance of the true prophet is an instance of false rather than of true prophecy; in other words, a true prophet may be sometimes false. Similarly, in the history of Christianity, true and false inspiration are embarrassingly mixed up in the teaching of the saints and leaders of the Church. Nor is a saint necessarily less firmly convinced of the truth of his inspiration when he is declaring

¹Our book of Nahum contains, in addition to the prophecy of Nahum, an acrostic Psalm. The real work of Nahum seems to be confined to i, 11, 14; ii, 1, 3 to 13; iii, 1 to 19. See translation by G. Currie Martin in *The Books of Joel, Nahum, and Obadiah*—price 9d.—National Adult School Union.

celibacy to be a higher state than marriage, encouraging the persecution of heretics, or denouncing the higher criticism, than when he is exhorting men to be honest, love kindness and walk humbly with their God.

It is a corollary of the teaching of Ezekiel in Ezekiel xiv, that, in so far as a man will not face any part of God's true message, that part, repressed, breaks out as a perversion, as a false message.

Only the prophet who is free from any repression, can be always and utterly a true prophet. History only records in its pages the life of one man in whom no trace of repression¹ can be detected. It is significant that his is the only teaching² which has never been superseded.

According to Ezekiel subjective certainty is no proof of the genuineness of inspiration. The false prophet is no less convinced of the genuineness of his inspiration than the true prophet is convinced of the genuineness of his.

It is a corollary of Ezekiel's teaching that subjective certainty with regard to religious experience is no proof of the validity of religious belief. If a prophet's intense personal conviction that he is truly inspired by God, is no guarantee of the truth of his inspiration ; then clearly a man's intense per-

¹See Luke ii, 49 ; Mark i, 11 ; viii 31, 33 ; x, 32 ; xiv, 33 to 34. Compare John xii, 27, 28. Matthew iv, 1 to 11 ; xvi, 21 to 23. A man does not stumble over a scandalon (stumbling block) which he has looked at and faced, but over one which (cf. Ezekiel xiv, 3) he has refused to look at and to face. If he looks at and faces the stumbling block, and then steps over it, it will be behind him—not repressed, but accessible to memory—under the control of the will.

²Is it possible to gauge the harm that has been done by the fact that until fairly recently Mark xvi, 16, was generally considered to belong to Mark's gospel and to represent the teaching of Jesus ?

sonal conviction that his religion is true, is no guarantee that his religion is really true.

The teaching of Ezekiel, then, leads us to the consideration of the theory that God is simply the rationalisation of the drive of the libido—a drive which seems—but only seems—to make on us demands such as one personality makes on another. This theory, expressed by Jung in the words—"If one honours God, the sun or the fire, then one honours one's own vital force, the libido"—and—"God is our own longing to which we pay divine honours"—[*Psychology of the Unconscious*, page 52] really sums up all possible theories which can be advanced to account for religion by psychology. It asserts that the Christian only thinks he is in touch with a living God because [page 40] "the roots of the Deity, set up as real by the pious, are concealed from him," and, having to account to himself somehow or other for the power of an unconscious urge, he rationalises this unconscious urge as a personal, living, God.

This theory is not met by the assertions of Christians—however enthusiastic—that they know whom they have believed. The Christians have intense personal conviction; but so have the psychoneurotics with "fixed ideas." If the madman's intense conviction does not guarantee the objective reality of his delusion, on what grounds can it be assumed that the Christian's intense conviction is a guarantee that, when he says his prayers, he is in touch with someone who is really there, and not merely practising auto-suggestion with the assistance obtained by rationalising the drive of the life force. Those who hold that God is simply the rationalisation of the drive of the life force, merely smile at the enthusiasm of the Christians, and in-

form them politely that they never intended to deny the reality of Christian experience, but only the interpretation of it which asserts that the Christian experience of God is the experience of anyone who is really there.

It is true that psychology is a science of mental processes, and is not concerned with the existence or non-existence of objective realities corresponding to ideas in the mind. But it is also true that those of the New Psychologists who usurp the province of philosophy, are only imitating the procedure of those of the Christians who, exalting "the religion of the heart" above "the religion of the head," assume that historical facts or theological propositions can be guaranteed by the intensity of the personal conviction with which their occurrence or their truth is accepted. As we have seen, this exclusive reliance upon subjective conviction was a mark of the false prophets, rather than of the true prophets.

And we have now reached a stage in the Old Testament history at which the violent outcroppings of the unconscious are regarded with suspicion rather than with confidence. Amos refused to be called a Nabi (Prophet); but he described his preaching by the niphal of the verb Naba. In Samuel and Kings the expression *ish elohim*—"man of God"—is sometimes used instead of Nabi to describe genuine prophets.¹ It must be remembered that Nabi and its verb are used, not only of genuine prophets, but also of heathen prophets and of false prophets. From the time of Micaiah ben-Yimlah the genuine pro-

¹In I Kings xiii, 1 to 32—a passage in its present form later than the Deuteronomic reformation (note mention of Josiah in 2)—there seems to be a distinction between "man of God" and "nabi." The nabi lies in 18, but is inspired in 20.

phets were always in a minority. It is not surprising that *Nabi* and its verb became suspect. "Usage of prophets themselves gives such a bad flavour to *Nabi*, that we are not surprised that it is absent from exilic Isaiah, the Wisdom Literature, and Psalms (except for special reasons in three psalms)."^{1 2}

Deutero-Isaiah's appeal is not to ecstasy, but to history and to reason—reason as the Hebrew conceived it—reason applicable, not only to the logical, but also to the moral and personal.

Again and again does Deutero-Isaiah appeal to history. Let his contemporaries observe the way in which Yahweh's predictions by the earlier prophets have been fulfilled. Let them observe the way in which Yahweh's predictions by Deutero-Isaiah are going to be fulfilled.

"I am Yahweh the true God—
such is my Name—

My honour I give to no other,
nor my praise to the idols ;

Lo, former predictions are come to pass,
and new things do I announce ;

Before they spring into existence
I make them known to you."

xlii, 8 to 9. Box's translation.

¹Psalm li, 2, in title; lxxiv, 9; cv, 15.

²See Oxford Hebrew Lexicon page 612. Note that *Nabi* is used in a good sense in Zechariah, chapter i, of ancient prophets. Cf. Chronicles, Ezra, Daniel. It is also used in narrative part of book of Haggai; but note that Haggai is in i, 13 described as Yahweh's *MALACH*—messenger. The priest is Yahweh's *malach* in Malachi ii, 7. And Yahweh will send his *malach*—the *malach* of the covenant—in iii, 1. Malachi means "my messenger"; *malach* being equivalent to Greek *ANGELOS*, angel. But Yahweh will send Elijah, the *nabi*, in iv, 5.

(Note curious use of *nabi* or of its verb in Nehemiah vi, 7; I Chron. xxv, 1, 2, 3).

Compare xli, 21 to 29; xlv, 25 to 26; xlvi, 11; xlviii, 3, 6, 14 to 16. The standing miracle of Judaism has begun to be obvious. The nation, the Temple, all the adjuncts of the national religion have been overthrown. But the religion of the prophets endures. Moreover, Deutero-Isaiah looks to the future. He declares that Yahweh has raised up Cyrus to restore Israel [xlv, 1], that Israel will be restored, and that the religion of Yahweh will be proclaimed to all the world. [xlv, 6, 22 to 23.]

The reaction against "verbal inspiration" and the abandonment by Biblical scholars of what may be called the "Old Moore's Almanack" principles of exegesis, have led to a desire to minimise the predictive element in the utterances of the prophets. To admit that prophecy is predictive, seems to some to involve the acceptance, either of fatalism, or of a God who, like a spoilt child, knocks over the board from time to time and starts the game afresh. But the prophets are not fatalists, nor do they look upon Yahweh as omnipotent in the sense of having reserved to himself the power to do anything he likes—the omnipotence of childish day dreams or of Peter Pan. Real creation implies real self-limitation—real self-sacrifice. The prophets regard man as having been created with some power of choice; they hold that man can thwart God.

Clearly, then, the predictive element in prophecy cannot be absolute. It must be relative to human co-operation and to human opposition, and it is evident that this was recognised by the contemporaries of the prophets. For in the days of Jeremiah the best type of Jew did not regard Micah as a false prophet, although his century old prediction had failed to be fulfilled. [Compare Micah iii, 12 with Jer. xxvi, 17 to 19, 24.] And many years later

the author of Jonah holds that a prediction may be the means of averting its own fulfilment. [Jonah iii, 4, 10; iv, 2.]

In Isaiah lv, the closing chapter of Deutero-Isaiah, Yahweh's creative work in history is described, not in terms of the capricious wind or breath (Ruach), but in terms of the deliberately reasoned, the deliberately spoken word (Dabar). But it is the *dabar* of Yahweh which is often described as the source of the inspiration of the prophets, as when the word (*dabar*) of Yahweh comes to Jeremiah or Ezekiel; it is the *dabar* of Yahweh which, in the good time coming, is to go forth from Jerusalem to teach all nations how to "walk" (i.e., make progress) in the ways of Yahweh [Isaiah ii, 3].

Now we have already seen¹ that to Hebrew psychology parts of a man's body and a man's emotions have a certain autonomy, a partial independence. Similarly the "hand," the "arm," the "sword," the "spirit," the "name," the "face," the "angel," the "zeal," the "glory," the "word" of Yahweh, are regarded, sometimes as hardly distinguishable from Yahweh, sometimes as having an initiative of their own.²

¹ See Chapter vi of this book and reference to H. Wheeler Robinson.

²HAND. Num. xi, 23; Dent. iv, 34; v, 15; vii, 19; I Kings xviii, 46; II Kings iii, 15; Isaiah viii, 11; xxxi, 3; lix, 1; lxvi, 14; Jer. i, ix; xv, 17; Ezek. i, 3; iii, 22; viii, 1; xxxiii, 22; xxxvii, 1; xl, 1; Ezra vii, 6, 9; viii, 18, etc; Nehemiah ii, 8, 18.

ARM. Dent. iv, 34; v, 15; vii, 19; Isaiah li, 9; lii, 10; liii, 1; lix, 16; lxiii, 5, 12.

SWORD. Isaiah xxxiv, 5 to 6; Jer. xlvii, 6, 7; Ezek. xxi, 1 to 17.

FINGER OF GOD. Exod. viii, 19.

GLORY. Exod. xxxiii, 18; Isaiah vi, 3; lx, 1, 2.

ANGER. Hosea xiv, 4; I Macc. i, 64; iii, 8.

ZEAL OR JEALOUSY. Isaiah ix, 7.

NAME. Exod. xxxiv, 5; Num. vi, 27; I Kings ix, 3; Isaiah

To Deutero-Isaiah it is not by breaking the rules of the game, not by arbitrary interference from outside, not by the capricious Ruach, but by his Dabar (word) that Yahweh is at work in history. It is because the *dabar* of Yahweh which speaks to the prophets, is the same as the *dabar* of Yahweh which is working in history as the rain works in the soil, that Yahweh "establishes the word (*dabar*) of his servants and the counsel of his messengers." [Isaiah xlv, 26. Box's translation.]

"For my thoughts are not your thoughts
Nor your ways my ways, says Yahweh's oracle.
As the heavens are higher than the earth,
So are my ways higher than your ways,
And my thoughts than your thoughts.

For as the rain descends and the snow from heaven,
And thither returns not except it have watered
the earth
And have made it bring forth and sprout,
And given seed to the sower and bread to the eater ;

xxix, 23 ; xxx, 27 ; Ezek. xx, 9, 14, 22, 44 ; xxxvi, 20 to 23 ; Malachi iv, 2 ; Proverbs xviii, 10.

FACE OR PRESENCE. Exod. xxxiii, 14, 20 with which cf. xxxiv, 9.

ANGEL (i.e. MESSENGER). Gen. xvi, 11, 13 ; xxii, 11, 15, 16 ; xlviii, 15 to 16 ; Exod. iii, 2, 4 ; xxxiii, 20 to 21 ; xxxiii, 2 ; Num. xxii, 22, 35 ; Judges ii, 1 ; vi, 11 to 14 ; xiii, 3, 22 ; II Kings i, 3, 15 and cf. Josh. v, 13 to 15.

SPIRIT. Isaiah xi, 2 ; xxx, 1 ; xl, 13 ; xlii, 1 ; lix, 21 ; lxi, 1 ; lxiii, 10 to 11, 14 ; Ezek. xxxvi, 27 ; Haggai ii, 5 ; Zech. iv, 6 ; Joel ii, 28 to 29 ; Neh. ix, 20, 30 ; Psalm li, 11 ; cxxxix, 7 ; cxliii, 10 ; Psalm in II Sam. xxiii, 2 ; Wisdom xii, 1.

WISDOM. Proverbs i 20 ff ; ii, 4 to 6 ; iii, 19 to 20 ; vii 1 ff ; ix, 5 ; Ecclesiasticus i, 4 ; xxiv, 3 ff ; Wisdom vii, 22 ff ; ix, 4 ; x, 5, 16.

WORD. I Sam. iii, 1 ; iii, 21 ; II Sam. vii, 4 ; xii, 9 ; xxiv, 11 ; I Kings, vi, 11 ; xvii, 2, 8 ; xviii, 1 ; xix, 9 ; xxi, 17 ; Isaiah ii, 3 ; ix, 8 ; xl, 8 ; lv, 11 ; Jer. i, 4, etc. ; Ezek. vi, 1, etc. ; Zech. ix, 1 ; Psalm xxxiii, 6 ; cv, 19 ; cvii, 20 ; cxix, 50 ; cxlvii, 15, 18 ; cf. Hosea vi, 5 ; Jer. i, 9 to 10 ; xxxix, 16.

So shall be my word that has gone out of my mouth ;
 It shall not return to me void,
 Except it have accomplished that which I pleased,
 And attained that for which I sent it."

Isaiah lv, 8 to 11. Box's translation.

Deutero-Isaiah is thus the prophet both of divine transcendence and also of divine immanence.^{1 2}

He insists more clearly than anyone ever insisted before, on the Transcendence, the Holiness, the creative power of God. See xl, 12 to 16, 21 to 31 ; xlv, 12, 18. Especially note xlv, 6 to 7.

That men may know from the east,
 and from the west,
 That I am Yahweh, and there is none else,
 there is none beside me ;
 I am He who forms light and creates darkness,
 who produces welfare and calamity.
 It is I, Yahweh the true God,
 who effect all this.³

But no prophet insists more clearly on the personal relation of God to Israel, a relation as of mother to child or of husband to wife. See l, 1 ; liv, 6, 7. Note especially xlix, 14 to 15.

But Zion said : Yahweh has forsaken me,
 and my lord⁴ forgotten me !

¹Isaiah vi—call of Isaiah—seems to suggest that Yahweh is both transcendent (intensely holy) and also immanent ("the whole earth is full of his glory.")

²This thought of divine immanence was developed in the later literature. Compare Psalm xxxiii, 6—"By the *dabar* of Yahweh were the heavens made." Or the transcendent God is immanent in the world by his wisdom (*chokmah*). Note especially Proverbs i, 20, 23, 28, 33 ; ii, 4 to 6 ; iii, 19 to 20 ; viii, 1 ; ix, 5. Whether the author of the 4th Gospel was well acquainted with Greek Philosophy or not, he had no need to go beyond the limits of the Hebrew Bible to find the thought of the immanent *dabar*.

³Box's translation.

⁴i.e. husband.

Can a woman forget her suckling,
 have no compassion on the son of her womb?
 Should even these forget
 yet will I not forget thee!¹

And the transcendent God can be frustrated, made to suffer, by the sins of His people. Note xliii, 24. Yahweh says to Israel: "Thou hast made a slave² of me with thy sins, thou hast wearied me with thine iniquities (plural of *awon*)."³ Strange that a prophet who lived over five centuries B.C., should find it easier than Greek Christian theologians to hold both the belief that God is transcendent, and also the belief that God can suffer.

It is by his *dabar* that Yahweh, the transcendent God, is immanent in the world. But if the *dabar* of Yahweh which speaks to the prophets, is also immanent in the world, working in history like the rain in the soil, the prophets' inner experience is in tune with the course of history—the subjective corresponds to a real objective.

That is (a) the reason why prophecy is predictive; for the prophet sees or hears the purpose towards which Yahweh is working.³ It is also (b) the reason why the religion of Yahweh is the universal religion; for, the *dabar* of Yahweh being immanent in the world, man as man, not merely Israelite as Israelite, can and ought to know Yahweh.

(a) Concerning the predictive element in prophecy, three things are evident.

(1) The prophets did make predictions.

(2) Their predictions were not always fulfilled. It is evident, for instance, from a comparison of

¹Box's translation.

²The Hebrew word "make to serve" is used in Exodus i, 13 and vi, 5, of compelling people to labour as slaves.

³Hence stress laid in O.T. on the need of "waiting for" Yahweh; e.g. Isaiah xxv, 9; xxvi, 8; Habak ii, 3; Dan. xii, 2.

Ezekiel xxvi, 1 to 14, and xxix, 17 to 20, that Ezekiel recognised and admitted that one of his predictions concerning Tyre had not been fulfilled. Again, Cyrus did not sack Babylon, did not destroy its religion, and did not embrace the religion of Yahweh ; thus some of the most striking of Deutero-Isaiah's predictions were not fulfilled. [See Isaiah xlv, 1 and 2 ; xlvii.]

(3) The prophets dreamed a dream of social justice, which is still ahead of the public opinion of the twentieth century A.D., but towards which the public opinion of the twentieth century A.D. is moving.

(4) Among the most important of the predictions of the prophets are : (a) The punishment of Israel, whether of Northern Israel or of Judah. (b) The restoration of Judah. (c) The proclamation of the religion of Yahweh to all the nations. In these predictions the prophets have been, or are being, justified by the course of history.

The prophets were sometimes at fault in their interpretation of history.¹ Are we therefore to look on them as deluded visionaries ? Not unless we look upon scientists as deluded visionaries. This we do not do. For to accept Einstein's theory regarding space, does not imply that Newton was a deluded visionary. The history of science shows that scientists may be right in postulating what we call law, in nature, but wrong in their interpretation of a particular phenomenon. The fundamental doctrine of all scientists is that the universe will not utterly betray man's reason.

¹Nor were the Prophets immune from rationalisation. See e.g. Amos iv, 11 ; viii, 8 ; ix, 5, regarding earthquakes and viii, 9 regarding an eclipse of the sun. Cf. Haggai i, 10 ; Malachi i, 3 (an unkind rationalisation of physical geography).

The fundamental doctrine of the prophets is that the course of history will not utterly betray man's highest thoughts of justice. For behind history is Yahweh, the God of justice, and "shall not the shophet (judge and vindicator) of all the earth do mishpat (justice)?" [Genesis xviii, 25].

(b) To Deutero-Isaiah the religion of Yahweh is a world religion—but a very different world religion from a world religion based on the personification of the whole group of humanity. When he declares that Yahweh is the only God, he does not invite the heathen to recognise that their gods are other forms of Yahweh. He is no advocate of syncretism. On the contrary, he is highly intolerant towards the gods of the heathen, and calls upon the heathen to abandon their senseless and immoral religions and to turn to Yahweh—"the King of Israel" [xliv, 6]—the God who has chosen Israel to be his missionary to the whole world.

In xlv, 1, 4, Yahweh calls Cyrus, the heathen,

"That men may know from the east,
and from the west,
That I am Yahweh, and there is none else,
there is none beside me."

xlv, 6. Box's translation.

Deutero-Isaiah is impressed by the obviousness of Yahweh in the normal affairs of life. Not only history but nature proclaims Yahweh to all who perceive and listen. There is something wrong with a man who does not recognize the Living God.

Do ye not know? Do ye not hear?
Has it not been told you from the first?
Have ye not become aware (of the fact)
from the foundation of Earth?

* * * * *

Lift up on high your eyes,
 And see: who has created those?
 xl, 21 to 26. Box's translation.

It is nothing but madness for men to try to examine the universe from outside, or to imagine that they have made themselves. [xlv, 9]. The failure of the heathen to recognise the living God is due, not to absolute ignorance, but to repression of the sense of moral responsibility. Man's inescapable sense of responsibility implies that there is someone to whom he is responsible. It is true that God hides himself with Israel [xlv, 14 to 15]. But this is simply because there is in Israel, in spite of all its faults, a people that "knows" (i.e. "acknowledges") "righteousness"—"tsedeq" (i.e. "a sense of responsibility¹ to Yahweh")—a people, in whose mind is Yahweh's "direction," "torah" (i.e. "ideal"). [See li, 7]. And Yahweh's purposes and promises are not limited to Israel.

"Turn to me and be delivered
 all ye ends of the Earth!
 For I am God, and there is none else,
 by myself have I sworn,
 Truth is gone forth out of my mouth,
 a word which shall not be recalled;
 That unto me shall every knee bow,
 every tongue swear."

xlv, 22 and 23. Box's translation.

The religion of Yahweh is no longer a religion which can only be practised in the land of Israel. Yahweh is to be worshipped, not by sacrifices which can only be offered in one country, but by

¹For Israel's tsedeq, "righteousness," consists in loyalty to Israel's covenant with Yahweh, just as Yahweh's tsedeq, "vindication," consists in loyalty to Yahweh's covenant with Israel. See e.g. Judges v, 11.

mishpat (justice and honesty) and by chesed (love), which can be offered in all countries and by all men. Nor, to the prophets, does Yahweh set before men a moral code, but he puts in their minds an inexhaustible ideal. (Torah—from Horah = "to throw," "throw a finger," "point out," "direct").

Having regard to the confusion wrought by "verbal inspiration"—a confusion on which much of Tansley's discussion of religion in *The New Psychology* seems to be based—it is important to remember what the prophets meant by this word Torah, which is often in English versions misleadingly rendered "law" in cases where this meaning is inapplicable.¹

The word Torah, which afterwards came to stand for a code—the law of Moses—meant to the prophets something quite different from a code. It meant "pointing out," "direction"—the direction of living men by a living God. [Compare Lecture IV of *Studies in Christian Philosophy*; W. R. Matthews—and what Hadfield says about the function of the ideal in *Psychology and Morals*]. It meant a transcendent and inexhaustible ideal, not altogether outside man's mind—for God can write it there [Jer. xxxi, 33], but too big for man to grasp and codify—transcendent because it is taught or suggested by a transcendent God. [Compare Isaiah ii, 3; xlii, 4; li, 7].²

¹In such cases Revised Version sometimes—not always—has a correct rendering in the margin; e.g., in Isaiah ii, 3.

²To the prophets "the Torah of Yahweh" meant a transcendent ideal. It was the doctrine of verbal inspiration which later caused the word to be specially applied to the Mosaic code or law. Paul clearly distinguishes between the Prophetic and verbal inspirationist meanings of Torah when he says—"The living, spiritual, law, i.e., ideal (Torah in Prophetic sense) in Christ Jesus made me free from the sin producing, death-dealing law, i.e. code (Torah in verbal inspirationist sense)."

CHAPTER XIII

BY the close of the sixth century B.C. the spirit of Yahweh is looked upon, not as a sudden, capricious, fitful force, but as an abiding presence.¹ So in Haggai ii, 5, Yahweh says—"My spirit abideth among you"—and in Zechariah iv, 6—"Not by an army, nor by power (or 'force') but by my spirit."

Significant is Haggai i, 14—in the account of the rebuilding of the Temple. The psychology of Haggai is different from that of the editors of "Judges." He does not say that the spirit of Yahweh leaped on, put on like a garment, or came on Zerubbabel. He says—"Yahweh stirred up (or 'aroused' or 'awakened') the spirit of Zerubbabel." No longer are all the outcroppings of the unconscious attributed to Yahweh. In fact the spirit—*ruach*—mentioned is not Yahweh's but Zerubbabel's. Yahweh works in a man's unconscious as he works in nature. But he is holy—"qadosh"—"apart"—"distinct" and distinguishable from the unconscious and from nature.^{2 3}

¹Such is the ideal expressed in the highest idealisation of Moses and in the figure of the servant of Yahweh. The ideal was never historically realised in the Old Testament. The uncanniness of the prophets suggests the fitfulness of their inspiration.

If inspiration ceases to be fitful, it ceases to be uncanny. See John i, 33.

²In Numbers xiv, 24—JE—"another spirit (*Ruach*) with" Caleb—"spirit" seems to mean "temper," "morale." (Cf.

Thus we reach a stage in Old Testament history which reminds us of the stage in New Testament history when Paul demands that the spirits of the prophets shall be under the control of the prophets, and John teaches men how to test the spirits whether they come from God.

Man is not to confound the mere outcroppings of his own unconscious with the voice of God. He is not to be the slave of his impulses, but to control them. Psychology shows that a repression, a dissociation, is not under control of the will. No one who, like Shakespeare's King Lear, "hath ever but slenderly known himself," can control himself. Man can only govern himself in so far as he knows himself—it is only when he recognises his instincts for what they are, that he can sublimate them. Therefore the authors of Psalm xix and Psalm cxxxix pray to God to search out and show

Gen. xxvi, 35; Exod. vi, 9—and for "with" see Leut. xv, 9; Job x, 13; xxiii, 14).

But in II Kings ii, 15—D—we find the Ruach of Elijah resting on Elisha, apparently as a permanent endowment; see verse 9. (Compare—or perhaps contrast—Numbers xi 17, 25—JE.). Indeed in the account of Elijah—D—the Ruach of Yahweh means the wind; when the spirit of inspiration is referred to, it is called the Ruach of Elijah. See I Kings xviii, 12; xix, 11; II Kings ii, 9, 15, 16.

Ezekiel perhaps distinguishes between the Ruach of Yahweh and the Ruach of men. See Ezekiel xviii, 31; xxxvi, 26 to 27.

For Psychology, similar to Haggai's, in later literature, see Ezra i, 1, 15; I Chron. v, 26; II Chron. xxi, 16. In Psalm li, 10 and 11, God's Ruach and man's Ruach are distinguished; cf. Romans viii, 16. But note older psychology of II Chron. xv, 1; xxiv, 20; I Chron. xii, 18, where Hebrew is "a spirit."

*For the unconscious mind see Micah ii, 11; Jer. xvii, 9 to 10; xxiii, 9 to 40; Ezek. xiii; Isaiah lvii, 20; Exod. xxxv, 21; Prov. xvi, 32; xviii, 8; xx, 27, 30; Eccles. x, 4; Psalm v, 9; xix, 12; xxxix, 1 to 3; xlv. 21; li, 10 to 12, 17; lxiv, 6; xc, 8; cxxxix, 23 to 24; Ecclesiasticus xxvii, 6; Note particularly the "inspiration" (false to the author) of Eliphaz in Job iv, 12 to 21; cf. xx, 2 to 3; xxxii, 18 to 22, where Elihu seems to be pressed to speak just as much as Jeremiah was.

them their unconscious minds. "Search me, O God, and know my mind (i.e. my unconscious mind); try me and know my thoughts." [Psalm cxxxix, 23, 24].

The word "ruach" often stands for what we call the unconscious. It is common in Proverbs; e.g. in xvi, 32—"He that ruleth his spirit (is better) than he that taketh a city."

Yahweh is holy—qadosh. He is "distinct" from the inconsistencies of men; he is consistently righteous. He is "distinct" from the forces of nature; he is transcendent, creative. He is "distinct" from the mere outcroppings of man's unconscious; he "suggests" good thoughts to man's unconscious.

Not only is Yahweh holy—the Israelites also are to be holy. The holiness demanded of the Israelites is still largely ceremonial. But, whereas in Exodus xxii, 31—in an early code—"Ye shall be holy men unto me: therefore ye shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field"—the holiness demanded of the Israelites was predominantly ceremonial, there is a bigger view in the "Holiness Code"¹ (later included in P), which was probably compiled during the exile. "Ye shall be holy; for I Yahweh your God am holy"—demands both a ceremonial and a moral holiness. The "Holiness Code" demands that the Israelites shall be like Yahweh. There is here a suggestion that man is created to be himself a creator—to be, not a victim of circumstance, but its master. "Holiness" now is not only concerned with ritual; it implies a moral ideal and personality.

The earlier prophets were concerned with the nation rather than with the individual man. But

¹ "Holiness Code"—Leviticus, chapters 17 to 26.

the life of Jeremiah—his hopes of a new covenant under which every Israelite would know Yahweh personally—the fall of Jerusalem, involving the end of the Yahweh religion as a purely national religion—the constant strain put by daily experience on Deuteronomic “orthodoxy”—the sharing in the religious experience of the prophets by psalmists and others—all these things gradually brought the individual to the front.

Ezekiel declares that all “souls” (plural of *nephesh*) belong to Yahweh.

The “Servant of Yahweh” will not be vindicated till after his death [Isaiah liii, 10 to 12]. Job,¹ though his children—his immortality substitute—have been cut off, is confident that God will somehow vindicate him—prove him to be in the right—after his death. His name rather than his children will be his immortality substitute. So in III Isaiah (lvi, 4), Yahweh will give to eunuchs who are faithful to his covenant, a monument and name that is better than sons and daughters—an enduring name which shall not be cut off. In Ecclesiasticus² xlv, 11 to 14, the righteous man’s substitute for immortality consists both in children and also in a good name. But in xvi, 3, it is better to die childless than to have ungodly children, and in xli, 13, “a good name continueth for ever.”

At first the thought of the individual was lost in the thought of the nation. In Exodus iv, 22 and Hosea xi, 1, it was Israel, the nation, that was regarded as Yahweh’s son. In II Samuel vii the national sonship of Israel to Yahweh was concentrated in the dynasty of David; it was the reigning King of Israel who was regarded as Yahweh’s son.

¹Date of book of Job perhaps about 400 B.C.

²About 200 B.C.

But in Proverbs iii, 12, Yahweh may regard an ordinary Israelite "as a father the son in whom he delighteth." To Ben Sirach God is the father of the individual righteous Israelite. [See Ecclesiasticus iv, 10; xxiii, 1]. In "Wisdom" any righteous man is son of God. [See Wisdom ii, 16, 18, and v, 5].

Thus later writers make explicit the thought which is on the whole implicit¹ rather than explicit in the teaching of the prophets, the thought that the living God is immensely interested in the personality of the individual man.

The growth of the belief that there is a resurrection of the individual, followed naturally the growth of the belief that God is immensely interested in the individual.

There is no "philosophical" argument in the Old Testament to prove that there is a life worth living for the individual beyond the grave. To such writers as accept the belief, as to Jesus [Mark xii, 26 to 27], the only reason for believing in a future life is the character of God, revealed in history and individual experience.

To traditional Hebrew thought God is ruach, spirit, and man is basar, flesh. Man only lives while the ruach of Yahweh is in him. He is not naturally immortal. Man's nephesh—soul, instincts—has no independent existence; it is no metaphysical entity. To Hebrew thought, as to Jung, "the soul is wholly only libido It is 'to wish'"; and this soul depends wholly on the ruach (spirit) of God. According to the traditional

¹It is not till the time of Ezekiel that the thought that Yahweh is immensely interested in the individual Israelite, becomes *explicit*. But it is *implicit* in the teaching of Amos. For Yahweh's demand for justice implies that the weak and the poor have rights, that they are *persons* who count with Yahweh.

psychology "when the spirit is withdrawn the personality is extinguished at death. This dissolution of the personality at death is frankly recognised in Ecclesiastes xii, 7, and the impersonal breath of life returns to the Supreme Fount of life: the spirit shall return to God who gave it."¹ (Charles—*Between the Old and New Testaments*.)

The Hebrew view of the soul is diametrically opposed to Plato's view of the soul.² Far from being inherently immortal, the soul is inherently mortal. "Flesh and blood"—blood being the materialized nephesh or soul—is a typical phrase to describe mortality, transitoriness, weakness. Thus, to Paul, "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God."

Continuance of life—eternal life i.e. enduring life—is utterly dependent on the ruach of God. At first it was only the life of the nation which was felt to be enduring, eternal. Thus in Haggai ii, 5, the ruach of Yahweh stands firm among the restored exiles.

But Ezekiel xxxvii, 1 to 14, had pictured the restoration as a national resurrection. So when the growing sense of personality had led the Jews to realise that Yahweh was immensely interested in the individual man, the thought of the national

¹Such a psychology is implied by all such doctrines of the resurrection as regard the dead as being asleep between their death and the resurrection. Note, for instance, Matt. xxvii, 52, 53.

²In the Book of "Wisdom" the world view is often Greek rather than Hebrew. Note viii, 19 to 20. "Now I was a goodly child, and a good soul fell to my lot; nay, rather, being good, I came into a body undefiled." Here we have Plato's view of the pre-existence of the soul. In ix, 15, "a corruptible body weigheth down the soul." In such passages man is an imprisoned soul, and the Greek view of immortality rather than the Hebrew view of resurrection, is suggested.

resurrection of Israel assisted the thought of the resurrection of the individual man.

The Hebrew thought of a resurrection differed from the Greek thought of immortality, both in that the resurrection was to the Hebrews, not something metaphysically implied by the existence of the soul, but something transcendent—due to the action of the transcendent God, and also in that the Hebrew thought of a resurrection applied, not merely to the intellect, but also to the whole personality of man.

The resurrection was at first thought of as the re-animating of the dead dust which had once formed the bodies of the dead. Thus, in a passage the date of which is probably about 330 B.C. or later, the dead are reborn from the earth [Isaiah xxvi, 19]; and in Daniel xii, 2 (166 B.C.) "many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake." In the former passage the resurrection is a new birth¹ of Rephaim—probably "powerless ones"—the dead bodies which lie without souls, without instincts, in Sheol. In the latter passage the resurrection is an awakening of bodies of martyrs and apostates, which are sleeping in the dusty ground. Clearly, therefore, the psychology of such writers is the traditional psychology and connects the personality of a man with the basar, "flesh," not with the ruach, "spirit," "breath," which deserts the man when he dies. Though these writers differ widely in their theology from the author of Ecclesiastes xii, 7, their psychology is the same as his. By them, therefore, the resurrection of the personality could only be expressed as a resurrection of the body or flesh. For, to the

¹Cf. comparison of the womb with the earth or with Sheol in Job i, 21; Job iii; Psalm cxxxix, 14 to 16; Ecclesiasticus xl, 1.

traditional Hebrew psychology, it is the body or flesh, animated by the breath of Yahweh, which is the man; a living human body is a living human personality.¹

But the teaching of the prophets had gradually brought to the front the thought of the value of the living *nephesh*, soul, to Yahweh. Ezekiel had declared that all souls (plural of *nephesh*) belong to Yahweh [Ezek. xviii, 4], and had even in xviii, 4, 20, associated a man's personality with his *nephesh*.² In P the word *nephesh*, soul, often occurs in the sense of "anyone."³ So it seems that a bigger psychology was gradually being developed.⁴

Moreover, though to early Hebrew thought Yahweh was *Ruach* and man was *basar*, yet Yahweh was not the only spiritual being. In a very old myth which forms part of J—[Genesis vi, 1 to 4]—the *bene ha-elohim*—"the sons of the gods"—="the gods,"⁵ who became the fathers of the giants, are regarded as inferior to Yahweh in power, but as similar to Yahweh in being not *basar* but *ruach*.

(Compare vision of Micaiah in I Kings xxii, 19. In Job, chapters 1 and 2, "the Satan" figures among the *bene ha-elohim*).

Many hold that in Psalm lviii, 1, and Psalm lxxxii, 1,⁶ 6, the "gods," or "sons of the Most High," were heathen deities, "regarded as the unseen

¹So in the Gospels the body or flesh stands for the personality. See Mark xiv, 22; John vi, 52 to 58.

²Cf. Micah vi, 7.

³e.g., it occurs five times in Leviticus v.

⁴For use of *lebab*, "heart," and *ruach*, "spirit," etc., see Psalm lxxiii, 26 and xxxi, 5.

⁵Cf. "the sons of the prophets" = "the members of the prophetic guilds, the members of the genus, 'prophet.'"

⁶See R.V. margin.

rulers of the heathen nations, responsible for the hostility they showed to Israel [see Is. xxiv, 21f; Dan. x, 13, 20f]" [*Peake's Commentary*, page 383].

Later these heathen gods became angels in a way not unlike that in which the gods of paganism sometimes became "saints." The doctrine of angels, satans, demons—a doctrine greatly developed under Persian influence—implied the existence of beings who were not basar but ruach.

But the term bene ha-elohim can mean, not only "the sons of the gods" i.e. "the gods," but also "the sons of God."¹

As soon, then, as it was felt that God was the father of the individual righteous Israelite, the thought lay near to hand that men were akin to, or to become equal to, the angels or bene ha-elohim.

"Whereas in the Old Testament and the literature of the second century the righteous were raised to live again on the present earth with glorified but earthly bodies, wherewith they could marry and be given in marriage, after 100 B.C. a transcendent view of the risen righteous is developed—the risen righteous enter immediately into heaven itself or an eternal Messianic kingdom in a new heaven and a new earth. To such spiritual abodes there could be no mere bodily resurrection. Hence, either there would only be a resurrection of the spirit, and the righteous would, as an old writer says, be as the angels of God in heaven, or else they would rise in garments of light and glory." *Between the Old and New Testaments*; Charles.

In Enoch xxii, 9ff—xlix, 3—ciii, 4, 8, etc., the ruach of a man is regarded as the essential part of him, and may descend to Sheol pending the final judgment. (Compare the psychology of

¹For Elohim means both "gods" and "God."

I Peter iii, 19—"the spirits in prison"). But this indicates a tremendous revolution in psychology. For according to such passages as these, man is no longer only basar, "flesh," he is also ruach, "spirit." But God is ruach. What then is man? He has clearly outgrown the traditional psychology and requires a new psychology.

The new psychology of the first century B.C. found an expression in Apocalyptic. For it is significant that the great period of Apocalyptic began about the time at which the thought of a resurrection of the individual became prominent. The Apocalypticist projected into the sky, the dwelling place of God, ideas which he felt to be too sublime to fit the old-fashioned view that man was merely flesh. In the book of Daniel the nations on earth are represented by spiritual counterparts projected into the sky. History on earth below depends on history in heaven above. It is because there is war in heaven, that there is war on earth. Israel is God's nation on the earth; but the spirit of the nation is projected into the sky and appears as "one like unto a son of man." Israel prevails on earth below, because "one like unto a son of man" comes with the clouds of heaven above.¹

But if nations, consisting of men of flesh and blood, have spiritual counterparts in the heavens, why should not the individual man, consisting of flesh and blood, have a spiritual counterpart in the heavens?²

At any rate in the New Testament Peter's "angel"

¹See Dan. vii, 2, 13 to 14, 26 to 27; x, 13, 20, 21; xii, 1.

²Long before it had been recorded that, while the Elisha of flesh and blood remained in his house, the leb ("heart")—"inner man"—of Elisha accompanied Gehazi in his pursuit of Naaman (II Kings v, 26.)

[Acts xii, 15] is the spiritual counterpart of the Peter of flesh and blood. The angels of the little ones—their ego's or spiritual counterparts in heaven—continually behold the face of God. And those who attain to the resurrection, are to be equal to the angels.¹ The "Angel," in this sense, is the spiritual counterpart of the "Adam" of flesh and blood.

Now their very conviction of the transcendence of God made it difficult for the Jews at the beginning of the Christian era to think of a kingdom of God within them. The old view of man had been monistic—essentially man was, not flesh and spirit, but flesh only. God was spirit and man was flesh. To the Apocalyptists, as to their ancestors, God is spirit. But man is not to the Apocalyptists, as he was to their ancestors, *merely* flesh. Man is both flesh and spirit. The Apocalyptists struggle to grasp a thought too big for the old psychology—"to bring the invisible full into play."²

Because the thought of man as spiritual was too sublime for the world view of their day, the Apocalyptists had to take a dualistic view of man—to project the spiritual into the sky. Hence the weirdness of their imagery. They had to "let the visible go to the dogs—what matters?"³ Before the spiritual could be conceived as being on earth, it had to be conceived, quite literally, as "looking like nothing on earth."

But Jesus taught that man must be born, not only of the flesh, but also of the spirit. The dualistic view of man was thus replaced by a sacramental view of man. Man being born, not only of the

¹According to this psychology the resurrection implies, not a fleshly, but a spiritual body (i.e., a "body," not of flesh *basar*, but of spirit *ruach*. See I Cor. xv, 44).

² ³"Old Pictures in Florence."—Browning.

flesh, but also of the spirit, the flesh becomes the outward and visible sign and instrument of the spirit.

Moreover, when the early Christians had learned to interpret their Master's eschatological teaching, no longer geographically, but psychologically, heaven ceased to be the sky. Thus in the fourth gospel the coming of the Son of Man with the clouds of heaven is understood psychologically. And in I Cor. iii, 16, Paul writes—"Know ye not that ye are a sanctuary of God, and that the spirit of God dwelleth in you?"

CHAPTER XIV

A SURVEY of the comparative science of religion is sufficient to demonstrate the uniqueness of prophetic or Hebrew thought. Teaching similar to parts of the prophetic teaching is found in all religions. But the combination of the ideas (*a*) of the living God, (*b*) of his transcendent ideal for man, and (*c*) of his immense interest both in human society and in the personality of the individual—this combination is admittedly unique.

It is sometimes said that Christianity became entangled in Jewish ideas, and that these ideas must be shed. It is suggested that we have outgrown the Old Testament. But the Jewish ideas which Christianity can conceivably shed without ceasing to be Christianity, are none of them part of the unique prophetic thought. It is true that the Church as a whole has not yet escaped from the trammels of certain ideas which at the beginning of the Christian era belonged to orthodox Judaism. But angelology, demonology, verbal inspiration, looking upon the moral ideal as a code, and similar ideas are not peculiarly Jewish. They are common to many religions. But the distinctively prophetic thought is fundamental to Christianity. The teaching of Jesus is unintelligible without it. It has been pointed out by T. H. Robinson¹ that in reading

¹*Prophecy and the Prophets in Ancient Israel.*

the New Testament it is necessary to pay attention, not only to the things which Jesus did say, but also to the things which he did not say—which he did not think it necessary to say—which both he and his hearers regarded as axioms. For it is not the prophet, but the popular orator, who stresses the things which both he and his hearers regard as axioms. Thus if the Old Testament is neglected, it is impossible to gain a balanced view of the teaching of Jesus.

On the other hand, some Psychologists assume dogmatically that Jesus never lived—that he is a mythical character, or consider themselves at liberty to suggest that the historicity of Jesus is doubtful. “Whatever time may reveal about the historical personality of the Founder of Christianity” says E. Jones in *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis*.

Now it seems to be assumed that if the historicity of Jesus were doubtful, we should be rid of the thought of the living God and of the inconveniences of a sense of responsibility and of a transcendent moral ideal. But should we? Suppose for a moment that we knew no more about the life of Jesus than we know about the life of Abraham or of Homer. Should we have escaped from a living God and a transcendent moral ideal? To secure our escape we should require, not only a “Jesus myth,” but also an “Amos myth,” a “Hosea myth,” an “Isaiah myth,” a “Jeremiah myth” and several other myths. We should also find it necessary to deal with the book of “Psalms” and much other literature.

Is the “mythical appetite” of any psychologist capable of really facing such a diet as this? If not, and if the New Testament be approached

through the Old Testament, a certain arbitrariness will become apparent in any treatment of history which denies the historicity of the greatest man of whom history tells, on the ground of his uniqueness. Would it be presumptuous to suggest that anyone who desires to account for Christianity by psychology, might advantageously, before giving his views to the public, devote a period of not less than three months to mastering (say) that portion of Peake's *One Volume Bible Commentary* which deals with the *Old Testament*?

Christians owe a debt of gratitude to the new psychologists for throwing a searching light on many of the ideas of God which have from time to time been looked upon as orthodox. The new psychology is as much needed and as iconoclastic as the D school. The "vindictive God" of much of the early Protestant theology, the "good natured God" of much of the modern theology, the "pacifist God" of the last few years, "the God who cannot suffer" of much of the Greek theology—all such abstractions appear remarkably unconvincing to anyone who has read something about the mother and father complexes, compensation, projection and the like.

But it is not only on belief that the new psychology throws a searching light; it throws an equally searching light on unbelief. For it is obvious to anyone who takes the trouble to study the Bible, that the God of the prophets and of Jesus is not a God in whom the "coward within us" wishes to believe.¹

It is often said that the Hebrews were not philosophers. But the correctness or incorrectness of this statement depends on the meaning we give to the word philosophy. Philosophy means love of

¹See *The New Psychology and the Preacher*. Crichton Miller.

wisdom. And it was the successors of the prophets who compiled the "Wisdom Literature." The uniqueness of the Hebrew conception of CHOKMAH ("wisdom") lies in its insistence that the ethical and personal are as significant as the logical. Chokmah implies ethical and personal values. Any philosophy to which the ethical and personal are less significant than the logical, is from the point of view of Hebrew chokmah a "philosophy falsely so called." For it is an abstract philosophy, a narrow-minded philosophy, a philosophy of psycho-neurotics who are "repressing" part of the data of experience. It is because he regards the sense of responsibility and the sense of personality as no less significant than the laws of mathematics, that the Hebrew Chakam (wise man) asserts—"The fear of Yahweh—that is wisdom; to depart from evil—that is intelligence."

It is a matter of simple history and daily experience that a man's belief or unbelief in the God of the prophets and of Jesus, depends ultimately on his acceptance or rejection of the Hebrew conception of Chokmah (wisdom).

For all thinkers must accept the laws of logic. Otherwise, no argument would be possible. But the mind cannot grasp either the moral ideal or living personalities as it can grasp the problems of "pure thought," such, for instance, as the problem—"What is two plus two?"

The moral ideal is Torah, "direction," in the prophetic sense of the word, and therefore cannot be reduced to a code. It does not exist complete in any one man's mind, nor does it exist complete in any generation's mind. The present generation will not tolerate evils such as child labour in mines, which a hundred years ago our ancestors took quite quietly. And it is certain that a hundred years

hence our descendants will refuse to tolerate many evils which scarcely move us to-day. This Torah introduces a disturbing, an incalculable, element which tends to upset the problems of "pure thought."¹

Nor can the intellect grasp living personalities. There is more in the smallest child than is dreamed of in all the systems of abstract philosophy. But it is easier to discuss philosophy—or theology—than to study and love living people. As Jung points out on page 107 of *Psychology of the Unconscious*, there is a "resistance against loving" which "produces the inability to love."

So some thinkers resent the intrusion of the thought of the moral ideal and of the sense of personality into the problem of the universe. Such thinkers "repress" the thought of these disturbing elements and solve the problem of the universe, more or less to their own satisfaction, without a Living God. Thus to a certain school of psychologists the belief in a transcendent moral ideal, in a sense of responsibility to someone, in a living God, is infantilism, and creeds are the supreme instance of rationalisation.

To the prophets it is inability to believe in a transcendent moral ideal, in a sense of responsibility to someone, and in a living God, which is infantilism—a cowardly refusal to grow up. It is unbelief which is the supreme instance of rationalisation.

It is impossible to reconcile these two views—"life's business being just the terrible choice."²

¹Elijah's ideal, for instance, is not behind him, but ahead of him. So far is he from longing for the "good old times" that, in a moment of despondency, he desires Yahweh to take away his life, on the ground that he has failed to become a better man than his fathers were when they lived on earth. (I Kings xix, 4.)

²Browning—The Pope.

CHAPTER XV

IN a melodrama the villain often thinks at a critical moment of the days when he was an innocent child, and laments his "fall." But modern psychology casts a somewhat lurid light on the alleged "innocence" of childhood, and shows that the villain's "virtuous period" is no more historical than the garden of Eden. When one laments the "innocence" of childhood, one laments a lost "potential" rather than a lost "actual"—"what might have been" rather than "what was." For the "innocence of childhood" is a projection on to the past of half-repressed ideals which one feels it too embarrassing to contemplate in the present—an attempt to compensate for the failure to do one's best to-day by dreaming of what might have been, if circumstances had been different in the past.

Modern psychology asserts that what is wrong with man, is, not that he has fallen, but that he has refused to grow up. Herein modern psychology has merely rediscovered the prophets. For the prophets are not interested in the story of the exclusion of Adam and Eve from the garden of Eden—what they are interested in is the story of Israel's refusal to respond to Yahweh's call in the days of Moses. What is wrong with Israel is most frequently pictured in the Old Testament in terms of the fixation of Israel on the irresponsibility, the self-gratification, the "do

as you please "¹—in a word, on the infantilism which is expressed by the term "the flesh pots of Egypt."

To Jeremiah there was a moment, in the days of Moses, when Israel responded to the call of Yahweh, her husband, and went (walked) after him in the wilderness [ii, 2]. But Israel has forsaken Yahweh, regressed to heathenism, and "played the harlot with many lovers" [iii, 1].

To Ezekiel [xvi, 3] Jerusalem's father was an Amorite and her mother a Hittite. The Jews shared their ancestors with the surrounding nations; just as, to modern scientists, man shares his ancestors with the anthropoid apes. But Jerusalem's fault lies, not in her ancestry, but in her refusal to respond to the call of Yahweh to rise above it. [See xvi, 1 to 34.]

The prophets' view of sin is, not the view which we find in the story of Adam, Eve and the serpent, but the view which we find in Psalm xcv, 7 to 10—"To-day, if ye will hear his voice, Harden not your heart, as at Meribah, As in the day of Massah in the wilderness: When your fathers tempted me, Proved me, and saw my work. Forty years long was I grieved with that generation, And said, It is a people that do err in their heart (mind), And they have not known my ways."

The prophets' mental picture of sin is based, not on the breaking of a taboo in an oasis, but on the refusal to march on with the living God into a desert.²

¹Cf. Rudyard Kipling.

The 'eathen in 'is blindness bows down to wood an' stone;
'E do'nt obey no orders unless they is 'is own.

²See Exod. xx, 19; xxxii, 1; Deut. v, 4 to 5, with which contrast Ezek. xx, 35; Deut. v, 24 to 31; xviii, 16; Amos v, 25; Hosea vi, 6; xiii, 12 to 13; Micah vi, 6 to 8; Isaiah xxx, 9 to 11; Jer. vii, 22 to 26.

Expressions like "original sin" and "the Fall"¹ seem to be equally unscientific and unprophetic. But they represent efforts to describe a psychological condition, the existence of which has been established scientifically enough by the observation of innumerable cases. For there is something wrong with man; but what is wrong with man is, both to the prophets and to the modern psychotherapists, not that he has ceased to be a child, but that he has remained one.² To the prophets man is suffering from arrested development or regression owing to his "rebellion" against God—his refusal to respond to the ever-widening ideal which God presents to him.^{3 4}

The repression of the thought of the living God is

¹Jesus cites both J's and P's creation stories to show that monogamy was an ideal implicit in the Old Testament religion from the beginning; but there is no reference in his teaching to J's story of the exclusion of Adam and Eve from the garden of Eden. The emphasis which has been laid on this latter story in Christian thought, is due to the fact that Paul, before he became a Christian, had been both influenced by the philosophy of Tarsus and also brought up in a school of Judaism whose views were in certain respects widely different from those of the prophets. It is, perhaps, worth while to point out that Paul often uses the word "flesh" in a sense different from that in which the Old Testament writers and the rest of the New Testament writers use it.

²Jesus teaches that men must become little children again—be born again—if they are to enter into the sovereignty of God. He teaches that a man must receive the sovereignty of God "as a little child." But what is the mark of a *healthy* child? The healthy child has no repressions, is willing to learn, and—*grows up*.

³It is to be remembered that fixation can take place, not only at the "mother phase," but also at the "father phase" or at "the group phase." From the point of view of the Bible, a man is a psycho-neurotic, not only if he retires to a world where he can turn stones into bread, but also if, worshipping his own libido, he seeks to alter the constitution of the universe at his own caprice, or if he bows down and worships the god of the group religion.

⁴See note at end of chapter.

often described in the Bible, in language not unlike that of modern psychology, as the "hardening" of the "heart" or "mind."¹

Now we know that a repressed instinct breaks out and obtains some kind of gratification in a perverted way.

It is misleading to speak of a religious instinct in dealing with the Bible, for the love of God is to

¹*The buried complex and its effects.*

Hosea xiii, 12 to 13.

Effect is described in Exod. xxxiv, 29 to 35, as veil (masweh) between face of Moses and people.

In Lam. iii, 65, as meginath leb—"a hard shell about the heart" (see Hebrew *Lexicon*, page 171).

In Exod. xxxii, 9; Deut. ix, 6; xxxi, 27; II Kings xvii, 14; as "stiffness of neck."

In Jer. vi, 10; ix, 26; Ezek. xlv, 7; as uncircumcision of mind or ears.

In Exod. iv, 21; ix, 12; as making mind rigid or hard (Chizzeq); cf. Exod. vii, 13, 22.

In Exod. ix, 34; x, 1; as making mind heavy, dull, unresponsive or insensible (Kibbed or Hikbid); cf. Exod. ix, 7.

In Exod. vii, 3; Psalm xcv, 8; as making mind "hard," "stiff," or "stubborn" (hiqshah) (same root as is used in "stiffness of neck"—see above).

In Deut. ii, 30, of making mind obstinate (immets); cf. Deut. xv, 7, where same verb is used of "repressing" sympathy for the poor.

In Isaiah vi, 10, as making mind fat (hishmin); cf. Jer. v, 28; Neh. ix, 25.

In Zech. vii, 12, as "adamant stone."

In Hosea ii, 8; v, 4; Isaiah vi, 9 to 10; xxviii, 13; xxix, 10 to 11, 14; Jer. v, 21; Ezek. xii, 2; Psalm xiv, 1; liii, 1; as inability to recognise God.

In Amos vi, 3; ix, 10; Psalm xcv, 10; as inability to face facts.

In Amos ii, 12; Jer. v, 31; Ezek. xiv, 4, 10; as muzzling the prophets and calling for popular preaching.

In Isaiah v, 20 to 21; Proverbs xiv, 12; xvi, 25; as perversion of conscience.

In Hosea throughout; Isaiah xlv, 18 to 20; Psalm cvi, 20; as idolatry.

In Ezek. xx, 25 to 26, as immoral religion.

In Habak. i, 16, as worship of an abstraction.

In Deut. xxxii, 5, as producing a "twisted and crooked generation."

include all the instincts—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole nephesh, soul,"—i.e., with all thy instincts.¹

But if perversion always follows the repression of one instinct, how much greater will be the perversion which follows the repression of them all!

The yearning of the whole nephesh for God, repressed from its proper objective, the living God, finds its gratification in a perversion, that is, in idolatry of some kind or other.

The popular idol in the days of Hosea was a golden bull representing Yahweh. Later on when the Deuteronomic Reformation had swept away the golden bull, the popular idol became a book, the law of Moses. According to the principle proclaimed by Hosea, the form of the idol is a mere detail; a Bible, a creed, an infallible Church, a "life force," "natural law," or a philosophical "absolute," are all idols or dead gods if they are regarded as substitutes for the living God; they are perversions of man's longing for the living God; and the cult of them is a "defence reaction" against growing up to face and love the living God.

Sin is, ultimately, "making through cowardice the great refusal"—a refusal followed by suspicion of life and of its author. For the suspicion of Yahweh—the desire to put him to the test [Deut. vi, 16; Psalm xcv, 8 and 9]—the failure to believe in him [Psalm lxxviii, 22]—are rationalisations. To the prophets, it is, not belief, but unbelief, which is the supreme instance of rationalisation.² Unbelief is the rationalisation of a selfish refusal.

¹Cf. Augustine—"Thou hast made us for thyself, and our souls are restless till they rest in thee."

²Contrast Tansley: *The New Psychology*.—"The rationalisation of religious beliefs that are to all appearance contradicted by experience of life constitute a regular system which we call

Therefore "to repent" in Hebrew is not merely "to change one's mind" (Greek *metanoein*), but *Shub* "to return." But he who returns, must return somewhither or to someone. "O Israel, return unto Yahweh, thy God"—says Hosea [xiv, 1]. The prodigal son's repentance does not consist in "coming to himself," but in going back to his father.

To the prophets, then, man is suffering from what we call a "buried complex"—due to his refusal to face and love the living God and to face himself.

How can he be cured of his complex—be delivered from that "resistance against loving" which "produces the inability to love"—be "justified" or put on right terms (*Tsaddiq*) with God? For repression is an unconscious process. A man is not aware of his own buried complex; otherwise it would not be a buried complex.

A man who is sick of a complex cannot cure himself unaided. He needs a psychotherapist.¹

Such is the view of the unknown author or authors of the "Songs of the Servant of Yahweh," which are found among the work of Deutero-Isaiah and Trito-Isaiah. These songs are (I) Isaiah xlii, 1 to 4—(II) Isaiah xlix, 1 to 6—(III) Isaiah l, 4 to 9—(IV) Isaiah lii, 13, to liii, 12—(V) Isaiah lxi, 1 to 4—(VI) Isaiah lxii, 1—(VII) Isaiah lxii, 6 to 7.

Christian apologetics. . . . When the system becomes too rigid, and tends to lose its hold owing to the growth of knowledge and the widening of mental outlook, instinctive attempts to meet the danger by timely concessions result in the development within the churches of such movements as those of 'liberal churchmanship,' the 'new theology' and 'modernism.'"

¹Cf. Hosea xiv, 1 to 4; Isaiah vi, 5 to 7; Deut. x, 16; xxx, 6; Jer. iv, 3 to 4; xxxi, 31 to 34; Ezek. vi, 9; xi, 19; xx, 43 to 44; xxxvi, 25 to 26, 31 to 32; Isaiah xxv, 7, a late passage; Joel ii, 13; Psalm cxxxix, 23 to 24; cxlvi, 8; cxlvii, 3; II Chron. xxxii, 31, comparing Deut. viii, 2.

We cannot discuss here the much debated question as to whether the author was thinking of the actual Israel as a martyr nation, of an ideal "remnant"—to use Isaiah's word—of keen Yahweh worshippers within the actual nation, or of an ideal Jeremiah. He is at any rate profoundly influenced by Jeremiah¹ and accepts vicarious suffering—the suffering of one on behalf of another—the suffering of the innocent on behalf of the guilty—as a fact of experience. He sketches the highest ideal of human character contained in the Old Testament.

Like Moses, to whom Yahweh used to speak, not symbolically in dreams and visions, but face to face as a man speaks to his neighbour, the "Servant of Yahweh" is, not an excitable Nabi [xlii, 2], but a disciple or intelligent pupil of Yahweh [1, 4].

Every morning Yahweh wakes him to speak to him; every morning he listens to Yahweh—[1, 4 to 5]. The spirit of Yahweh is upon him—not that he may perform prodigies of strength like Samson, nor even reign as a just king like Isaiah's ideal king [Isaiah xi, 1 ff]—but rather that he may be the world's psycho-therapist. [lxi, 1 to 4.]

The fourth "Servant Song" [Isaiah lii, 13, to liii, 12] reminds us of the Transference² which occurs

¹Cf. Isaiah xlix, 1, with Jer. i, 5—Isaiah xlix, 4, with Jer. xx, 7 to 12—Isaiah liii, 7, with Jer. xi, 19, but also with xii, 3. For discussion of date, etc., of the "Servant Songs," see *The Book of Isaiah*—Box—[Pitman].

²For Transference, see *Psycho-Analysis—A Brief Account of the Freudian Theory*—Barbara Low—"The patient re-lives, in feelings directed towards the analyst, many of his forgotten or hitherto unrecognized feelings towards persons who have been in intimate and significant relation to him (father, mother, sister, brother, nurse, etc.). Only through this evocation of feeling is it possible for the unrealized affects to come to light, to be studied, and finally to be adjusted to the patient's psyche as a whole. . . . Without Transference no effective analysis could take place, and no therapeutic work could be achieved.

in Psycho-therapy. Men work off on the Servant of Yahweh the emotions engendered by their repression of the thought of the living God. They are appalled at him [lii, 14], despise him [liii, 3], refuse to look at him [liii, 3], hate him mortally [liii, 7 to 9], listen in admiring wonder to him [lii, 15], are cured of their complex and put right (tsaddiq) with God [liii, 11].

As in Hosea, the word awon, "iniquity," seems to stand (a) for "unevenness" of the mind, the refusal to face the living God, the repression of the thought of him, and (b) for the perversion which results from such repression.

The perversion of us all is concentrated upon the Servant of Yahweh [liii, 6]. He is broken by it [liii, 5]. He bears our perversions [liii, 11].¹ The "Servant of Yahweh" bears the result of our wrong view of God—our desire for a dead God rather than a living God—a desire made evident by our view of mechanical retribution [liii, 4].

But the Servant of Yahweh, by pouring out his nephesh (soul), does what the priests, by pouring out the blood—the materialized nephesh [see Deut. xii, 23]—of animals could never do; he bears away the error of "many"² by enabling them to face it; he puts "many" "on right terms" (tsaddiq) with their God. But there is nothing magical about this "justification." It is the result, not of legal fiction, but of psychotherapy. Therefore there is nothing of fatalism about it. The patient may refuse the treatment as Ephraim in Hosea xiii, 13, refused to face the new birth.

. . . . The Transference may show itself in various aspects, as dominantly positive, negative, or (more usual) as a mixture of both."

¹Cf. Exod. xxviii, 38; xxviii, 43; Lev. x, 17; xvi, 22; Ezek. iv, 4, 5, 6; Num. xviii, 1, 23; Lam. v, 7.

²With "many" of Isaiah lii, 14, 15; liii, 11, 12, cf. Daniel xii, 3; Mark x, 45; xiv, 24.

It is by bearing our perversion that the " Servant of Yahweh " makes possible the cure of our complex. For his triumph [lii, 13] enables us, if we will, to face the result of our own conduct, see ourselves as we really are [liii, 6], experience the humiliating effect of such self-knowledge [lii, 15], and face the " arm " of Yahweh—that " weakness of God which is stronger than men." Thus it is by the Servant's stripes—the very stripes we ourselves have put upon him—that we are healed [liii, 5].

It is clear that to the author of the " Servant Songs " man needs something to be done for him which he cannot do for himself. The Servant of Yahweh is no mere projection of an endo-psychic conflict. True, he is not a historical figure. But he is no merely mythical hero like Mithra. Plato's ideal man (see *The Republic*—Book II) is perhaps the closest parallel in literature to the " Servant of Yahweh." But the figure of the Servant of Yahweh is dependent on the *history* of the prophets. Just as Isaiah's ideal king is an ideal figure, based on the David of history ; so the " Servant of Yahweh " is an ideal figure based on the prophets of history. It is agreed that great prophets, like Jeremiah, who had lived and suffered on the stage of history, were the artist's model, the raw material, from which the author of the " Servant Songs " created his ideal figure. Nor, as a matter of simple history, did the author's message appeal to the world at large until his ideal had been realised—" out there "—on the stage of history.

But once the ideal had been thus realised, the author's poems provided language in which men struggled to express the psychological value, in their own minds, of what had happened " out there "—on the stage of history.

It is a well-known saying that the Higher Criticism has rediscovered the prophets. Will it perhaps be said that the New Psychology has rediscovered the gospel ?

FOOTNOTE TO PAGE 198.

In the case of Israel the Nirvana Complex may be called the Egypt Complex. "Would that we had died by the hand of Yahweh in the land of Egypt when we sat by the flesh pots"—Exodus xvi, 3—said the Israelites to Moses when the life of the desert seemed hard to them. We may compare the Œdipus Complex of Freud and what Jung describes figuratively as "incest," i.e., the backward urge to childhood, to the purely animal life, to the absence of responsibility.

One can hardly fail to be struck by the similarity between parts of the teaching of Jung and parts of the teaching of the prophets. Thus Jung says—(*Psychology of the Unconscious*, page 147)—"A deep animosity seems to live in a man because a brutal law has separated him from the instinctive yielding to his desires and from the great beauty of the harmony of the animal nature."—Again—"The separation of the son from the mother signifies the separation of man from the generic consciousness of animals, from that infantile archaic thought characterized by the absence of individual consciousness." (page 166.) Jung has much stimulating teaching against the regressive longing for the "morally poisoned infantile atmosphere" (page 187). To him "what robs . . . life of its joy, is the poison of the retrospective longing, which harks back, in order to sink into its own depths." (page 245). And "indolence is the beginning of all vice, because in a condition of slothful dreaming the libido has abundant opportunity for sinking into itself" (page 252). "This indolence is . . . a passion" (page 108), and is "the resistance against loving" which "produces the inability to love"; and it is "the incapacity to love which robs mankind of his possibilities" (page 107).

Jung's ideal man seems to be sketched on page 215—"The sun, victoriously arising, tears itself away from the embrace and clasp, from the enveloping womb of the sea, and sinks again into the maternal sea, into night, the all-enveloping and the all-reproducing, leaving behind it the heights of mid-day and all its glorious works . . . in the morning of life man painfully tears himself loose from the mother, from the domestic hearth, to rise through battle to his heights. Not seeing his worst enemy in front of him, but bearing him within himself as a deadly longing for the depths within, for drowning in his own source, for becoming absorbed into the mother, his life is a constant struggle with death, a violent and transitory delivery from the always

lurking night. This death is no external enemy, but a deep personal longing for quiet and for the profound peace of non-existence, for a dreamless sleep in the ebb and flow of the sea of life. Even in his highest endeavour for harmony and equilibrium, for philosophic depths and artistic enthusiasm, he seeks death, immobility, satiety and rest. If, like Peirithoos, he tarries too long in this place of rest and peace, he is overcome by torpidity, and the poison of the serpent paralyses him for all time. If he is to live he must fight and sacrifice his longing for the past, in order to rise to his own heights. And having reached the noonday heights, he must also *sacrifice the love for his own achievement*, for he may not loiter. The sun also sacrifices its greatest strength in order to hasten onwards to the fruits of autumn, which are the seeds of immortality; fulfilled in children, in works, in posthumous fame, in a new order of things, all of which in their turn begin and complete the sun's course over again." *Psychology of the Unconscious* abounds with fine passages such as this. But Jung has no convincing theory as to the meaning of the conflict. "I merely venture to suggest"—he says—"that it may have been a question of a primitive separation of the pairs of opposites which are hidden in the will of life: the will for life and for death. It remains obscure what adaptation the primitive man tried to evade through introversion and regression to the parents: but, according to the analogy of the soul life in general, it may be assumed that the libido, which disturbed the initial equilibrium of becoming and of ceasing to be, had been stored up in the attempt to make an especially difficult adaptation, and from which it recedes even to-day" (*Psychology of the Unconscious*, page 257).—The prophets, on the contrary, are quite clear that the "adaptation" which man "tries to evade" is the "adaptation" to the living God. Moreover, there are passages in Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious* which force the question—Is Jung's ideal man suffering from "fixation" at the "father phase"? Is he a mere overgrown boy desiring to imitate the caprice of the primitive father? His "essential and highest ethical goal" (page 307, note 42) is "moral autonomy"—a term which might have provoked enquiries from Socrates. He has "replaced" "belief . . . by understanding" (page 145). He has no "positive creed"—no uncomfortable conviction, for instance, that Jesus was a real man who really lived—to make him feel himself "ethically inferior" (page 144). Never forgetting "the harsh speech of the first Napoleon, that the good God is always on the side of the heaviest artillery"—convinced that "not only is heaven no father and earth no mother and the people not brothers and sisters," but that "they represent hostile, destroying powers, to which we are abandoned the more surely, the more childishly and thoughtlessly we have entrusted ourselves to the so-called Fatherly hand of God" (page 144)—Jung's super-

man stands forth—magnificent as in 1914 to 1918—alone against the universe—illuminated by the limelight of his own libido—unvisited by a sense of humour.

Like Ephraim in the days of Hosea, he finds "the unhappy combination of religion and morality" a "stumbling block." Unlike Isaiah, who faced this "stumbling block" and found it to be, not a "stumbling block" after all, but a "foundation stone" (Isaiah xxviii, 16 to 17; cf. viii, 14); Jung's superman refuses to face the "combination." So, because he remains "fixated" at the "father phase," he appears to be in danger of regressing, just as Ephraim regressed, to the "mother phase"—of becoming involved in that "moral degeneracy" which Jung declares to have been a mark of the first century of the Christian era, when "sexuality lay only too close to the relations of people with each other" (page 41). For Jung's superman is convinced that "nature has *first claim* on man; only long afterwards does the luxury of intellect come." He has "a natural conception of life, in which the normal demands of men are thoroughly kept in mind, so that the desires of the animal sphere may no longer be compelled to drag down into their service the high gifts of the intellectual sphere in order to find an outlet" (page 189). [One wonders what is to be the fate of the parental instinct.]

The contrast between Jung and the prophets is strikingly clear from a comparison of *Psychology of the Unconscious*, page 287, note 66, and Hosea iv. Jung laments that "the erotic adventures necessary for so many people are often all too easily given up because of moral opposition." Hosea, to whom (see Hosea ix) the sex instinct cannot be separated from the parental instinct, looks upon the home as the basis of society and declares that Yahweh does require the highest sexual morality, not only of women, but also of men. (Cf. Mark x, 1 to 12.)

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
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